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Executive summary 
This research project was conducted between April 2017 and February 2018, aiming to 
answer the following research questions: 
1. What modalities of reception drive what kind of gendered wellbeing outcomes for 
refugee and host communities in cities across Jordan and Lebanon? What explains 
for these outcomes? 
2. In what ways can policymakers, practitioners and donors support modalities of 
reception that promote gender equitable, improved wellbeing outcomes for urban 
refugees and host communities? 
The project used the Bath Wellbeing in Development framework to analyse material, 
relational and subjective wellbeing outcomes for hosts and refugee groups. It conducted a 
systematic review of secondary materials, and combined this novel analysis of existing 
datasets for Syrian refugees in Jordan, a synthesis of policy analyses and a limited set of 
semi-structured interviews with key policy and practice stakeholders. The project also 
developed a Participatory Video together with host and refugee communities in Lebanon. 
Here we present some of the synthesis findings from the research, capturing the connections 
between modalities of reception and gendered wellbeing outcomes. 
Urban modalities of reception 
The war in Syria, now in its eighth year, has led to the mass exodus of the Syrian people. 
Lebanon and Jordan have achieved a remarkable feat by hosting millions of refugees, with 
many having located to urban areas, where the great majority of local populations are 
already situated. The war has slowed down the Lebanese and Jordanian economies. 
Simultaneously, the refugee influx has put tremendous pressure on urban systems providing 
housing and basic services (health, education, water, sanitation, electricity and waste 
collection) that were already strained prior to the crisis. The mass arrival has seen 
accelerated house rent inflation, severely diminished water supplies, daily power outages, 
higher unemployment rates, rising poverty, and the inability of health-care and education 
providers to cope with demand. Charged regional politics are severely challenging delicate 
societal and inter-communal harmony. There are large discrepancies in perceptions of 
inequality and threats between Syrian refugees and host groups. Many refugees complain 
about their discriminatory treatment by local business and state institutions, whereas hosts 
consider Syrian refugees as disproportionately benefiting from international aid and an 
economic threat. 
We broadly conceptualised ‘modalities of reception’ comprising of those (formal and informal) 
arrangements, policies, programmes and implementation practices that constitute more or 
less enabling environments for refugee and host communities to enjoy safe, dignified and 
worthwhile lives and to achieve wellbeing, as people themselves define this. 
The relations that Syrian refugees have with governments in Jordan and Lebanon often 
involve national level authorities, as both countries have highly centralised policymaking 
processes. Frequent changes in national policies and complex bureaucratic processes (e.g. 
regarding registration, residency, work) make it hard for refugees to both stay updated on 
their obligations regarding temporary stay, and entitlements and protections that may be 
enjoyed. Moreover, government officials have a significant level of discretion in applying 
policies, creating further uncertainty, arbitrariness and unevenness in their application. 
Yet, relations with local urban/municipal authorities are important too, as the latter bear the 
brunt of dealing with the everyday challenges that the refugee influx poses. Local responses 
are, however, largely ad hoc, and little evidence is discerned of self-initiated strategic plans 
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or policies to manage the influx. In Lebanon but not in Jordan, mayoral initiatives were noted, 
apparently generating both positive (e.g. hosting social events for hosts and refugees) and 
negative (e.g. curfews; closure of informal businesses) wellbeing outcomes. However, while 
likely to be significant, these occasions are poorly documented and their wellbeing effects 
under-analysed. 
In the early years of the crisis, humanitarian actors largely sidestepped municipalities, facing 
both low capacity and centralisation of policy. However, it is increasingly recognised that this 
is not sustainable and while many new initiatives have emerged that do better, there are 
opportunities to take better stock of lessons learnt from these efforts. 
Informal settlements attract the poorest Syrian refugees and other migrants, but also poor 
Jordanians and Lebanese, precisely because they offer the most affordable housing (and 
sometimes a place of anonymous refuge). However, neither Jordan nor Lebanon has a 
national urban policy and both consider informal settlements undesirable. Urban planning is 
weak in both countries, but whereas Jordan has undertaken efforts in promoting social 
housing and upgrading informal settlements, in Lebanon the state has been highly 
ambivalent towards the latter. Thus, whereas Palestinian camps are not provided with 
services such as electricity, water and sanitation, etc., informal settlements raised by 
Lebanese internal migrants who are able to politically organise vis-à-vis the state have 
achieved some provisioning over time. 
In urban and peri-urban informal settlements of various forms, assemblages of actors 
(private, aid, government, non-government, faith based organisations, NGOs) are involved in 
a wide range of service provision to poor hosts and Syrian refugees – from security, to 
housing, education, etc. The terms under which these occur diverge by location and by 
population, and their wellbeing effects are generally not very well understood. 
Evidence synthesised in this study suggests that urban modalities of reception are based on 
who one is but also where one is. Reception differs spatially between and within cities, 
especially in Lebanon. Thus, for instance in Beirut, Palestinian unofficial ‘gatherings’, 
Palestinian camps and informal settlements all are governed by different actors, whose 
territorial dominance generates different ways of rule, and distinct relations to city 
governments, utilities, and other formal actors to result in a patchwork of negotiated, and 
highly localised provisioning of services. Similarly, peri-urban informal tented settlements on 
private land are idiosyncratically governed by their owners. 
Urban informal institutions have historically emerged to provide critical services and forms of 
political representation for refugees and internally displaced groups and migrants. They 
generate ‘solutions’ that seek to work around the constraints posed by formal policy positions 
that have historically emerged. For instance, mediators and municipalities find ways to allow 
for housing maintenance in unofficial Palestinian gatherings. While these urban informal 
institutions perform important functions for their constituencies, their treatment of Syrian and 
minority host populations are not necessarily equitable, and greater understanding is needed 
of their wellbeing effects on the most vulnerable groups. 
Border regimes, registration and residency: effects on wellbeing 
The current (and possible future) modalities of reception for Syrians can be understood with 
reference to historical ways in which influxes of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees were politically 
and administratively managed. Whereas Jordan has extended citizenship rights to most 
Palestinian refugees, Lebanon has steadfastly resisted this. Consequently, the enduringly 
temporary status of Palestinian refugees in urban Lebanon, spanning multiple generations 
(since 1948), is characterised by severe and multiple overlapping vulnerabilities, including 
limited entitlements to work, health care, higher education and lacking social and political 
rights and structural discrimination. 
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Nationality, wealth and religious affiliation emerge as factors in modalities of reception for 
refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. In the absence of refugee or asylum law, Jordan and 
Lebanon consider refugees and asylum seekers foremost as ‘foreigners’, where nationality 
serves as a primary source from which civil rights and entitlements are derived. 
Consequently, within the same host country, people fleeing from Syria are not all treated 
equally. Palestinian refugees from Syria have been received on less generous terms than 
people bearing the Syrian nationality. From early on in the conflict, borders have been shut 
for Palestinian refugees from Syria in both Jordan and Lebanon. Moreover, we find some 
evidence that distinct modalities of reception were based on wealth and religious affiliation, 
for Syrians, and historically with Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. 
Interlocking public policies regarding border crossings, processes of registration, status 
determination and legal residency determine Syrians’ access to housing, economic 
participation and legal identity. For instance, policy sets out that the nature of a person’s 
entry into the host country, via an official or unofficial border crossing, interacts with policy 
that shapes the processes and options for gaining access to housing (in host communities vs 
obligatory encampment in Jordan), or towards obtaining temporary legal residency status 
(Lebanon, Jordan). Residency policy in turn determines the possibility for parents to find 
legal work and to register child births. 
Public policy and diffuse implementation practices have made it difficult for a significant 
share of Syrian refugees to obtain and retain legal residency status, through imposition of 
regular fees and sponsorship requirements for those not registered with UNHCR (Lebanon), 
and officials retaining and misplacing identity documents (Jordan). Irregular residency status 
is a key factor in producing material and subjective wellbeing failures: it reduces people’s 
mobility – in particular affecting the menfolk – access to basic services, formal work, and 
exposing people to arrest, detention and deportation; labour exploitation and sexual abuse 
(particularly women and girls); an inability to turn to the authorities for protection or redress; 
and psychological anxieties. It also inhibits registrations of marriages and births, to risk 
thousands of newborns becoming stateless, and structural vulnerability in the future. 
Recent policy efforts, following multi-year compacts with the EU and the international donor 
community, seem to enable more Syrians to gain legal residency, though data on this are not 
yet available (Lebanon), and some groups are excluded from this arrangement and remain 
highly vulnerable. 
In the absence of legal protections, cultural notions of hospitality have had important 
symbolic and practical significance for dealing with the Syrian influx by buffeting relational 
wellbeing. Enduring displacement and financial and social pressures faced by host groups 
has, however, put significant strain on hospitality, with host communities struggling to live up 
to cultural ideals of hosting, and a gradual social re-categorisation is taking place that 
considers Syrians less “guests” and more “refugees”, and less worthy of support. The 
terminology of “guests” connotes hospitality, but also the temporary nature of refugees’ 
presence in the country, and does not imply the granting of legal rights. 
Housing and wellbeing 
While Jordan has made a significant effort at encampment and Lebanon adopted a ‘no-camp 
policy’, in both countries a significant majority of people have ended up living in urban and 
peri-urban areas. For Syrian refugees, living conditions vary widely. The main housing 
options available are: (1) rental housing; (2) squatting in and further overcrowding one of 
UNRWA’s camps for Palestinian refugees and in unofficial ‘Palestinian gatherings’; (3) 
forming or joining informal tented settlements (ITS) on rented private or public land (often in 
conjunction with providing low-wage labour; (4) living with local hosts; or (5) camps (Jordan 
only). Each of the options presents its own wellbeing challenges, and they collectively fail to 
meet the need for housing. 
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In Jordan, refugees face trade-offs between modalities of reception that offer provision of 
shelter and subsistence but little mobility or opportunity to exercise agency (camps), and 
living in cities which offers greater autonomy and opportunity for improvement, but that also 
entails the risk of a more precarious existence. 
The extra population influx of Syrians has placed substantial additional pressure on already 
inadequate urban basic infrastructure servicing the host populations, while the unavailability 
of affordable housing has meant that property rents have rapidly increased, and are a key 
cause of worries and anxieties for both host and refugee communities. The psychological 
pressures that high and rising housing rents generate leads to frequent relocation, potentially 
making it harder for social networks, important to everyday relational wellbeing, to take root 
and inhibiting social cohesion. Moreover, this housing deficit further underpins the 
disproportionally powerful position of landlords versus refugee tenants, enabling abuse, 
violence and arbitrary treatment. 
The pressures of housing rents have made the relatively low-rent conditions of official and 
unofficial Palestinian camps and gatherings in cities attractive to the poorest host, Syrian and 
other migrant groups, diversifying its populations. This also involves a growing densification 
of poor urban neighbourhoods and a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of living conditions. Subject 
to historic policy neglect, in Lebanon, urban Palestinian camps have weak physical 
infrastructures, substandard housing and are overcrowded, yet offer low rents, and relative 
anonymity and security for those unable to acquire or maintain legal residence status. 
Overcrowded, unsanitary and unsafe living conditions, affect subjective wellbeing in various 
ways. Worries and anxiety about one’s ability to pay the rent now and in future are common. 
Overcrowded housing limits privacy, dignity and affects people’s peace of mind, while the 
lack of safety outside, and the risk of arrest by security forces and the police due to one’s 
irregular legal status immobilises and keeps women and girls in particular confined to their 
homes, with many living in extreme social isolation. Refugees linked cramped living 
conditions to their psychological health, the occurrence of family conflict, domestic violence 
(to which women are particularly subjected), and rebellious and badly behaved children. 
Outside the home too, lack of safety and threats to personal and bodily integrity are key 
wellbeing concerns of both hosts and Syrian refugees, and particularly to girls and women. 
Displaced populations are often affected by a heightened risk of violence within the displaced 
community, between host and displaced communities and with the authorities. The risk of 
violence is associated with family separation, overcrowded living spaces, poor social 
cohesion, unsafe shelter, gender-based discrimination, limited rights and protection services, 
and changes in traditional gender roles that accompany displacement. Competition for 
economic resources have played a role in violent clashes in urban camps in Lebanon. 
Legal safeguards are largely absent and judicial systems weakly equipped to offer protection 
to refugees. 
Economic participation and wellbeing 
Economic participation is critical for the wellbeing of refugee and host communities. 
Humanitarian assistance is neither designed nor sufficient to provide for the full scope of 
refugee needs. Work is critical for catering to basic needs and material wellbeing, but also 
potentially offers the perspective for longer term improvement, provided the terms under 
which work is engaged in are conducive. 
Public policies in Lebanon and Jordan are geared to protect the formal sector economic 
interests of the host communities, in the shape of work permits and professions restricted to 
these populations. In Jordan, since the end of 2015 access to formal jobs has been 
facilitated by the Government as part of the Jordan Compact with donors. Nevertheless, 
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refugees have had to primarily rely on the informal sector for work. This meant that poorer 
Jordanians, Lebanese and other migrants who were already working in the informal sector 
had to bear the costs of growing labour supplies, through falling wages and loss of jobs. 
The relational wellbeing of refugees with regard to interaction with the host populations are 
defined by the tensions, real or perceived, that have been created not only by the increased 
competition for jobs, but also by competition for other resources. Labour markets are a key 
point of friction and these frictions have increased with time, generating increasing levels of 
negative relational wellbeing. 
Economic participation in the informal sector was possible only if the refugees were prepared 
to bear significant risks of exploitation. In addition to lower pay, which the poorer locals also 
had to endure, other forms of exploitation such as longer hours of work, poor labour 
conditions, rights violations and use of child labour, are common. Under the kefala system, in 
operation in various forms in Lebanon and Jordan, migrant workers require a domestic 
sponsor for obtaining a work visa. The relationship between these workers and their 
employers is characterised by structural power inequalities. As legal status is dependent on 
continued employer support, the conditions are fertile for abuse, particularly in the absence 
of effective policing and judicial protection. 
The lack of economic opportunity and the inability to fulfil the traditional role of breadwinner 
of a household has negatively affected men’s subjective wellbeing. Their anxieties and 
frustrations have perversely spilled over to other members of the households in the form of 
domestic violence. The use of child labour as a negative coping mechanism to secure some 
form of economic participation achieved the desired effect only at a substantial psychosocial 
cost. This type of trade-off between material and subjective elements of household wellbeing 
was common. Syrian boys were the most exploited in the labour market but girls, because of 
the gendered nature of economic opportunities available for them, were more at risk of child 
marriages. 
Since late 2015, in Jordan, the compact with donors has led to a concerted effort to issue 
200,000 work permits, formalising existing jobs and aiming to generate new jobs for 
Jordanians and Syrians. Its roll out is progressing, albeit not as fast as planned, and its 
effects are as yet unclear. Comparable efforts in Lebanon have focused on job creation and 
livelihoods, but have not led to policy change simplifying access to the formal labour market 
for Syrians. Portraying refugees as a resource that can be harnessed for the benefit of the 
host country is a strategy that is likely to improve relational wellbeing of refugees as well as 
the hosts. Both countries have specific example projects that have begun to look at refugees 
as a resource. 
1 
1 Introduction 
Cities, towns and urban areas play a central role in the dynamics of global refugee flows. 
They absorb more than two thirds of the refugee population across the world (IOM 2015: 78) 
and the volume of urban refugees is estimated to increase at a rate of 8 percent per annum 
(United Nations 2015). Cities have been critical too in the case of the ongoing Syrian refugee 
crisis (Mercy Corps 2014). Now in its eight year, the civil war has led to over 5 million Syrians 
fleeing the country, with another 6.5 million being internally displaced (http://www.unhcr.org/ 
uk/syria-emergency.html, accessed 30 November 2017). Besides the refugee influx, the war 
has significantly affected neighbouring countries by impeding cross border trade, slowing 
down economic growth in Lebanon and Jordan (EIU 2017a; 2017b). The World Bank (World 
Bank 2013: 1) estimated that during the 2012–14 period, the Syrian conflict could cut real 
GDP growth by 2.9 percentage points each year in Lebanon. It would further push 
approximately 170,000 Lebanese into poverty, while deepening the poverty of those already 
poor. The Syrian conflict has also led to the infiltration of extremist groups leading to regular, 
highly violent incidents, attacks and battles in Lebanon, and the fear of further spill-overs 
casts a significant shadow over refugee politics and social relations in host countries. 
Estimates suggest that over 85 per cent of Syrian refugees have settled in and around urban 
centres (Achilli 2015a), and their displacement has become protracted in most instances. By 
September 2017, Lebanon and Jordan had absorbed and given commendable hospitality to 
an extraordinary number of registered Syrians: respectively 1.001 million and 0.65 million 
(http://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html). Substantial additional numbers of 
displaced people remain unregistered. Their numbers are subject to much uncertainty and 
significant contestation (Lenner 2016; UNHCR et al. 2016). In addition, both countries have 
historically absorbed significant Palestinian and Iraqi refugee populations. The influx of 
Syrian refugees has added to already highly urbanised populations in Lebanon (83.7 per 
cent) and in Jordan (87.8 per cent) (United Nations 2014). For instance, Amman, the capital 
of Jordan, harbours more than 400,000 Syrians (EIU 2017a). However, the impact of mass 
displacement (driven by conflict or disasters) on host cities, and in particular on the resilience 
of the urban system, is not well understood (Kirbyshire et al. 2017). 
Significant proportions of Syrian refugees experience poor wellbeing (Scales et al. 2015). 
The refugee population influx combined with assistance gaps have affected a dramatic 
deterioration of living conditions for refugees and vulnerable host populations because of an 
exhaustion of the affordable housing market, stretched public services (water, electricity, 
education, health, solid waste collection, etc.), price inflation (Jordan) and wage depression. 
The World Cities report 2016 sets out that in 2014/15, 12.9 per cent of the urban population 
in Jordan was estimated to be living in slum areas, amounting to 808,000 people (UN-
HABITAT 2016). The urban poverty headcount rates amounted to 13.9 per cent in 2010, 
based on national poverty lines, which typically underestimate urban poverty incidence. In 
Lebanon, in 2014/15, 53.1 per cent of the urban population was estimated to be living in slum 
areas, amounting to 4.4 million people (ibid.). 
The Government of Lebanon’s (2016: 63) submission to the United Nations’ Habitat III 
conference notes that it has not recognised slums until today, and officially maintains the 
need for their dismantling. It further identified four types of slums in Lebanon. First, small 
pop-up gatherings of substandard housing near industrial and agricultural sites, found 
present in nearly all urban and rural areas of Lebanon. Second, large informal settlements 
are present as neighbourhoods in central and suburban areas of major cities. For instance, in 
Beirut, there are 24 informal neighbourhoods housing nearly 300,000 inhabitants (an 
estimated 20 per cent of the agglomeration’s population). Third, Palestinian refugee camps. 
Fourth, informal tented settlements, especially in rural areas and in urban peripheries. 
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While 15 per cent and 23 per cent of the working age populations in Jordan and Lebanon are 
unemployed, and 70 per cent of Syrian refugees live under the poverty line and 35 per cent 
are moderately/severely food insecure, competition over income-generating opportunities 
has grown sharply, challenging community relations (UNHCR et al. 2016). In Lebanon, for 
example, nearly 71 per cent of the surveyed host communities in cities perceived that public 
service conditions had worsened in their municipalities (Mercy Corps 2014). More than a one 
out of four million Lebanese nationals live below the poverty line, and it is estimated that a 
further 170,000 have been pushed into poverty by the unfolding Syrian crisis (World Bank 
2013). 
Cities may offer economic and social opportunities – however, they can also be places of 
rising inequalities, deprivation, poverty, isolation and exploitation. In conditions of scarcity 
and growing urban inequalities, greater understanding is needed of the ways in which people 
succeed or fail to make urban areas into places of belonging, participation and wellbeing. 
The limited understandings we have about how local urban dimensions shape wellbeing 
outcomes in conditions of protracted crises hinder a more effective humanitarian and 
developmental response. A key opportunity may be lost: 
Urban refugees could be highly beneficial to cities if they were allowed to pursue 
productive lives, absent legal restrictions, harassment, and insecurity … Host 
governments and UNHCR could do much to bring about positive outcomes without 
expending significant resources, and without placing the host society at a 
disadvantage. 
(Jacobsen 2006: 273) 
International recognition of the importance of urban areas in the protection of forced migrants 
and refugees is rapidly rising. The New Urban Agenda of UN-Habitat (2016) explicitly calls 
for inclusion of urban refugees within existing city structures, to help achieve the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goal 11: inclusive, sustainable and secure cities. But as 
cities and towns are now key settings for protracted displacement, humanitarianism faces a 
double challenge. Firstly, as the average period of displacement is now about two decades, 
responses need to turn from humanitarian relief to development. This requires taking a long 
term perspective that looks beyond immediate survival and protection needs, towards 
livelihoods, security and prosperity, underpinned by new sets of competences, mandates, 
and analytical and programmatic approaches. Humanitarian policy is beginning to recognise 
that forced displacement is primarily a ‘development issue with humanitarian elements – and 
not the other way around’ (Harild 2016: 5).1 One key aspect, highlighted by the World 
Humanitarian Summit (2016) concerns the ‘localisation agenda’: the need for a much richer 
appreciation of local context in responses. Arguably, the humanitarian system and its 
operating principle of human universality is poorly geared up to appreciate difference in 
people and their values, cultures and needs, and the ways in which people’s relations to 
others and to diverse holders of authority shape their lives. Secondly, humanitarianism is at 
the start of a process of coming to terms with ‘the urban’, as its bodies of knowledge, 
instruments and tools for intervention have historically been grounded in temporary rural 
(camp) conditions. This challenge to better understand the urban is, however, also faced by 
the development studies discipline (Parnell 2016). 
In this respect, urban studies and related disciplines have significant insights to offer. 
Urbanists highlight the complexities of urban systems, referring to, amongst others, the 
dynamics between high population fluxes, mobilities and densities; congested and contested 
use of public and private spaces; the significance and fluid relations between formality-
informality and the struggles for public authority by multiple actors. National and city 
                                                
1 The UNDP, for example, have taken a ‘resilience-based development approach’. This involves adopting a longer-term 
perspective from the outset, focusing on strengthening the capacity of communities to cope with the crisis through immediate 
emergency interventions and sustaining this recovery toward development (UNDP 2014). 
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governments, donors and non-state actors put in place policies, programmes and 
implementation practices, and various informal arrangements that establish environments 
within which refugees and host communities pursue wellbeing. 
We broadly conceptualised ‘modalities of reception’ comprising of those (formal and informal) 
arrangements, policies, programmes and implementation practices that constitute more or 
less enabling environments for refugee and host communities to enjoy safe, dignified and 
worthwhile lives and to achieve wellbeing, as people themselves define this. Modalities of 
reception need to be understood historically, and can vary by country, by city, by population 
groups and along gendered lines in terms of services (e.g. access to shelter, health, 
education and social protection), control over labour activities, and people’s mobility and 
freedom of movement. 
Globally, refugee studies show that ‘modalities of reception’ have significant impact on 
wellbeing for both refugee and host communities (Wallin and Ahlström 2005; Watters 2008, 
2001; Wimelius et al. 2017), often in a highly gendered way (Ellis et al. 2010; Rousseau et al. 
2004). The ‘refugee policies of the host government – or in cases where the central 
government’s remit is weak, the local authorities – is a key determinant of refugees’ 
vulnerability and their ability to pursue livelihoods’ (Jacobsen 2002: 101). Where the state 
fails to provide protection, a variety of other actors can be expected to fulfil such welfare 
functions (Davis 2004). For instance, non-state actors such as faith based organisations 
have been shown able to provide effective modes of reception (Ager, 2015). In urban 
contexts, the density and concentration of people may particularly facilitate a rich tapestry of 
organisations and rich variety of collective action responses. Formal and informal support 
modalities co-exist, but their interrelations and effects on wellbeing are poorly understood. 
Moreover, gendered institutional practices (e.g. by support agencies or FBOs) can have 
significant impacts on gendered outcomes (Kabeer 2013), while needs for support may differ 
by gender (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2013). In Jordan and Lebanon, significant 
heterogeneity exists in terms of institutional service delivery and governance between urban, 
peri-urban and rural areas (World Bank 2015), while some reports also note that local 
municipalities increasingly devise policies aiming to address the Syrian refugee crisis (Mercy 
Corps 2014). However, there is currently little comprehensive evidence that tells us how and 
why modalities of reception shape wellbeing outcomes for Syrians and host communities, 
and how to improve reception environments in cities. 
Accordingly, in this report, we aim to review, synthesise and strengthen the evidence base 
on dynamics and consequences of urban modalities of reception (including those supported 
by donors) for gendered wellbeing outcomes of refugee and host communities. We do so 
with the aim to support evidence informed decision-making by key actors managing the 
Syrian refugee crisis across cities in Jordan and Lebanon. As such, the report seeks to 
answer the following research questions: 
1. What modalities of reception drive what kind of gendered wellbeing outcomes for 
refugee and host communities in cities across Jordan and Lebanon? What explains 
for these outcomes? 
2. In what ways can policymakers, practitioners and donors support modalities of 
reception that promote gender equitable, improved wellbeing outcomes for urban 
refugees and host communities? 
Accordingly, this report investigates the possible ways in which the wellbeing outcomes of 
refugees and their hosts in Jordanian and Lebanese cities are shaped by modalities of 
refugee reception. The remainder of this report is structures as follows. This introductory 
section will be followed by section 2, which explains the background of refugee flows into 
Jordan and Lebanon. Section 3 explains the conceptual framework and this is followed by 
section 4, which outlines the methodological approaches used in this report to produce a 
nuanced analysis. Sections 5 (Lebanon) and 6 (Jordan) offer a detailed analysis of the 
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modalities of reception for Syrians living with hosts in urban areas. We briefly discuss 
general governance issues in the host countries to set the scene, then discuss national 
policies on three focal themes: borders/registration/legal status; housing; and economic 
participation. Finally, we will review local responses to the Syrian influx, including those of 
municipalities and non-state actors involved in governing urban spaces, to directly and/or 
indirectly affect the wellbeing of refugees. Next, section 7 provides a systematic analysis of 
the academic literature on wellbeing of refugees that had fled to Jordan and Lebanon over 
the last 20 years and presents findings across the three focal themes. Section 8 concludes 
the study and offers a set of recommendations for policy and research agendas. 
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2 Refugee flows in Jordan and Lebanon: A 
background 
Several years into the crisis, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt were hosting 95 per 
cent of the overall Syrian refugee flow (Achilli 2015). 
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of registered Syrian refugees in the region (Sullivan and 
Simpson 2017). 
Figure 2.1 Registered Syrian refugees in the region. 
 
Source: Sullivan and Simpson (2017). 
Consequently, Lebanon and Jordan are now amongst the countries with the highest ratios of 
registered refugees to overall population in the world (Kirbyshire et al. 2017). Table 2.1 
shows the total and relative shares Syrian refugees make up in (groups of) host countries. 
Table 2.1 Syrian refugee numbers in various host countries 
 EU US Germany Jordan Lebanon Turkey 
Syrian Refugees 1,322,825 16,218 476,510 1,265,000 1,017,433 2,764,500 
Total Population 508,000,000 318,900,000 80,620,000 9,523,000 4,467,000 74,930,000 
Per cent 0.26% 0.005% 0.59% 13.3% 22.8% 3.6%* 
*These figures are approximations based on UNHCR, Eurostat, and national census data. With any hidden and mobile 
population, especially politically controversial groups like refugees, estimations are based on the best available data. 
Source: Sullivan and Simpson (2017). 
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The Syrian influx has added to significant existing numbers of refugees and displaced people 
hosted in these countries. Jordan has hosted significant population influxes of Palestinian 
refugees, with estimates of 1.1 million arriving over time from Palestine (in 1948 and 1967) 
and Palestinian-origin Jordanians who had lived in the Gulf for decades (fleeing the Gulf war 
in 1991). In addition, Jordan has hosted thousands of Iraqis (following the first Gulf War as 
well as after the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 (Table 2.1). 29,191 Iraqi refugees were 
registered with UNHCR in Jordan, and 8,751 in Lebanon by 2012 (UNOCHA 2012). Some 
estimates suggest that around half of the population of Jordan is of Palestinian descent 
(Lenner 2016). 1.9 million Palestinians are registered with UNRWA (these include 
Palestinians born in Jordan). Unlike any other host country, Jordan granted most Palestinian 
refugees citizenship rights.2 Yet this has not quite resulted in citizenship on the basis of 
equality with Jordanian nationals (IRIN 2010). 
The Syrian civil war has doubly displaced Iraqis or Palestinians who had found refuge in 
Syria (Lenner 2016). Just ahead of the Syrian civil war, 427,000 Palestinian refugees were 
registered with UNRWA in Syria, many holding most of the same rights as the Syrian 
population, barring citizenship rights. Other UNHCR registered refugee groups in Jordan also 
increased from 28,070 in December 2013 (Bidinger et al. 2015) to 57,140 in December 2015 
(Saliba 2016). These include, in Jordan, 1,700 African refugees, including Sudanese, 
Egyptians and Somalis (Bidinger et al. 2015) and a growing number of Yemeni people that 
are in the country but have not necessarily applied for asylum. UNHCR’s April 2016 Jordan 
country update indicated that there are 3,852 Yemenis registered in the Kingdom (ARDD-
Legal Aid 2016a). 
Over 90 per cent of Syrians entering Jordan (and Lebanon) are families, and over half the 
population are children below 18 years of age (Bidinger et al. 2015). The large influxes to 
Jordan have been facilitated by several factors, such as its political stability, historical social, 
economic and cultural relationships between inhabitants of the two countries and refugees’ 
kinship and friendship ties in Jordan (Achilli 2015a). As Table 2.2 shows, estimates of the 
number of refugees from Iraq and Syria in Jordan vary widely. The number of UNHCR 
registered Syrian refugees stands over 650,000 as of October 2017 
(http://www.unhcr.org/uk/jordan.html, last accessed 3 November 2017). 
Table 2.2 Major forced migration movements to Jordan 
Year Origin of forced migrants Estimated numbers 
Jordan* 
Estimated numbers 
Lebanon 
1948 Palestinians from Palestine  ca. 450,000 300,000***–450,000**** 
1967 Palestinians from West Bank & Gaza  ca. 350,000 
1990–1992 Jordanian nationals of Palestinian 
origin from Kuwait and other Gulf states  
ca. 300,000 Not available 
1990–2007 Iraq  160,000–700,000 50,000***** 
2011– Syria  660,000–1,300,000 1,100,000–1,500,000** 
Sources: *Lenner 2016; **Republic of Lebanon (2016); ***HRW (2010a); ****https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon, 
last accessed February 2018; *****HRW (2007). 
In contrast, the number issued by the Syrian Refugee Assistance Department and publicly 
used by the Jordanian government estimates that there are roughly 1.26 million Syrians in 
the country. As the King of Jordan Abdullah II used a similar figure of 1.2 million in a 2013 
speech, this number has become an important reference point for policy, population surveys 
and in public discourse (Lenner 2016). The government estimates are based on a census 
analysis carried out in late 2015 and combine registered plus unregistered Syrians. However, 
                                                
2 The exception are 120,000 Palestinians who arrived without identity documentation from the Gaza Strip. 
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details about the methodology applied and data have not been released, incurring 
widespread concern about the census’ veracity (Lenner 2016). On the other hand, the 
Government has pointed out that the significant mobility of Syrian refugees, and their failure 
to notify UNHCR or the Ministry of Interior makes it difficult to maintain accurate official data 
on refugee population distribution (Aide Médicale Internationale, 2014, p. 16). 
In the case of the Iraqi influx in 2003, counting methodologies inflated estimates of the 
number of Iraqi displaced people in Jordan, substantially increasing donor aid (Lenner 2016: 
14–15). While this enabled a strengthening of the protection space, it also created serious 
problems for humanitarian agencies, who were unable to plan activities for ‘missing Iraqis’. 
As a consequence, UNHCR and its partners now rely exclusively on their own figures and do 
not openly contest the government numbers (Lenner 2016: 14–15). 
In Lebanon, immediately prior to the start of the Syrian conflict, Iraqi refugees made up close 
to 90 per cent of the population of concern to UNHCR in Lebanon (not counting the 
Palestinian groups) (UNOCHA 2012). The Syrian influx has occurred at a rather different 
scale. The highly paced influx of Syrians is shown in Figure 2.2 (using data from 
https://data.humdata.org/dataset/refugees-residing-lbn). 
Figure 2.2 UNHCR registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
 
Source: Authors’ own, using data from https://data.humdata.org/dataset/refugees-residing-lbn. 
By 2017, there were 1.1 million UNHCR registered refugees, with up to an additional 500,000 
unregistered Syrians in Lebanon (GoL and United Nations 2017), up from 200,000 in 2013 
(ACAPS 2013: 4). Moreover, around 450,000 Palestinian refugees are registered with 
UNRWA in Lebanon (https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon, last accessed 1 
November 2017). In addition, Lebanon has an estimated 250,000 migrant domestic workers 
(HRW 2017a), hailing primarily from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and 
Nepal (HRW 2012a; ILO 2016). 
In Lebanon, sectarian politics and the fragile demographic balance between confessional 
communities (including Sunni and Shia Muslims, Maronite, Greek-Orthodox Christians, 
Druze, Alawite and other groups) has affected reception responses. The demographics are 
so sensitive that the last official census was conducted in 1932, which showed that the 
largest community within Lebanon was the Maronite Christian sect, followed by Sunni 
Muslims and Shi’a Muslims. This count formed the basis of a fragile political settlement in 
which key positions in the polity were allocated by confession. So, the Presidency of the 
Republic is always fulfilled by Maronites while the offices of Prime Minister and Speaker of 
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Parliament have been given to Sunnis and Shi’ites respectively. Thus, Halabi (2004: 40) 
argues that Palestinian refugees would, if naturalised and granted full citizenship, shift the 
demographic balance in favour of the (Sunni) Muslims, implying a change in power 
distribution in favour of a new Muslim majority. Similarly, Martin (2015: 10) notes that for this 
reason, historically, not all Palestinians were treated the same way. The Palestinian middle 
and upper classes have never known life in the camps, as they, especially the Christians, 
were allowed to settle in the cities and integrate into Lebanese society. Between the 1950s 
and 1970s some 28,000 Christian Palestinians were encouraged to obtain Lebanese 
citizenship in the government’s attempt to counterbalance the growth of the Muslim 
population (El-Natour 1993: 42; in Martin 2015). 
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3 Conceptual framework 
There are many ways of assessing wellbeing. One influential analytical framework with 
particular promise for application in displacement contexts concerns the Wellbeing in 
Development approach developed at Bath University. It uses a three dimensional framework 
that takes account of the dynamic interplay of the material and relational dimensions of a 
person’s wellbeing with their assessment of their subjective wellbeing (Figure 3.1). By 
considering material wellbeing (what one has and could do with this), relational wellbeing 
(living well together with others) and subjective wellbeing (taking account of how people feel 
about their achievements and failures) it enables a rounded understanding of how people are 
faring. 
Figure 3.1 The triangle of wellbeing 
 
Source: (adapted from White 2009b) 
As such, it considers vulnerability, marginality and deprivation by considering not only 
income and asset poverty (the material dimension of wellbeing). It also involves aspects of 
exclusion, as well as social and political connectivity (the relational dimension of wellbeing), 
as wellbeing ‘does not “belong” to individuals at all, but is produced through interaction with 
others and the context in which wellbeing is experienced’ (White 2016: xii). Wellbeing hence 
is not simply about living well, but about living well together (Deneulin and McGregor 2010). 
Finally, the framework recognises the lived experience of impoverishment and indignity (the 
subjective dimension of wellbeing) as another key dimension that is fundamental to 
understanding what people ‘in poverty’ are able to do and why (see for example Gough and 
McGregor 2007; McGregor et al. 2009, 2007; Rojas 2008; White 2010). 
Also important here are insights from Sen’s capability approach, that highlights the critical 
role of agency and freedom in the constitution of eudaimonic wellbeing (human flourishing), 
rather than more hedonic versions of wellbeing that stress material needs. Wellbeing then is 
viewed as both a process and an outcome, with individuals requiring capabilities to achieve 
meaningful goals (McGregor et al. 2007; Sen 1999). Cities’ ‘bright lights’ offer the prospect of 
modernisation, of opportunity and freedom from various forms of restriction. Thus, urban 
contexts in Lebanon offer women ‘more opportunities of gender equality with increased 
participation in education, economic and social activism’ (Government of Lebanon 2016: 20). 
They also offer anonymity for those seeking it. Cities are thus places in which people aspire 
and strive for new forms of wellbeing. The salience of these cognitive aspects makes it 
particularly apparent why a wellbeing framing for an analysis of urban displacement is 
appropriate (te Lintelo et al. 2017). 
Subjective 
Relational Material 
Wellbeing 
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The Bath Wellbeing in Development framework underlines that achievements and failures 
can be experienced in relation to material, relational and subjective dimensions of wellbeing. 
One starting point for analysis involves ‘knowing what people think about what they conceive 
as wellbeing and how they are trying to achieve this’ (McGregor 2007: 347). This observation 
is important, as it implores external analysts and programming staff not to make a priori 
assumptions about what wellbeing constitutes for displaced groups and host communities. 
Wellbeing can be derived in many domains of life (e.g. housing, education, environmental 
conditions) that are typically overlapping and interdependent (Psychosocial Working Group 
2003; Sumner and Mallett 2011; White 2008; Williamson and Robinson 2006). In this 
respect, it has also been noted that perceptions of what constitutes being or subjectively 
feeling ‘vulnerable’ can vary enormously between people (Sumner and Mallett 2011: 22). The 
experience of displacement-related trauma, for example, may be closely related to those 
things that a person uses to define himself or herself (Berman 2016). We cannot ‘claim to 
know, from the mere fact of refugeeness, the actual sources of a person’s suffering’ (Malkki 
1995: 510). 
Subjective wellbeing is founded in sets of values and relates to aspects that make up 
people’s (cultural, religious, national, local, youth, class, ethnic, gender) complex identities. 
Hence, while wellbeing goals may be individually prioritised, as humans are social creatures, 
individual goals often reference wider socio-cultural values. The link between individual and 
collective wellbeing is consistently highlighted across the development literature (Watters 
2001; White 2016). For instance, religious beliefs and praxis can be central to how people 
conceive and experience wellbeing. It informs individuals’ social and political identity, but 
also provides community, a source of social welfare and grounds values (White 2012). 
Accordingly, we need to pay attention to individual wellbeing goals, but also to how these are 
produced relationally, through interaction with others and the context in which wellbeing is 
experienced (White 2016: xii). 
It is now widely recognised that cultural values are closely linked to how people understand 
and respond to traumatic events such as protracted displacement. Western models of 
psychiatric support have been criticised for undermining traditional ways of dealing with 
trauma and failing to engage with refugee priorities (Watters 2008: 129). It is now widely 
recognised that cultural values are closely linked to how people understand and respond to 
traumatic events: the expression of trauma may be closely related to those things that a 
person uses to define himself (Berman 2016). Summerfield also notes that ‘every culture has 
its own constructions of traumatic events and recipes for recovery’ (Summerfield 1995: 354). 
Understanding values held by refugee as well as host groups may also equip programmes to 
help build connections between host and refugee communities and improve social cohesion 
(Guay 2015). However, it should be remembered that culture is not fixed and that 
displacement may cause cultural values to change over time (Hall 1993; Watters 2001). 
Cities inhabited by heterogeneous groups of people practising a wider range of cultural 
values and practices may be particularly accommodative of cultural change. 
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4 Methodology 
All urban inhabitants aspire to wellbeing and act in efforts to achieve it, however they define 
it. While a wellbeing inquiry is thus pertinent in respect of city populations generally, we 
analyse displaced Syrians and vulnerable Lebanese and Jordanian host populations, and 
recognise that understanding their experiences may need sensitivity to intersectionalities of, 
for example, gender, class, religion, ethnicity and nationality. We consider that comparative 
attention to historic (Palestinian and Iraqi) and other contemporary refugee populations 
(Somalis, Sudanese, Eritreans, etc.) can provide valuable insights into the diverse modalities 
of reception that are in place in Lebanon and Jordan and the political and ideological 
underpinnings of policies. Comparisons are also made, where possible, between cities and 
between areas within cities located in Jordan and Lebanon. 
Following the recommendations from the International Advisory Committee on the research 
proposal, the research design and methodology have been further specified from the outset 
of the project. The methodology has several integral elements as illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
These are examined in detail below under separate subsections. 
 
Figure 4.1 Research process and methodology 
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4.1 Inception and end of project ‘research to policy’ workshops 
Organised and hosted by the Impact Initiatives, a project inception workshop was held in 
Amman, Jordan on 15 May 2017. This provided a valuable opportunity for all project partners 
– from Jordan, Lebanon and the UK – to meet in person and together finalise the project 
methodology. This included finalising important methodological decisions on retrieval and 
analysis of secondary data/literature; on the identification and analysis of primary datasets; 
on the national level and city level policy analysis; and on the communications plan. One key 
decision taken by the participants was to focus the research on three themes: housing and 
shelter, economic participation, and refugee registration and legal status. These themes 
were deemed critical by the practitioner partners, Impact Initiatives and Acted, and 
particularly opportune areas for review. The workshop also crafted stakeholder maps for 
Jordan and Lebanon (0) as part of a communications plan that further outlined 
communications products and suitable channels targeting the mobilisation of research 
findings towards strategic academic and non-academic audiences. 
Finally, two end of project workshops were conducted in January 2018 in Amman and Beirut 
to share and debate research findings and their implications for policy and programming. 
Participants included donors, UN bodies, researchers, INGOs and local NGOs, and 
invitations were extended to a wide range of participants recommended by the NWO-
WOTRO Security and Rule of Law Programme’s Knowledge Platform. 
Prior to these workshops, Acted, Impact Initiatives and the urban advisor (Dr Mansour) 
elaborately commented on a draft version of this report, and on a set of key findings that 
were shared with participants at the workshops. This entailed joint analysis and devising of a 
set of key findings, to ensure also that these were framed in a locally appropriate manner. 
In Beirut, Syrian and Lebanese representatives from the Naba’a area who had been part of 
the Participatory Video were invited and actively contributed to the workshop. They 
particularly used the opportunity to ask critical questions to the representative from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs about service provisioning in their area, but also shared their highly 
personal experiences living together in a low cost area that is under tremendous strain. 
Finally, detailed inputs were received from Professor Charles Watters, the senior academic 
advisor to the project based at the University of Sussex. This included regular contact, a 
review meeting halfway through the project (August 2017) that discussed interim findings, 
and detailed feedback and comments on the draft final report (February 2018). 
4.2 Systematic review of academic literature 
Wellbeing can mean different things to different people (White 2009: 3). The Wellbeing in 
Development conceptual framework thus emphasises a methodological commitment to 
bottom up enquiry, to open up analytical space to understand individual needs, aspirations 
and (dis)satisfactions. Within the context of this project, limited space existed to undertake 
bottom up enquiry beyond the participatory video, as the funders’ directed the review of 
secondary materials. Yet, the analytical categorisations proposed by the framework were 
found helpful for organising study findings. 
We used a systematic approach to sift through and select all academic studies that looked at 
possible wellbeing impacts on refugees and hosts in urban areas in Jordan and in Lebanon 
and on their local hosts. To this end, we used a clearly documented online keyword search 
strategy. Three online databases were used – Web of Science, Scopus and Google Scholar 
– to identify existing studies focussing on: refugee or host populations in Jordan and 
Lebanon; thematic areas identified for this research (housing; economic participation; 
registration/legal status) or on urban areas. The details of the keyword search strategy are in 
0. 
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The search strategy involved a sequence of well documented, meticulous and replicable 
operations before the final set of studies were identified. It was applied to Web of Science 
and Scopus as described above and with Google Scholar with some modifications.3 
Figure 4.2 provides a graphical description of these various steps and show how they relate 
to each other. 
 
Figure 4.2 Systematic review of academic studies 
 
  
                                                
3 Google Scholar does not allow complex search strings like Web of Science or Scopus. We modified the search strategy to 
reflect these limitations and used the modified version on Google Scholar to look at urban-focussed work done on Syrian 
refugees in Jordan and Lebanon in the last year. 
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4.3 Re-examination of existing primary data on Syrian refugees 
in urban Jordan 
The Impact Initiatives holds a repository of primary data on refugees and/or hosts in Jordan, 
as part of its assignments conducted for various clients during the last few years. This 
constituted a significant untapped resource. We accordingly did a fresh analysis of some of 
the survey datasets in this repository. We were exclusively interested in household/individual 
level survey data on Syrian refugees’ registration/legal status, economic participation and 
housing in urban Jordan. Having comparable data across Syrians/Jordanians or across 
urban/rural was considered an added advantage. Seventeen primary datasets were 
shortlisted after methodically combing through the metadata (see 0 for an annotated list of 
these datasets). The relevant datasets were selected from among the shortlisted ones after 
carefully considering the reports based on the surveys, and the questionnaires used in the 
surveys. The nationwide Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise (CFSME) 
conducted in 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the Social Cohesion Survey 2016 was selected after 
considering these requirements. Though not collected for this purpose, the studies contain 
valuable unpublished data on wellbeing indicators relating to our thematic areas of interest, 
to provide new insight into the still unfolding refugee crisis. 
In case the survey data included geo-coordinates of the households, we connected that 
information with night-time light (NTL) data. Given that there are no widely available 
classifications or maps showing these areas in Jordan, Impact Initiatives developed an 
approach using night light data to approximately identify areas as being urban, peri-urban or 
rural areas. These identifications enabled wellbeing outcomes to differ significantly across 
urban, peri-urban and rural areas in Jordan. 
The DMSP/OLS stable NTL data has been extensively used to provide a unique data set to 
study/map urban extent (Elvidge et al. 1997; Huang et al. 2016). We used Version 4 of the 
data captured in 2013 (NCEI 2018) which was the latest available NTL data (Figure 4.3). 
The following method was used: 
● Processed the imagery and converted it into a georeferenced raster using ArcGIS 
software, each pixel covering 745,400 square meters (the picture below shows how 
much this area covers). 
● Each pixel’s colour was placed onto a grey colour ramp with values from 0–63. 
● Determination of urban/peri-urban/rural categories on the 0–63 colour ramp based on 
visual comparison of lighting data with satellite imagery, Open Street Map (OSM) 
landscan of populated areas, OSM land cover data and census 2016 population 
clusters. 
● The best suiting light-categories were found to be: 0–20: Rural, 21–45: Peri-urban, 
46–63: Urban. 
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Figure 4.3 Night light based urban map of Jordan (2013) 
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4.4 Grey literature 
Grey literature, as we have defined it here, includes reports, handbooks, practitioner 
guidelines and other publications by NGOs and UN agencies. They contain valuable 
information regarding donor perspectives on the refugee crisis and most are publicly 
available for online access. Our methodology for accessing these documents had been 
guided by a (structured) snowballing technique. This process was kicked off by perusing the 
grey literature already in the possession of Impact Initiatives and Acted, but also available in 
platforms such as UNHCR Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal. 
4.5 Policy analysis 
We reviewed existing summary analyses of the policy and legal environments that shape 
government reception for Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon, and further screened for examples 
of city level initiatives in this respect. Sources included academic articles, research reports, 
online commentaries and English language local newspaper articles. We further conducted 
informal consultations with selected informants and local contacts, including mayors and 
municipal and ministerial officials in key ministries. In Jordan, this included stakeholders from 
Greater Amman Municipality (GAM); Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MoMA); Cities and Villages 
Development Bank (CVBD); Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD); Ministry of Planning 
and International Cooperation (MoPIC); UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the 
Department of Urban Planning, Architecture and Build Environment of the German Jordanian 
University; the Danish Refugee Council; Jesuit Refugee Support; UNHCR; UNRWA; and a 
local women’s NGO. In Lebanon, such consultations included UNDP, UNHCR, UN-Habitat, 
United Cities and Local Governments, and World Vision. Academic literature was reviewed 
to assess the role of non-state actors in contemporary modalities of reception. 
4.6 Participatory Video 
Participatory video (PV) is a form of participatory media in which a group or community 
creates their own film. The idea behind this is that making a video is easy and accessible, 
and brings people together to explore issues, voice concerns or simply to tell their stories. A 
3-day workshop in Lebanon targeted 10 participants representing a range of communities, 
women, men, vulnerable hosts and refugees. The activity also engaged communications and 
programming staff of Acted, one of the project partners; the lead investigator; and the 
Lebanese academic advisor, Dr Wissam Mansour, to build their capacity in this technique. 
The training supported the participants in planning and recording content to support research 
aims. PV was used in this research to provide displaced persons/refugees and hosts in 
Naba’a, a highly diverse and deprived inner-city neighbourhood in the Bourj Hamoud 
municipality within Greater Beirut, with a channel of communications to explore and express 
their lived reality, and their perspectives on what helps and hinders them. 
Following production, the video content was presented to the workshop participants for 
feedback, and then shown (and receiving plaudits) at the final project workshops. The video 
is also made available on the IDS website and YouTube channel. The video presents stirring 
visual materials that speak well about the complexities, insecurities and often humane 
responses to the challenge of hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees within a dense urban 
neighbourhood. It conveys such messages to policymakers and general public alike, and 
makes the case for why participatory dialogue with marginalized groups is important, and 
how fruitful exchange can happen. 
4.7 Reflection on impact pathway 
A range of project activities and outputs have delivered the proposed impact pathway and 
communicated research findings to key stakeholders. These include: policy briefings; blogs; 
‘Research- to- Policy’ workshops in Lebanon and Jordan; a participatory video; infographics; 
17 
a journal article; social media and media engagement; and academic conference 
presentations. These have delivered several key research outputs: (a) a strengthened 
evidence base on the dynamics and consequences of urban modalities of reception, 
expressed as gendered wellbeing outcomes; (b) increased access to knowledge on 
enhancing wellbeing outcomes for refugees and host communities; and (c) clear 
recommendations for improved policy and programming shared with key stakeholders. 
In addition to the scheduled project activities, the research team and local partners have 
opportunistically shared research findings in a range of settings additional to those originally 
envisaged, to add value and optimise potential impact. The inception workshop in Amman 
provided researchers with the opportunity to conduct short field visits to ground the research 
in local realities, and to conduct a selected number of key informant interviews with 
humanitarian and development specialists. Similarly, during the one week visit to Beirut in 
July 2017, when the participatory video exercise was conducted, researchers undertook 
additional key informant interviews. These interviews had not been part of the research 
design (as the call for proposals highlighted the need for reviewing secondary materials). 
Nevertheless, these activities proved an important way of building up contextual knowledge. 
Moreover, the key informants that we engaged all expressed an interest in the final research 
findings, to constitute opportunities for advancing research uptake and achieving impact. 
Accordingly, they were then invited to participate in final project workshops and sent the final 
report and policy briefs. Moreover, interim research findings have also been shared at an 
invited talk by the project lead at a Symposium on Displacement and Space at the Oslo 
School of Architecture and Design, on 24 October 2017. A blog (https://www.ids.ac.uk/ 
opinion/urban-wellbeing-mental-health-and-the-syrian-refugee-crisis; 9 October 2017) has 
been published, while an academic paper looking at the potential of wellbeing approaches for 
understanding enduring urban displacement in Lebanon and Jordan was submitted to the 
peer reviewed journal Forced Migration Review (November 2017). 
These activities have achieved the following research outcomes: 
● Evidence-based lesson learning on key lessons of urban policies, programming, 
implementation for wellbeing of refugee and host communities in urban Jordan and 
Lebanon. 
● Uptake of new insights by wider audiences with an interest in migration, refugees and 
humanitarian planning in Lebanon, Jordan, UK, Switzerland and France. 
● Uptake of new knowledge by researchers and advancement of academic discourse 
on the causes, dynamics and consequences of mixed migration flows). 
As a result of the end of project workshops, follow up enquiries have been received from 
various participants as well as donors, expressing an explicit interest in receiving the final 
research report and policy briefs. We are thus hopeful that further evidence of the targeted 
research outcomes and their effects informing more effective humanitarian and development 
responses to migration crises in Jordan and Lebanon will emerge in future. 
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5 Modalities of reception 
In Lebanon and Jordan, even though local government authorities are on the frontline of 
managing the Syrian refugee crisis, most public policies and laws dealing with refugees are 
made at the national level. We accordingly give substantial attention to the national policy 
and legal frameworks governing refugee reception. However, significant inter- and intra-city 
variations in the modalities of reception for displaced groups in cities of Jordan and Lebanon 
can be generated by the ways in which national policies are unevenly applied by local level 
initiatives, for instance by mayors, as well as by the efforts of non-state actors. 
The localisation agenda adopted by the World Humanitarian Summit 2016 has underlined 
the need to be more responsive to local specificity. International humanitarian actors are 
increasingly recognising the need to better understand urban dynamics for effective 
programming. The UNHCR has shifted its policy from focusing on refugee containment in 
refugee camps to an emphasis on pursuing ‘alternatives to camps, whenever possible’ 
(UNHCR 2014a). Yet, historical neglect and opposition to supporting refugees in urban areas 
(for a discussion on this within UNHCR, see: Crisp 2017) linger and the ‘implications of 
protracted urban displacement have not been given due weight by an international aid and 
governance system that has historically focused its displacement responses on rural camps’ 
(Haysom 2013: 1). 
One important aspect noted in the global literature on urban governance concerns the 
significant role of non-state actors in cities in low and middle income countries, and in 
contexts of crisis or weak governance contexts. They have a critical role in shaping people’s 
relationships with urban built environments and their identities, practices, struggles and 
opportunities of everyday social life (McCann 2016). Urban governance, rather than just 
being conducted by governments, is often characterised by ‘fierce competition between 
different territorialised forms of association and patronage – be they the state, religious 
organisations, NGOs or international development organisations’ (Alsayyad and Roy 2006: 
12) that seek to ‘define and enforce collectively binding decisions on members of society’ 
(Lund 2006: 676). Their claims to legitimacy differ widely, from aid organisations enjoying 
formal legitimacy through their registration with the government to the organisations whose 
popular legitimacy resides in providing de-facto access to material goods, security and other 
services in conditions of great need. In this respect, the refugee studies literature notes that 
globally, non-state actors such as faith based organisations (FBOs) provide effective modes 
of reception (Ager 2015) that are highly complementary to the international aid responses. 
Eghdamian (2016: 1,7,9), however, notes that despite the importance of religious identity for 
refugee reception, responses by the UNHCR seek to ‘avoid or downplay religion’, invoking a 
‘neutral’ position ‘under the guise of universality’ that ‘inadvertently favours certain religious 
groups over others’. In Jordan and Lebanon, initial humanitarian responses to the Syrian 
crisis also involved the sidestepping of local authorities. As the humanitarian engagement 
with local government and faith based organisations has proven challenging, engaging other 
non-state actors is likely to be even more so. 
In order to understand the modalities of reception for Syrians living in urban areas in 
Lebanon, in the following section we will first briefly discuss general governance issues in 
Lebanon to set the scene, then discuss national policies on the themes of 
borders/registration/legal status; housing; and economic participation. Finally, we will review 
local responses to the Syrian influx, including those of municipalities and non-state actors 
involved in governing urban spaces. 
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5.1 Governance context – Lebanon 
Lebanon is at risk of severe political instability, characterised by weak governance and poor 
functioning of state institutions. It is also subject to regional power struggles between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, as demonstrated by the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri being forced 
to offer his resignation on a visit to Riyadh in November 2017 (Fisk, 2017). Political and 
military appointments are routinely negotiated between competing political factions rather 
than awarded on merit, eroding trust that public figures will carry out their tasks 
professionally (EIU 2017b). 
Political deadlock has resulted in parliament not formally approving a budget since 2005, 
forcing the authorities to formulate spending plans on an ad hoc basis. In the midst of the 
Syrian refugee influx, a general election due in June 2013 was postponed twice after political 
parties could not agree on a new electoral law, to finally take place in May 2017.4 Following a 
substantial period of political stalemate, a national unity cabinet began work in January 2017. 
The coalition government includes bitter rivals, impairing policymaking (EIU 2017b). There is 
widespread popular cynicism about politics, politicians and voting, as well as a growing 
reliance on the military to maintain basic domestic security. 
The World Bank (2013: 1) estimated that during the 2012–14 period, the Syrian conflict could 
cut real GDP growth by 2.9 percentage points each year. It would push approximately 
170,000 Lebanese into poverty, while deepening the poverty of those already poor, while 
social safety nets were inadequate, fragmented and poorly targeted. Prior to the Syrian 
crisis, high unemployment rates coexisted with a high prevalence of low-quality and low-
productivity jobs. Unemployment rates are higher among women than men, at a rate of 18 
per cent in 2010 due primarily to caring roles within families. Women have been found to 
occupy very few high positions in the labour force. Likewise, their representation in decision-
making positions is low. Women are rarely members of unions and account for just 3.1 per 
cent of members of parliamentary (Government of Lebanon 2016). 
The influx of Syrian refugees hence could increase labour supply by between 30–50 per cent 
— with the largest impacts on women, youth, and unskilled workers. Hence, the crisis was 
predicted to double the unemployment rate to above 20 per cent, most of them unskilled 
youth. Moreover, the crisis would depress government tax collection by US$1.5 billion, whilst 
simultaneously increasing government spending by US$1.1 billion due to the surge in 
demand for public services (World Bank 2013). The Government responded by reducing 
both access to and the quality of public service delivery. It was estimated that an additional 
spending of US$2.5 billion would be required to reinstate the access to and quality of public 
services to their pre-Syrian conflict level. Furthermore, Lebanon’s public finances were in 
poor condition prior to the Syrian shock (World Bank 2013), and by the fiscal deficit in 2016 
rose to 9 per cent of GDP, with over one third of public spending going to debt-servicing (EIU 
2017b). 
5.2 National policy and law in Lebanon 
The most significant protection gap for refugees from the Syrian conflict in Lebanon is their 
uncertain and time-limited legal status. Legal status encompasses: a refugee’s initial 
classification and the rights it affords (through registration); personal identification and 
residence status; and the ability to record births, marriages, and other major life events 
(Bidinger et al. 2015: 41). This legal status commences as it is determined at the border. 
Indeed, ‘from the first procedure of status determination – who is a refugee? – to the 
structural determinants of life chances which this identity then engenders, labels infuse the 
world of refugees’ (Zetter 1991: 39), with myriad implications for material, subjective and 
relational wellbeing of – directly – the refugees, and indirectly, host communities. 
                                                
4 Municipal elections were held during May 2016. 
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5.2.1 Border regimes 
At the start of the crisis, Lebanon maintained an open-border policy with Syria. A 1993 
Bilateral agreement for Social and Economic Cooperation and Coordination between the 
Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic sought to gradually reach reciprocity 
between Syria and Lebanon with respect to economic integration. The agreement 
encourages freedom of movement, stay, work, and practising of economic activity in 
conformity with the laws of each country (ACAPS 2013). A further 1994 Bilateral Labour 
Agreement established a joint office on the Syria-Lebanon border and created a department 
within the Ministry of Labour to handle Syrian workers’ issues. Under the agreements, 
nationals from each country could enter the other country visa-free, showing a national 
identification card or a passport (Bidinger et al. 2015). Strong economic and family ties exist 
between communities on both sides of the border and many Lebanese families found shelter 
in Syria during the Lebanese civil war, and more recently in 2006 during the Israeli war on 
Lebanon (ACAPS 2013). And when the Syrian conflict broke out, an estimated 300,000 to 
600,000 Syrian migrant workers were active in Lebanese agriculture, construction, 
commercial establishments and handicrafts (ACAPS 2013). Many of these men called over 
families and friends to escape the conflict. 
Most Syrians arrive in Lebanon with valid personal identity documents (Bidinger et al. 2015) 
through five official border crossings: at Aarida, El Aabboudiye, Qaa Baalbek, Al-Masnaa and 
Wadi-Kahled. When exiting Syria, Syrians are provided with a Return/Entry Coupon with exit 
and entry stamps by the Syrian and Lebanese authorities (ACAPS 2013). However, 
Palestinian refugees from Syria had to obtain a prior departure permit from Damascus in 
order to legally leave the country (Bidinger et al. 2015: 39–40). There are also several 
unofficial crossing points along the 365km border, which by May 2013 had been used by 
about 15 per cent of all Syrians applying for UNHCR registration (ACAPS 2013). 
Lebanon’s open border policy has, however, been increasingly eroded to the effect that 
borders are now effectively closed to some groups. The General Security Office (GSO) in the 
Ministry of the Interior of the Government of Lebanon (GoL) is the agency in charge of 
foreigners’ entry and residency in the country. It controls all official entry points on the border 
into Lebanon, and has wide discretion to designate procedures for the treatment of Syrian 
refugees. Measures put in place include the periodical opening or tightening of the border 
crossings; changing the document requirements for entry or admission; imposing visa or 
permit fees or other requirements; and detaining or otherwise penalising refugees for lack of 
status (Bidinger et al. 2015: 24–25). 
Without proclaiming new policy, in August 2013, the Lebanese border authorities started 
enforcing new and stringent conditions of entry for Palestinian refugees from Syria. These 
groups could now only enter Lebanon under limited circumstances, such as having a 
scheduled doctor’s appointment, a scheduled and documented interview at a foreign 
country’s embassy, or having documentation showing the presence of a Lebanese spouse or 
a mother residing in Lebanon (Bidinger et al. 2015: 37). Consequently, Palestinian residents 
of Syria seeking refuge in Lebanon were turned away, violating the legal principle of non-
refoulement: i.e. not to reject at the border anyone whose life or freedom would be 
threatened in Syria (HRW 2014a). 
Furthermore, in October 2014 the Lebanese Cabinet voted to adopt a policy paper which 
called for halting the influx of Syrian refugees and reducing their existing number in the 
country (Daily Star 2014). Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil stated: ‘All this aid – be it food, 
shelter or health care – encourages Syrian refugees to stay in Lebanon, while what we want 
is to encourage their speedy exit’ (Hodeib 2014). 
By 31 December 2014, Lebanon introduced new regulations, identifying six categories of 
persons eligible for entry. Human rights organisations noted that the narrow selection criteria 
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would violate the principle of non-refoulement by, for instance, denying entry to child orphans 
and persons with disabilities who do not have relatives in Lebanon. Furthermore, it was 
noted that the regulations cancelled the displaced person status of anyone that temporarily 
crossed back into Syria, regardless of reason (e.g. to attend a funeral, to retrieve a stranded 
relative, to obtain necessary documents) (HRW 2015a). 
5.2.2 Registration 
Because Lebanon’s law does not incorporate the 1951 Refugee Convention, prospective 
refugees do not have a pathway to asylum (Bidinger et al. 2015: 40). Instead, a 2003 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the GoL and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) sets out the management of refugee issues. The MoU 
stipulates that Lebanon is not an asylum country and that the term “asylum seeker” means a 
‘person seeking asylum to a country other than Lebanon’. The Government of Lebanon thus 
officially terms the Syrians “displaced” individuals and allows them to enter Lebanon under 
the conditions of the 1994 Agreement with Syria. However, the MoU for the first time formally 
recognised the right of refugees to remain in Lebanon if their lives or freedom are in danger 
in their home countries (Frangieh 2017), with the expectation that refugees will be resettled 
to a third country within nine months (Bidinger et al. 2015). However, this MoU was not 
designed to govern large influxes of refugees (ACAPS 2013) and though there was talk of 
revising the MoU (Akram et al. 2015), agreement does not seem have been achieved. 
An individual is not eligible for host country absorption or third country resettlement facilitated 
by the UNHCR unless (s)he has undergone refugee status determination (Bidinger et al. 
2015: 27).5 In Lebanon and Jordan, the first step towards status determination involves 
‘registration’ by UN agencies. Two agencies are of particular importance. UNHCR’s mandate 
concerns all refugees other than Palestinians, whose protection needs are the mandate of 
UNRWA6 (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East).7 
UNHCR began registering Syrian nationals in April 2011 but, significantly, suspended this 
process from May 2015, at the request of the Lebanese government (Khawaja 2017). Whilst 
registration was possible, Syrians had to approach the nearest Social Development Centre 
(SDC) of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), the municipality or the nearby UNHCR offices. 
UNHCR then arranged an appointment in one of its four registration centres (Tripoli, Zahle, 
Tyre, and Jnah in Beirut). The registration process is free of charge and confidential. It 
enquires into basic protection and assistance needs and candidates for temporary and 
permanent resettlement are identified. All the household members should be present at the 
registration appointment during which they are interviewed and photographed. All family-
related documents should be brought (at least one issued in Syria) such as a national identity 
card, family registration book, passport, birth certificate, marriage certificate, 
school/university certificates or any official document issued by Lebanese authorities. While 
the registration process is also open to Syrians who entered the country through unofficial 
crossing points, some Syrians refrain from registering with UNHCR out of fear of arrest, lack 
of documentation, a lack of mobility or the inability to pay transport costs to the registration 
centres (ACAPS 2013). Some also chose not to register with UNHCR out of fear of 
disclosing their name and place of residence to authorities associated with the Lebanese 
government (Thorleifsson 2016). Unregistered individuals are at risk of detainment and 
deportation. However, few such instances are reported (ACAPS 2013). A similar situation 
characterised the response to Iraqi refugees, a decade prior. 
                                                
5 The 1951 Refugee Convention requires host states to provide administrative assistance, assessment of status, and identity 
papers for all refugees, implying an obligation to engage in a preliminary refugee status determination procedure (Bidinger et al. 
2015). 
6 Some Palestinians fall within the mandate of UNHCR, such as a Palestinian woman married to a Syrian. 
7 This distinction between groups is mirrored in the Lebanese government structures dealing with Palestinian and other refugee 
groups. The Department of Political and Refugee Affairs (until 2000 called Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs) was 
created to engage with the UNRWA with respect to shelter, education, health, and social services. 
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The police and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) do not systematically arrest Iraqi 
refugees who do not have valid visas or residence permits, but sufficiently large 
numbers of Iraqis are arrested and detained to ensure that the risk of arrest is 
constantly on their minds. 
(HRW 2007) 
Registrees are given a UNHCR certificate of registration, which provides access to basic 
services such as primary healthcare and public education.8 The Ministry of Education allows 
all Syrian students to enrol in public schools and universities (Sadek 2013). For Palestinian 
Refugees from Syria (PRS), UNRWA provides free education, non-food items, cash 
assistance and primary healthcare (ACAPS 2013). However, PRS are recorded as 
assistance recipients by UNRWA, but not registered, to enable them to retain their registered 
refugee status in Syria upon return (Bidinger et al. 2015).9 Assistance is also provided by civil 
society organisations, host communities and municipalities. The Ministry of Social Affairs, in 
collaboration with UNHCR and UNICEF, set up Social Development Centres (SDCs) 
providing health services, including psychosocial support and sexual and gender based 
violence awareness sessions for the Lebanese community and Syrian refugees. Whereas at 
the start of the crisis, all assistance extended to all Syrian registrants irrespective of 
particular vulnerabilities, the enduring nature of the crisis and the limited resources led to a 
more targeted approach from September 2013 (Bidinger et al. 2015), and a rapidly growing 
awareness of the need to also support vulnerable groups amongst host communities for 
social stability. 
Accordingly, the registration certificate issued by UNHCR enables access to assistance. 
Critically however, it is not an official identification card, does not grant Syrians legal 
residence and – as noted above – does not entail recognition of status as an asylum seeker 
(Bidinger et al. 2015: 38). Additional procedures exist for these ends. 
5.2.3 Legal status: residence permits, sponsorship and birth certificates 
Lebanese policies and law determine the legal status of refugees from Syria on various and 
sometimes overlapping grounds: by nationality (Syrians vs Palestinian refugees from Syria); 
religious affiliation and class; by the nature of entrance to the country (regular or irregular); 
by identity documentation (valid/invalid or missing); and by registration status 
(registered/unregistered). 
Like other foreigners, Syrian nationals may attempt to obtain permanent residency permits as 
per the Law Regulating the Entry, Stay, and Exit from Lebanon (1962). However, few are 
able to meet the criteria. 
The 1994 Bilateral Agreement governs the issuance of temporary residence permits for 
nationals of Syria entering Lebanon through regular border crossings. Upon entering 
Lebanon, Syrian nationals possessing valid identification receive a free residence permit, in 
the form of a date stamped Entry Coupon. It is valid for six months and can be renewed free 
of charge for another six months at any regional office of the General Security Office 
(ACAPS 2013). Some Syrian nationals (born to a Lebanese mother; married to a Lebanese; 
born in Lebanon; pursuing their studies; and retired diplomats) are also eligible for a 
‘courtesy residence permit’, which is renewable, free of charge and valid for three years 
(ACAPS 2013). 
After a year of stay in the country, Syrian nationals have two options. First, they can return to 
Syria for a minimum of 24 hours, then re-enter Lebanon, and apply for a new residence 
permit free of charge. While this was the default option contemplated by the Bilateral 
                                                
8 UNHCR only covers secondary healthcare intervention in life saving situations. 
9 This ensures that PRS remain registered with UNRWA-Syria, but their assistance needs as displaced persons in Lebanon are 
covered by UNRWA-Lebanon. 
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Agreement, security considerations effectively rule this out for most. As a result, the GoL has 
permitted Syrians to extend their permits for another six months without leaving Lebanon, but 
for a fee of US$200 (300,000 LL) per person over 15 years of age, which can be renewed 
free of charge for another six months (Bidinger et al. 2015: 38). When this year is over, the 
renewal process starts afresh. However, as the crisis continues and people are protractedly 
displaced, the residency permit fee has become crippling for most, as 70 per cent of Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon fall below the poverty line and rely on aid to survive (UNHCR et al. 
2016). 
Article 32 of the 1962 law on Entry and Exit from Lebanon allows the assessment of criminal 
charges and penalties against individuals entering Lebanon without authorisation, regardless 
of whether those individuals are asylum seekers (Bidinger et al. 2015: 43). Hence, Syrian 
nationals over 15 years of age and in possession of valid identification who entered Lebanon 
irregularly were initially urged to regularise entry by submitting a ‘petition for mercy’ with the 
authorities, and paying a fee that ranges from 300,000 to 900,000 Lebanese pounds 
(US$200–600) (ACAPS 2013). A similar policy had been pursued with respect to irregular 
Iraqi refugees in the 2000s, who were considered illegal and exposed to the risk of arrest, 
detainment and deportation, although they were also granted periodical amnesties 
(UNOCHA 2012). The success of petitions for mercy are, however, uncertain, as there are 
no policies or guidelines for the exercise of discretion by the GSO, and applicants cannot be 
represented by counsel in their proceedings (Bidinger et al. 2015). Furthermore, new 
procedures regarding residency renewal circulated by the Ministry of Social Affairs on 23 
January 2015 note that Syrians who have entered the country illegally must pay the penalty 
for their illegal entry or be permanently banned from entering Lebanon (HRW 2015a). 
Moreover, they will no longer be able to regularise their residency status, and instead be 
given five days to leave the country, or be subject to arrest and deportation (HRW 2015a). 
For Palestinian refugees from Syria, distinct rules apply. Having secured a departure permit 
from Damascus and gained access to Lebanon, in February 2013 a Government of Lebanon 
circular stated that PRS would receive a transit visa stamp at the border (US$12), valid for 
two weeks (ACAPS 2013). After its expiry, a short-term residence permit valid for three 
months could be obtained, initially for a fee of US$33 and subsequently PRS could renew 
their residence fees at the end of one year of residence, subject to the same renewal fees as 
Syrian nationals. PRS applying for a visa who could not afford the visa renewal fee received 
a slip stating that they had made an application for visa renewal (Bidinger et al. 2015: 39–
40). Moreover, in early 2014 it was decided that the fee could be waived. This generosity 
was, however, soon limited to the existing group, as Lebanon closed its border to Palestinian 
refugees from Syria in May 2014 (Bidinger et al. 2015: 41). PRS who failed to renew their 
visas, or entered the country irregularly, were at risk of not being able to pass military 
checkpoints guarding entry to Palestinian camps where many reside (ACAPS 2013) as they 
lacked valid identity documents. While expired residence permits put Palestinian refugees 
from Syria at potential risk of deportation to Syria, there does not appear to be widespread 
evidence of such refoulement, yet the government retains the discretionary powers to do so 
(Bidinger et al. 2015: 43). However, Palestinian refugees from Syria and Sudanese refugees 
have been detained and subjected to mistreatment and torture in detention and forcible 
returns (HRW 2014b, 2013a). 
Finally, since January 2015 residency status policy distinguishes between Syrians that have 
registered with UNHCR and those who have not. Its application has largely affected existing 
displaced populations, as the GoL instructed UNHCR to no longer register refugees from 
May 2015. Refugees applying to renew their residency permits were sorted into two 
categories: those registered with UNHCR and those who are not. Registered Syrians aged 
15 and over had to pay an annual US$200 renewal fee per person, present valid 
identification and an entry coupon obtained at the border, and also submit a housing pledge 
confirming their place of residence, and provide two photographs stamped by a Lebanese 
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local official to obtain residency status. In contrast, Syrians without UNHCR registration were 
directed to find a Lebanese sponsor in order to remain in the country legally. This involved 
providing a ‘pledge of responsibility’ signed by a Lebanese national or registered entity, to 
sponsor an individual or family. Some reports noted that in response to the policy change “a 
rather vivid black market of fake sponsors, brokers, employers, and contracts emerged” that 
make it very difficult for Syrians to renew residency (Lebanon Support, 2016a, p. 25). 
Sponsorship hence raised serious concerns about the potential for Lebanese citizens to 
exploit asylum seekers looking for sponsors, with some Lebanese nationals charging 
refugees up to US$1,000 for sponsorship (HRW 2015a).10 
In February 2016, Lebanon committed to a review of existing regulatory frameworks related 
to residency conditions and work authorisations for Syrians at an international donor 
conference in London (Republic of Lebanon 2016). Subsequently, in February 2017 the GSO 
once more changed the residency policy, waiving the annual US$200 residency fee for 
Syrian refugees, provided that they had registered with the UNHCR before 01 January 2015, 
or obtained residency status through their UNHCR certificate at least once in 2015 or 2016 
(HRW 2017b). For many Syrians, this new fee waiver policy was described as ‘life changing’ 
(Khawaja 2017). However, large groups are excluded, notably Syrians not registered with 
UNHCR – almost 400,000–500,000 people by government estimates (GoL and United 
Nations 2017). In this respect, it should be noted that the UNHCR suspended registration of 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese government on 06 May 2015. 
Excluded from the waiver are Syrians who were not able to maintain valid UNHCR 
registration continually since their arrival, or those who turned 15 since they entered the 
country and who are not able to access residency as they do not have valid personal 
identification. There are also suggestions that the new General Security policy excludes 
registered refugees who renewed their residency through sponsorship by a Lebanese 
national and that the waiver does not apply to Palestinian refugees from Syria (Khawaja 
2017). 
Furthermore, observers have noted that the residency renewal policy comes amid public 
statements about the possible return of refugees. Lebanon’s president recently called for the 
return of refugees to ‘safe zones’ inside Syria (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-
News/2017/Feb-03/392143-lebanon-president-calls-for-return-of-syrians-to-homeland.ashx). 
And in February 2017, Lebanon’s foreign minister called for adopting ‘a policy to encourage 
the Syrians to return to their country’ (https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-
News/2017/Feb-19/394235-bassil-renews-calls-for-return-of-refugees-to-syria.ashx). 
Moreover, reports have emerged of negotiations between Hezbollah and Syrian opposition 
forces to return refugees from Lebanon to Syria. Human rights activists and the UNHCR 
have, however, firmly dismissed these discussions, arguing that the situation inside Syria is 
too volatile (Khawaja 2017). The evolution of policy regarding residency for Syrian and 
Palestinian refugees from Syria is shown in Figure 5.1. 
Finally, Syrian refugees lacking valid residence permits may not obtain birth, marriage or 
death certificates in Lebanon. When a baby is born, parents must either register their birth in 
Syria, or go through a cumbersome registration process in Lebanon (Bidinger et al. 2015: 
52). The diagram below sets out the steps that should be completed within one year: after 
obtaining a birth notification document from the hospital/midwife a local mokhtar (government 
representative11) and a registered nofous (local registry) should be visited to acquire a birth 
certificate. Afterwards, the birth should be registered with the Personal Status Department. 
Only at this stage is the birth registration complete; a stage completed by just 17 per cent of 
Syrian households (Figure 5.2). Although the charges are nominal, the procedure is 
                                                
10 Similar concerns have been expressed regarding the sponsorship system for Syrian refugees in Jordan (HRW 2015a). 
11 Mokhtars are state representatives elected at neighbourhood or village level, responsible for some official functions such as 
registering births, deaths and marriages; ensuring the implementation of circulars; and distributing administrative bulletins on 
behalf of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (UN-Habitat 2017). 
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complicated and often requires extensive and costly travel (ACAPS 2013). In September 
2017, the Government of Lebanon announced the simplification of birth (and marriage) 
registration procedures, indicating that valid legal residency of parents, a key obstacle, would 
no longer be required for birth registration (UNHCR et al. 2017). 
Figure 5.1 Changing residency policy in Lebanon 
 
Figure 5.2 Households that have completed each step in birth registration 
for children born in Lebanon 
 
Source: UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP (2017: 14) 
To conclude, we observe how interlocking public policy addressing the Syrian refugee crisis 
in Lebanon accentuates vulnerabilities. Refugees’ mode of border crossing sets them off on 
distinct routes to obtaining residency status via petitions for mercy, sponsorship and UNHCR 
registration. Residency status is, however, only of a temporary nature, in need of annual 
renewal, and as we have outlined, its associated costs have crippled the financial status of 
Syrians, at least till early 2017 when a fee waiver policy was adopted. Most Syrians hence 
ended up without valid residency papers, which in turn made it impossible, amongst other 
things, to register marriages and births, access formal work, and enhanced the risk of 
municipal curfews leading to arrest, detention and possible deportation (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3 Interlocking policy – Lebanon 
 
5.2.4 Economic participation 
By November 2016, the existing Lebanon Crisis Response Plan — a US$2.5 billion 
transitional arrangement towards the new strategic framework, backed by the Lebanese 
government and multilateral partners—had been only half funded. Even if it is forthcoming, 
however, international aid would not fully compensate for the pressure on public services that 
the Syrian refugees have created. The government estimates direct budget costs from their 
presence at US$400 million annually, while the World Bank has calculated Lebanon’s losses 
as a result of the Syrian conflict at US$13.1 billion since 2012, taking into account wider 
disruption to trade, investment and tourism. 
The Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, unveiled a three-year response plan for the Syrian refugee 
crisis, calling for US$2.8 billion in aid on 20 January 2017. Some US$571.5 million would go 
towards providing humanitarian assistance for the 1.2 million most at risk (comprising 
refugees and host communities), with a further US$507 million to ensure 961,338 receive 
adequate amounts of food. Investment in the education, healthcare and water sectors will 
absorb the bulk of the remaining funds (EIU 2017b). With a perception among Lebanese host 
communities that they are bearing the economic burden of the refugee inflows, a stronger 
policy response to defuse the issue will need funding, but also more effective government 
management. 
Work permits and restricted professions 
Lebanese law restricts foreigners’,12 and therefore refugees’, ability to work in many areas, 
distinguishing groups on the basis of occupation and by worker nationality. We illustrate this 
through a discussion of Syrians, Palestinians (enduringly residing in Lebanon and fleeing 
from Syria) and the group of migrant domestic workers. Annex A provides further detail. 
Any foreigner requires a permit to work legally, which will not be issued to all professions, as 
a range of professions are reserved by law for Lebanese nationals. Foreigners who work 
without a permit can be sentenced to at least one month in prison, and are subject to fines. 
                                                
12 Labour laws treat Lebanese women’s [foreign] husbands and their children as foreigners (whether or not the latter are born in 
Lebanon). They are required to obtain a work permit from the Ministry of Labour as well as a courtesy residency permit from the 
General Security. Recently, enforcement action by inspectors of the Ministry of Labour have targeted these groups (Ayoub 
2017). 
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By 2010, over 20 high-level professions were off-limits to non-Lebanese workers (HRW 
2010a) and in order to practice law, medicine, and engineering, membership of a relevant 
professional syndicate is required. Foreigners are by law allowed to take membership in 
these syndicates – however only if Lebanese professionals are allowed reciprocal 
entitlements in their home country. Moreover, annually the Minister of Labour announces a 
list of professions in which foreigners are allowed to work. In February 2013, Resolution No. 
1/19 opened some professions, such as those involving construction, electricity, and sales, to 
refugees (Sadek 2013), in effect regularising a common practice (ACAPS 2013). However, 
over the last two years Syrians have been prohibited from working in all trades and crafts 
restricted to Lebanese citizens except for agriculture, construction, and ‘environment’ (Ayoub 
2017). 
Syrians have long had special privileges working in Lebanon, and vice versa. The bilateral 
agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination (1993) abolished 
movement restrictions on persons and granted freedom of stay, employment and practice of 
economic activity for nationals of both countries (ACAPS 2013). While Syrians needed a 
work permit in theory, the Lebanese Government has been hesitant to issue work permits, as 
Syrians were considered to compete with local workers for scarce jobs even before the crisis. 
By 2012–13, according to official figures by the Department of Syrian Workers in the Ministry 
of Labour there were only 650 people issued permits (ACAPS 2013). The Ministry of Labour 
issued 1,558 work permits to Syrian citizens in 2014, 2,150 permits in 2015 and 1,567 in 
2016 (Ayoub 2017). It is thus clear that the great majority of Syrians working in Lebanon 
have done so without work permits. 
The Lebanese government tried to both reassert itself and reduce arrivals in late 2014 by 
replacing its open door policy with new visa and residence regulations. These regulations, 
which went into effect on 05 January 2015, delineate two ‘categories’ of Syrian refugees: 
those registered with UNHCR and those with a Lebanese national ‘sponsor’. The former 
must sign a pledge not to work in order to receive a residency permit. This pledge serves as 
an official and binding agreement (Lebanon Support, 2016b). The latter must have their 
subsistence guaranteed by their sponsor. For both categories, the annual renewal of the 
residence permit for persons over 15 years of age costs US$200 (Lenner and Schmelter 
2016: 123). Further down in this section we discuss how the kefala sponsorship system has 
played out for other migrants in Lebanon, to raise concerns about its potential for abuse. 
At the London donor conference in February 2016, Lebanon committed to a review of 
existing regulatory frameworks related to work authorisations for Syrians, including by 
simplifying documentary requirements such as waiving the ‘pledge not to work’ requirement 
for Syrians. However, it also underlined that it would only seek to ease the access of Syrians 
to the job market in certain sectors where they are not in direct competition with Lebanese, 
such as agriculture, construction and other labour-intensive sectors (Republic of Lebanon 
2016). Nevertheless, some reports note that Syrians are still told to sign a pledge not to 
work, despite this requirement being dropped (HRW 2017b, 2016a). 
At the same time, while Lebanese law prohibits the employment of children under 14, and 
limits the work that children between 14 and 18 years of age can perform to six hours a day, 
these laws are rarely enforced. High costs of living combined with lack of work opportunities 
and lowly paid jobs for adults has meant that many Syrian refugee children work in 
restaurants, farms and other jobs to help provide for their families (Bidinger et al. 2015: 52). 
Palestinian refugees who have lived in Lebanon for decades or were born there are still 
treated as foreigners with extremely limited rights to work and social security (Bidinger et al. 
2015: 36). Halabi (2004, p. 42) sets out that 
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Under Lebanese labour laws, Palestinians fit the ‘stateless foreigner’ category, and 
thus were denied work permits and were prohibited from practising 73 professions in 
Lebanon. Even where exceptions were made, Palestinian workers benefited neither 
from social security nor from work compensation. The Palestinian refugee workforce 
was forced to engage exclusively in unregulated informal-sector work such as 
construction and retail, which provided irregular and scarce sources of income 
They are to a significant extent dependent on employment in an UNRWA dominated 
economy (Allan 2014). Approximately 75,000 Palestinians are part of the Lebanese 
workforce, but 75 per cent of them earn below the minimum wage, mostly living below the 
poverty line with no health insurance or social security. Palestinians remain excluded from 
practicing in over 70 professions, including medicine (except within refugee camps), law, and 
engineering. Laws regarding professional syndicates frame foreigners’ membership around 
nationality, to exclude stateless Palestinians (HRW 2010a). Studies have shown that just 15–
20 per cent of adult Palestinians that work have employment contracts, and only two per cent 
of Palestinians in Lebanon have official work permits (Bidinger et al. 2015: 50). While some 
attempts have been made by the Government of Lebanon to increase the opportunities for 
Palestinians to work legally, their effects have been limited. For instance, in 2005 Lebanon 
eliminated a ban on Palestinians holding most clerical and technical positions, provided they 
obtain a temporary work permit from the Labour Ministry. Yet, few Palestinians benefited 
from the reform and by 2009, only 261 out of 145,679 work permits issued to non-Lebanese 
were for Palestinians (HRW 2010a). Other reforms amending Article 59 of the Labour Law 
were made in August 201013 to revoke work permit fees, the reciprocity requirement and to 
also allow Palestinians to qualify for many of the previously-banned professions. However, 
these laws remain essentially unimplemented (Bidinger et al. 2015: 54). Moreover, the law 
disincentives Palestinians from taking up formal sector jobs by making social security 
contributions mandatory, while excluding them from benefiting from these (HRW 2010a). 
These discriminatory laws create ‘a permanent underclass in the Lebanese economy’ 
(Bidinger et al. 2015: 54). As the majority of Palestinian workers do so informally, without 
permit and without legal protection, they face severe discrimination in wages and hiring. 
Many employers pay them less than their Lebanese colleagues, or refuse to hire 
Palestinians, or are unwilling to support them getting a work permit (HRW 2010a). Figure 5.4 
summarises the policy environment regarding economic participation for Syrians and 
Palestinians in Lebanon over time. 
Finally, and not covered in the diagram, are an estimated 250,000 migrant domestic workers 
who reside in Lebanon, almost all of them women. The relationship between these workers 
and their employers is characterised by structural and highly gendered power inequalities 
(ILO 2016), partially because of the design of Lebanese labour laws. These exclude 
domestic workers from standard labour protections afforded to almost all other categories of 
workers, such as the right to a weekly day of rest, paid leave, benefits, and worker 
compensation (HRW 2015b). In order to obtain a work visa, workers require a domestic 
sponsor. Under this kefala system, migrant domestic workers lose their legal status if their 
sponsor terminates their contract, or if they decide to leave the employer. Accordingly, a 
migrant domestic worker who leaves an employer and files a complaint against him or her 
loses the right to work and faces potential detention and deportation. The kefala system 
hence enhances the risk of exploitation and abuse. The domestic workers typically have 
short-term contracts and are expected to live in their employer’s home. Migrant domestic 
workers in Lebanon commonly report non-payment of wages, forced confinement, 
employers’ refusal to provide time off, and verbal and physical abuse (HRW 2017a, 2013b).14 
                                                
13 Companion Laws No. 128 and 129. 
14 Moreover, under Lebanese residency regulations, low-wage migrants such as domestic workers, are not allowed to sponsor 
residency for their spouses or children. Lebanon-born children of the migrants could apply for year-long residency up until age 
four and then could apply for residency if they enrolled in school. In 2014 however, General Security took a decision to deny 
residency permit renewals for a number of low-wage migrants who have had children in Lebanon and for their children (HRW 
2015b), demanding people to leave the country at short notice. This policy violates the right to family life (HRW 2017a), and 
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Figure 5.4 The policy environment regarding economic participation for 
Syrians and Palestinians in Lebanon over time 
 
A recent ILO study surveying 1200 Lebanese employers showed their low level of knowledge 
of domestic worker rights and employer responsibilities under national labour laws. Two out 
of five employers pay the workers’ first three months’ salary to the recruitment agency and 
not to themselves, violating worker rights. Half the employers do not allow for one day of rest 
a week, and of those who do, only half allow them to go out alone on their day off. One out of 
five Lebanese employers lock the worker inside, heavily restricting personal freedoms 
despite many knowing that this is not permitted. Although Lebanese courts have stated that 
employers do not have the right to withhold their worker’s passports, 94 per cent of 
employers surveyed did. Thirty-five per cent pay less than US$200 per month in wages. 
While contracts govern the labour relationship, more than three quarters of employers 
indicate that workers do not receive a copy of it (ILO 2016). While unionisation may help 
domestic workers to stand up for their rights, the Ministry of Labour has actively deterred 
them from doing so, violating the human right of freedom of association (HRW 2015b). 
Domestic workers also face extremely weak protection from abuse by the judiciary and police 
(HRW 2015b). National courts are frequently found failing to observe human rights treaties 
relevant to the treatment of refugees, despite the fact that Lebanon’s Constitution requires 
such treaties to take precedence over domestic legislation (Bidinger et al. 2015: 29). One 
report in 2010 reviewed 114 judicial decisions involving migrant domestic workers, and found 
that not a single employer faced charges for locking workers inside homes, confiscating their 
passports, or denying them food (HRW 2017a, 2010b). 
5.2.5 Housing 
Unlike Jordan, and despite efforts by the UNHCR (Chatty 2017: 27), the Government of 
Lebanon has maintained an official ‘no-camp’ policy since the start of the Syrian crisis 
(Sanyal 2017). Key political actors see the establishment of refugee camps ‘as a security 
threat, rather than a solution to a security threat, because of the history of Palestinian camps 
in Lebanon, Lebanon’s weak state capacity and the risk that camps could damage al-Asad’s 
regime and cause instability within Lebanon’ (Turner 2015: 391). This policy was also 
strongly driven by a fear of replicating its history of Palestinian refugee camps. Becoming a 
                                                                                                                                                   
conflicts with Lebanon’s obligations to protect this right as per the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 23) 
and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
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permanent fixture in Lebanon’s urban and peri-urban landscapes, Palestinian refugee camps 
have over decades transformed flimsy tented settlements into multi-story concrete housing. 
Ineffectively policed by the Lebanese state, over time the camps developed into ‘states within 
a state’, that weaponised, became active factions in the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990), and 
repeatedly drew in Israeli bombings (Fisk 1990). Turner (2015: 399), however, asserts that 
both Lebanon and Jordan’s distinct no-camp and encampment approaches towards 
managing the refugee crisis is informed not just by security or humanitarian concerns, but by 
the state’s interests in maintaining a cheap and docile Syrian labour force. 
Lebanon’s ‘urban refugee approach’ allowed refugees the freedom to determine where they 
wish to live. Granting refugees their right to be mobile and the chance to support themselves 
and not be dependent on handouts not only allows them to contribute to their host countries, 
but also promotes their human dignity and the possibility of living normal, productive lives. 
Yet, all too often, refugees ended up living in urban squalor, undignified on the margins and 
in desperate need of assistance (Frelick 2013), not least because of the lack of citizenship 
and employment rights set out in the previous sections. In this respect, Frelick also notes that 
while camps bring high visibility and an outpouring of international assistance, the no-camp 
policy may have led the international community to provide inadequate and disproportionally 
low support to the Government of Lebanon for its efforts to accommodate refugees.15 
Another consequence of the no-camp policy is the exacerbation of shortages of low income 
urban housing, in the absence of active housing construction for the refugees (Bidinger et al. 
2015: 29). Indeed, some studies prior to the crisis have depicted the Lebanese housing 
market as dysfunctional, with a large and unmet demand for affordable housing, and the 
absence of credit facilities addressing the needs of the urban middle- and low-income groups 
(Fawaz 2009: 843). One key underlying reason for this failure to provide low cost housing in 
cities is a fragmented urban planning system. Thus, the capital Beirut ‘offers a masterclass in 
the over-politicisation of planning, and of what happens in a complex urban environment that 
continues to develop in an urban policy vacuum and with only the most basic of regulatory 
controls’ (Carmona 2013: 124). Consequently, the conurbation lacks the delivery of any 
serious citywide transport planning and an almost total absence of public transport. For 
Fawaz (2009: 840), as part of a neoliberal development model promoted by the international 
community, urban planning in Beirut became preoccupied with promoting ‘heavy investments 
in the tourist and service sectors serving the visions and needs of the wealthiest groups, 
rapid gentrification of low income areas, and the proliferation of new forms of private policing 
and security provision’ (Fawaz 2009: 840). 
Carmona nevertheless notes that there is no absence of incentives to build houses, but 
these appear to be rather of the wrong type, and limited to landowners. Accordingly, all 
landowners in Lebanon have a right to develop at 0.4–0.8 Floor Area Ratio, anywhere. This 
as-of-right entitlement ‘sets an expectation of development’ (Carmona 2013: 125) and 
overseas investments through remittances of 15 million people of Lebanese descent drives 
rapidly rising property prices. The result is ‘a more or less continuous urban sprawl in the 
zone along the coast between the sea and the Lebanon Mountains, with very little control on 
the quality of this development’ (ibid.). 
Decentralisation and privatisation policies have shifted the responsibility for the provision of 
social goods in cities to under-capacitated and poorly funded local authorities, while 
protections for the low income class were abandoned. As rental housing became the 
dominant mode, in the 2000s, housing rent controls were abandoned. Estate agents now 
play an important role in brokering access to housing, but are also implicated in being less 
tolerant of rent arrears and in people’s forced evictions (pers. comm. T. Kamourieh, UN 
                                                
15 While Lebanon hosted more Syrian refugees than any other country in the region, the UN’s $1 billion Syria Regional 
Response Plan called for $495 million for Jordan and only $267 million for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. If the pledges are 
fulfilled, per capita, Jordan will receive 75 per cent more per refugee than Lebanon. 
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Habitat January 2018). Moreover, large private sector employers were allowed to weaken 
social welfare provisioning for its workforce, and instead commenced hiring flexible (often 
foreign) daily workers, increasing demand for low cost rental housing. These migrants, like 
the Syrians now, shared housing, sometimes among up to ten income earners, and 
sometimes taking shifts to use a bed. While paying lower rents per capita, aggregate rents 
increased, creating a competition from below for affordable housing (Fawaz 2009: 842). 
Furthermore, in the absence of low-cost housing options, the displaced solve their 
accommodation needs by expanding informal settlements (Martin 2015: 13). Large shares of 
the urban population of Lebanon live in ‘slums’. According to one estimate, this amounts to 
over 53% in 2005 (https://unhabitat.org/lebanon/lebanon-urban-issues/, last accessed 
January 2018)16 and these areas are inhabited by the poorest Lebanese as well as by 
Palestinians, migrants and Syrians. 
There are various types of informal settlements, roughly distinguishable by who governs 
these, by the density of their built up areas, and who lives in them. Lebanon’s Palestinian 
refugees live in crowded camps that lack essential housing, road, water and sanitation 
infrastructure (HRW 2010a). For Carmona (2013: 125), the conditions in these camps, 
abandoned by urban planners, offer ‘a stark reminder of the sorts of urban conditions that 
planning was first invented to confront’. There are 12 official camps and a range of unofficial 
Palestinian ‘gatherings’. These ‘refugee camps, even if they are segregated and 
marginalized, are part of the urban settings that host them’ (Doraï 2010: 8) because of the 
integration of economic exchange, social networks and movements in and outside the 
camps, and the blurring of institutional and geographic boundaries. In a study of a 
Palestinian camp in Amman, Oesch (2017) comes to a similar conclusion. Estimates suggest 
that by 2014, 12 over-crowded official UNRWA camps are housing 53 per cent of the 
Palestinian refugees from Syria (Bidinger et al. 2015: 47). 
However, under Lebanese law, people living in informal settlements are not entitled to 
access to public services. According to Law 7279 issued in 1961, ‘it is forbidden to connect 
property owners or residents of a lot with a phone, service or electricity if s/he does not 
provide a residency permit’. As noted, the majority of Syrians lack valid residency permits. 
While this law was suspended momentarily in 1967, this provision was reinstated by the 
1971 Lebanese Building Code and reconfirmed in 1983. It applies to all public agencies 
providing services, including water and electricity (Yassin et al. 2016: 348–349). Some laws 
and public policies affect the ability to improve conditions in urban informal settlements. 
Presidential Decree No. 11614 of 1969, amended by Law No. 296 of 2001, states that: 
No real right of any kind may be acquired by a person who does not carry citizenship 
issued by a recognized state or by a person, if such acquisition contradicts the 
provisions of the Constitution relating to the prohibition of permanent settlement 
(tawteen). 
(Yassin et al. 2016: 348). 
This law effectively revokes a right that many Palestinians had enjoyed for decades (HRW 
2010a), and affected all Palestinians outside the official refugee camps (living in unofficial 
gatherings). These generally do not hold official titles for the land they are living on – even 
though many have contracts with the former Lebanese owners (El-Natour 2012; NRC 2013, 
in Yassin et al. 2016). Such informal tenure status also affects people’s ability to improve 
their housing, such as undertaking simple repairs or building new floors. These require a 
prior permit from the municipal authorities, but can only be requested by a person holding 
legal title to the land (NRC 2013, El-Natour, 2012). 
                                                
16 The underlying method for estimating this figure is not clear, and the estimate is dated. 
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About 10 per cent of the Syrian refugee population is living in informal tented settlements 
(ITSs) in Lebanon that are not officially recognised by the government. These appear to be 
mainly located in rural and peri-urban areas, and are typically situated somewhere on a 
spectrum between the camp and the city (Sanyal 2017: 118). They constitute ‘an 
informalized response to the crisis through a system of deregulation’ (i.e. as a consequence 
of the non-recognition) to enable ‘refugee spaces to emerge that are visible, yet 
unrecognized, flexible, yet precarious’ (Sanyal 2017: 117). ITSs are often at risk of eviction, 
but are sometimes tolerated, with the backing of local employers’ organisations such as 
farmers’ unions who depend on the cheap labour of the refugees – but local authorities 
regularly dismantle them once they appear too sturdy or threaten to become actual camps. 
UNHCR and NGOs have been trying to negotiate with municipalities to allow settlements not 
exceeding 20 tents, and to ensure that such settlements have adequate sanitary conditions, 
winterisation, and water-proofing. The government has, however, banned creative housing 
initiatives that could provide a partial and camp-free remedy for some refugees, such as the 
Danish Refugee Council’s box shelters, IKEA lightweight modular shelters and other 
temporary solutions, because they appear too sturdy and permanent (Onishi 2013). At the 
same time, national government authorities have advocated for the creation of ‘safe zone’ 
camps inside Syria and immediately beside the Syrian-Lebanese border – initiatives which 
UNHCR has firmly resisted (Bidinger et al. 2015: 47). 
Finally, as the response by the Lebanese state to the housing crisis was largely absent, 
initially (I)NGOs started to give rental assistance to the refugees. However, this approach 
proved impracticable to maintain due to surging rents, dwindling aid, and growing shelter 
needs. Some NGOs provide assistance to refugee families to help fix temporary shelters, 
inadequate living quarters, or shared housing at no expense to the owners in exchange for 
no or low rent to the refugees, and for agreeing rental contracts. These initiatives are aimed 
at adding value to property of the local owners or hosts, while arranging housing for 
refugees, and creating goodwill between Syrians and host communities (Bidinger et al. 
2015). However, giving the resources at the disposal of NGOs, these arrangements have 
had limited coverage. 
5.3 Local urban responses: municipalities and other actors 
In Lebanon, municipalities ‘have been at the frontline of the refugee crisis in the absence of a 
coherent national response’ (Mercy Corps 2014; Mourad and Piron 2016: 5). Their tasks 
include registering new arrivals, maintaining security, ensuring adequate water and sanitation 
services, and providing shelter, as well as mediating community tensions (Mercy Corps 
2014). Municipalities and unions of municipalities have displayed ‘unparalleled generosity 
and fortitude’ (Republic of Lebanon 2016), for a variety of reasons. These include a moral 
obligation to support refugees’ pressing needs because of shared heritage and culture; the 
desire to reciprocate support received from Syrians when Lebanese people fled Israel’s 
invasion in 2006; as well as by security concerns, prompting them to monitor and channel 
refugee settlements (Boustani et al. 2016: 7; Mercy Corps 2014). 
Moreover, the central government issued a decision generically instructing municipalities to 
respond to the Syria refugee crisis. In some instances, this has led to efforts that have taken 
a somewhat participatory approach involving the municipalities, such as the Ministry of Social 
Affairs putting in place work plans for 251 municipalities, identifying key problems and 
planning solutions. Yet other ministries, such as those responsible for water and energy, still 
have a highly top-down approach in engaging municipalities (pers. comm. S. el Ghali, 
Ministry of Social Affairs). Furthermore, some centrally steered programmes have a 
significant physical presence in city neighbourhoods and towns. For instance, over 200 
Social Development Centres (SDCs) are run by the Ministry of Social Affairs across the 
country, providing psychosocial counselling services as well as vocational training to both 
local populations and to refugees, in collaboration with NGOs, and this may be a site for 
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strengthening community relations. Yet, the central government has generally sought to 
retain control over local responses. It has provided limited support or guidance to help 
municipalities cope with the additional pressure on social relations or local services (Mercy 
Corps 2014: 2), as for instance in the case of a markedly visible decline in the level and 
quality of solid waste management services (World Bank 2013). 
Lebanon’s local governments and municipalities are highly dependent on central government 
transfers, have a weak local revenue base, and have a backlog of investment needs that far 
exceed available resources (World Bank 2013). In the early years of the crisis, local 
responses have been hindered by weak governance, and the absence of a national 
response strategy that could support the coordination between international actors, the 
central government, and local authorities (Boustani et al. 2016). International organisations 
including United Nations (UN) agencies took the initial lead in responding to the rapid 
refugee influx. This has, in some ways, involved humanitarian organisations sidestepping 
cumbersome bureaucratic processes in municipalities. Funding constraints and limited 
programme timeframes also disincentivised the development of enduring relations with 
municipalities and unions of municipalities (Boustani et al. 2016). However, over time, the 
role of the Government of Lebanon grew, leading to the development of the 2015 Lebanon 
Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) jointly with UN agencies. Moreover, as relief interventions are 
shifting gear towards development, and recognition of the necessity of urban specific 
responses is growing, area based efforts that seek to meaningfully engage local 
governments are gaining in popularity. One notable example concerns the detailed city and 
vulnerable urban neighbourhood profiles that UN-Habitat has been devising to inform 
strategic interventions by humanitarian and development agencies, in close collaboration 
with municipalities. These have covered major cities including Beirut (e.g. UN-Habitat 2017), 
Tripoli and Sour. Humanitarian and development organisations’ engagement with urban 
municipal authorities is nevertheless hindered by the absence of a national urban policy. 
Moreover, definitional clarity on which areas in Lebanon are urban is missing, and clearly 
defined statistical measures (for instance based on population sizes or densities common 
measures) for what constitutes the urban have not been adopted by the government. 
Moreover, municipalities can, but often do not, govern urban areas, as ‘more than 70 per 
cent of the 1,000 registered municipalities in Lebanon have fewer than 4,000 residents 
registered in their area’ (Boustani et al. 2016: 7). Associations of cities are not allowed in 
Lebanon, and there is no ministry focusing of municipalities. Because they are part of the 
mandate of the Ministry of Interior, security is the priority issue, and municipalities are given 
less attention (pers. comm. H. Odeimi, UCLG July 2017). 
Our review of responses of the Lebanese municipalities regarding the Syrian influx provides 
limited evidence. Some municipalities have sought to enhance community relations, for 
instance by encouraging the existing community football teams to recruit Syrian refugee 
youth so they may participate in regularly organised tournaments; or adjusted or more 
generously applied permit policies and procedures to promote the building of homes. This 
has been beneficial to the host community, as well as Syrian refugees by allowing the host 
community to benefit economically through renting their real estate, while also opening more 
living spaces for Syrian refugees in need of shelter (Mercy Corps 2014). There is, however, 
also some evidence that municipalities are involved in activities detrimental to the Syrians, 
but these have not been systematically recorded. Since 2014, at least 45 Lebanese 
municipalities have imposed evening and night-time curfews on Syrians (HRW 2014c). In the 
wake of multiple suicide attacks killing five civilians on a predominantly Christian village, al-
Qaa, some 30 kilometres north of Baalbek on 27 June 2016, Syrians faced vigilante reprisal 
attacks, military raids and a tightening of curfews. The Lebanese army’s official Twitter 
account reported at least 600 Syrian nationals were arrested in the first three days after  
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al-Qaa, and the Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk admitted concern noting that ‘lately, 
there has been a rise in the abuses committed by members of the police in several 
municipalities concerning Syrian refugees’ (Rollins 2016). 
Observers have noted that enforcement of curfew rules happen in bursts, and the picture 
differs around the country. In response, Syrians are self-policing, and observe the curfew, 
though in urban areas, there are greater opportunities for ignoring the curfews. Syrians in 
urban, Sunni neighbourhoods of Baalbek, for example, say they can go outside at night after 
curfew. But in pro-Hezbollah areas of the city, the situation is quite different (Rollins 2016). 
While local officials defend restrictions on the freedom of movement for Syrian refugees as 
necessary security measures, their explanations often rely on stereotypes and contribute to a 
discriminatory climate (HRW 2014c; Rollins 2016). Curfews seem to carry widespread 
support amongst the Lebanese. One survey found that about 90 per cent of the participants 
would support nightly curfews and restricted political freedom (Harb and Saab 2014). 
Nevertheless, protest marches by Lebanese citizens against the curfews have also taken 
place, notably in Beirut (Rollins 2016). The curfews are also contested at a high level. 
Cabinet ministers, representing different sectarian groups, have sent mixed messages. While 
multiple Ministers of Interior have condemned the curfews and challenged that there is no 
legal basis for the measure, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been expressing his support 
(HRW 2014c; Rollins 2016). 
Further to curfews, since the beginning of 2017, municipalities in Lebanon have taken 
increasing action against Syrian workers. Municipalities have been involved in forced closure 
of shops run by Syrians, and have forced other establishments to dismiss Syrian workers for 
replacement by Lebanese workers, with support from the local police. Such reports have 
been made for various municipalities, including Dahieh in Beirut, al-Hadath area of Baabda 
district (Mount Lebanon), Aley in Mount Lebanon, Baysarieh in Saida, Dekwaneh in Metn, 
Ashqout in Keserwan, and Naameh in Chouf district (Ayoub 2017). Some municipalities have 
justified their interventions by asserting its duty to implement Decision 1/41 issued by the 
Minister of Labour (2017), identifying professions restricted to Lebanese citizens. Civil 
society groups have, however, challenged this argument, noting that these interventions 
exceed the mandate set out in the Municipalities Law, and that it infringes the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Labour (Ayoub 2017). 
 
Case: Shop closures 
Before closing his vegetables shop located in Beirut’s southern suburb [Dahieh], Syrian refugee 
Mahmoud, 33 years of age and father of two, depended on his income to secure a living for himself 
and his family. The municipality sent Mahmoud two warnings to close down his shop, but he 
ignored them since there is no other way for him to support his family. Finally, a police patrol sealed 
off the shop with red wax. Since then, Mahmoud has been unemployed and living off of some 
assistance he receives from his family. Mahmoud knows very little about the Lebanese Labour Law. 
He does not know the main reason why his shop was closed. Now, six months later, Mahmoud is 
trying to find a Lebanese sponsor, hoping to secure legal work in Lebanon. He says that, “a sponsor 
costs at least US$500, not to mention residency fees of LL300,000 [US$198]”. 
Source: Ayoub (2017) 
 
Overall, local responses to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan and Lebanon are that: 
In each country, some governorates and municipalities have adopted relatively more 
inclusive or restrictive policies towards Syrian refugees. The main sets of factors that 
appear to mediate this relate to identity and interests, but also to the personalities of 
individual heads of municipal authorities. 
(Betts et al. 2017: 2) 
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Religious affiliation appears to play an important role in particular. It is clearly important to 
Syrian refugees, 55–63 per cent of whom in our analysis of survey data for urban areas 
across 5 districts in Jordan noted that religion is ‘most important’ for them, trumping other 
identity markers such as nationality (16–21 per cent); or tribal allegiance (0–8 per cent). 
In Lebanon, the Sunni municipalities we spoke with have been the most welcoming. 
Elsewhere, Hezbollah-run Shia areas have become the least welcoming, with 
Christian areas ranging across the spectrum. Confessionalism has mattered because 
of the predominantly Sunni identity of Syrian refugees – assumed rightly or wrongly to 
be supportive of the Syrian Revolution – by Hezbollah which is allied to the Assad 
regime. 
(Betts et al. 2017: 2) 
Eghdamian (2016: 1, 7) also finds that Syrian Christian and Syrian Druze refugees living in 
urban centres in Jordan ‘experience isolation, insecurity and discrimination because of their 
religious identity’. However, besides religious affiliation, reception ‘has also been shaped by 
class dynamics and importantly, the personalities of particular mayors’ (Betts et al. 2017: 2). 
In terms of social cohesion, the influx of multiple communities has added another layer of 
complexity in a fragile system, where urban neighbourhoods are fragmented along sectarian 
lines; a legacy of the Lebanese civil war. Moreover, the absence of legal and institutional 
mechanisms for metropolitan governance also limits the possibilities of ensuring cohesion 
between social groups in such urban areas (Government of Lebanon 2016: 20). Non-
Lebanese nationals such as Syrians have no official representation in the political system 
(Fawaz 2009: 835) and cannot participate in local governance (Government of Lebanon 
2016: 20). However, this is also the case for many Lebanese residents, albeit for different 
reasons. One peculiarity of the Lebanese polity is that though municipal councils are directly 
elected, the Lebanese typically hold voting rights that are maintained in one’s area of origin 
rather than residence. Most rural migrants continue to vote in their areas of origin, despite 
having lived in the city for several generations, and this creates serious accountability deficits 
for urban residents; they do not vote for local political representatives. While the transfer of 
voter registration is legally-speaking an easy step, in practice it is very complicated because 
it requires strong political support, as local political blocks resist any change in the balance of 
power (Fawaz 2009: 835). 
Fawaz (2009: 839) notes that in essence, Lebanon’s development model has emphasised 
the provision of healthcare, housing subsidies, schooling and other basic needs by non-state 
actors – ‘predominantly religious authorities and institutions that respond to their own 
constituencies’ needs’. Hence, assemblages of municipal, humanitarian, NGO, faith based, 
private (e.g. landlord), gangs and community organisations are involved in providing 
idiosyncratic and locally specific modalities of reception, to affect refugee access to security, 
jobs and housing, and more generally govern the places in which they live. Informal tented 
settlements thus emerge ‘through a collusion of private interests, state acquiescence and 
humanitarian aid’ (Sanyal 2017: 119). In urban Lebanon, the provisioning of housing, work, 
living, and social support for refugee populations is to a considerable extent informal. There 
are significant areas within the country (EIU 2017b), as well as within specific cities such as 
Beirut or Sour, where the state has limited authority, and other actors have a greater say 
over public life, and are (potential) interlocutors for aid and humanitarian efforts from Western 
or Gulf based donors. Two cases stand out: Palestinian camps (official and unofficial) and 
Lebanese dominated informal settlements. 
In Lebanon, local authorities’ position towards informal settlements varies from one 
municipality to the other. Some, such as Ghobeiri municipality (Beirut), have sought to 
improve their condition, even though the position of the central government remains not to 
recognise and service these areas (Government of Lebanon 2016). 
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Throughout the Arab world, religious socio-political organisations such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Harmsen 2008) or Hezbollah, while sometimes outlawed or declared extremist 
by foreign states, are an important force in social development and actively engaging 
refugees and internally displaced groups (Carmona 2013; Roy 2009). Yet, religious 
organisations in host societies can also have conflicting agendas and interests to refugees. 
For instance in Lebanon, Hezbollah has been politically and militarily aligned with Bashar al 
Assad’s regime, and thus has a rather ambiguous position vis-a-vis Syrian refugees. 
Furthermore, Fawaz points out that Hezbollah 
…represents only sections of the community, meaning the majority of the Shiite 
dwellers who abide by its politics. Others, such as migrant workers, but also 
Christians and (Shiite or not) Muslims who oppose its policies, have not only lost 
representation but also leverage and position in any negotiations with the state and 
have no venues to challenge the consolidated authority of the party. 
(Fawaz 2009: 846) 
The rapid urbanisation of Beirut in the 1950s and 1960s involved the formation of many 
informal settlements that were deemed illegal by the state and thus not provided with basic 
services. Populations of informal settlements are often considered ‘undesirable’ on a 
religious and class basis by local urban authorities who do not view their dwellers as partners 
in the making of the city, not least because they lack voting powers. As mayors work on 
shoestring budgets while facing substantial challenges, many are frustrated. Neglect by 
urban authorities prompted newcomers to establish new forms of organising in order to 
influence local decision makers (Fawaz 2009). Accordingly, neighbourhood committees were 
set up that constructed sewerage systems and road pavements, lobbied for inclusion in 
public networks and organised the construction of the local mosque. These all-male 
committees represented and sought recognition for the neighbourhood from municipal 
authorities and service agencies, and lobbied elected representatives in their areas of origin. 
Women were never included in formal processes of decision-making, were not allowed in the 
land development or building construction businesses, and property records show that the 
percentage of women acquiring home ownership was far lower than for men (Fawaz 2009: 
837–839). 
Over time, population increases and changing populations made it harder for neighbourhood 
committees to represent neighbourhood dwellers, and their role has fallen back on public 
authorities and the political parties (Fawaz 2009: 844). The Shiite community had historically 
been underrepresented, but its political parties Amal and especially Hezbollah have emerged 
to play a central role in the country in post-war Lebanon (Fawaz 2009: 839–840). Hezbollah 
provides security and assistance, bridges communities and state, and resists and reshapes 
policy efforts by state or international institutions (Roy 2009). Following Israeli bombardments 
in southern parts of Beirut in 2006, that totally destroyed 1,300 buildings and made 13,000 
people homeless, the organisation provided highly effective reconstruction. The rapid 
restoration of neighbourhoods cemented its power-base and offered a sharp contrast to the 
stasis and neglect suffered by Palestinian camps (Carmona 2013). 
Palestinian refugees to Lebanon, arriving in several waves starting from 1948, were housed 
in camps, which over time have become part of the Lebanese urban fabric. The Palestinian 
camps increasingly accommodate the poorest Lebanese, Syrians and other migrants. 
In the first twenty years of their residency in Lebanon, offices of police and intelligence 
services were placed in the Palestinian camps to monitor the refugees’ activities. However, 
the 1969 Cairo Agreements between the Lebanese government and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) granted administrative autonomy to the Palestinian refugee camps, lifted 
the ban on employment, and allowed the use of Lebanese territories as a base for attacking 
Israel (Halabi 2004: 40). It permitted the Palestinians to self-administer their spaces, and 
allowed them to expand their camps and build multi-story houses and other buildings that 
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would have created a sense of permanency. While the Lebanese government abrogated the 
Cairo Agreements in 1987, Lebanese authorities are still not controlling the camps from 
within (Martin 2015: 14). Rather, these settings are characterised by hybrid sovereignties 
(Ramadan and Fregonese 2017), with the Lebanese state and other partially sovereign 
actors competing for authority to create ‘spaces of exception’ beyond the control and 
surveillance of the state (Ramadan 2013, 2009) and the de facto suspension of laws (Hanafi 
and Long 2010). 
In the 12 official camps, the UNRWA provides basic health, social and education services, 
and does not extend to the physical environment. In unofficial camps, also known as 
‘gatherings’, which are neither serviced by the Lebanese state nor by UNRWA, dwellers have 
‘resorted to alternate self-help mechanisms and strategies so as to secure and maintain their 
basic urban services – in the process creating informal institutions that govern access to 
electricity, water, solid waste disposal and shelter repair’ (Yassin et al. 2016: 356). 
Political parties, local committees, and NGOs are the main actors responsible for provision of 
urban services in camps, such as the provision of water from wells, the implementation and 
maintenance of local electricity networks and generators, and local sewage networks. In 
many of the camps, Palestinian Popular Committees (PCs) play an important governance 
role. For instance, in the Maashouk gathering in the city of Sour, popular committees collect 
a monthly service fee from its inhabitants in exchange for organising some services, such as 
digging community wells for water provision, organising waste collection, and redistributing 
pirated electricity. Popular committees undertake some coordination with the municipality, 
often based on the development of personal relations with the mayor and the deputy 
mayor.17 The municipality does not collect taxes from the settlement, and ‘does not take a 
consistent position on servicing the settlement across service such as electricity, water, 
waste’ (Yassin et al. 2016: 356). Whilst it engages in a waste collection service, it does not 
allow residents to obtain permits necessary for building repairs or construction. Such permits 
are only granted to inhabitants who are able to show residency documents, but this is not 
possible for Palestinians living in informal settlements.18 Because of the 2001 law that forbids 
Palestinians to own land or real estate, the ‘link between Palestinian nationality, lack of 
residency papers and absence of building permissions has indeed become a direct and 
institutionalized one’ (Yassin et al. 2016: 356). Consequently, the majority of construction 
repairs in Maashouk are done without formal permission or do not abide by any sort of 
regulation. 
The treatment of Palestinians contrasts with treatment of Lebanese citizens living in informal 
settlements in Sour. For the latter, an inability to show proof of legal ownership, which is 
often hard,19 is not decisive in the quest for building permits. Indeed, in order to deal with 
such instances, the municipality of Sour has adopted an institutionalised informal practice 
called ‘knowledge of ownership’, where officials have some discretion to issue the permits, 
even though this overrides the law (Yassin et al. 2016: 356). Informality thus results from the 
coping mechanisms of marginalised communities, but also because of the practices of the 
Lebanese state. Its national law declaring that no services will be provided to informal 
settlements enables their ‘deregulation’, while the 2001 law institutionalised the informal 
residency status of the Palestinians living outside the official camps. Moreover, there are 
highly localised, institutionalised (‘knowledge of ownership’), as well as idiosyncratic informal 
practices adopted by the local municipalities. These practices enable the Lebanese 
                                                
17 Whereas legitimacy is drawn from such facilitation of access to services, the PCs ‘lack the de jure legitimacy of 
representatives elected by citizens as well as the de facto authority of representatives operating under the Cairo Agreement in 
the camps’ (Yassin et al. 2016: 358). 
18 If they do have residency papers it usually states their (fictitious or previous) residence in one of the official camps) (Yassin et 
al. 2016: 356). 
19 Proof of ownership is especially difficult with respect to inherited lands or lost deeds and other complications partly stemming 
from the administrative absence of the state during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90) (Yassin et al. 2016: 356). 
38 
authorities to deal with significant numbers of urban dwellers, marginalised on the grounds of 
lacking citizenship, legal residency status or official refugee status. 
As such, modalities of reception differ and take account not only for who one is, and what 
one’s legal status is, but also where one is. Different municipalities engage vulnerable groups 
such as the poorest Lebanese, Palestinians or Syrians in significantly different ways. 
Moreover, we have shown that within cities there are areas that receive distinct treatment 
(compare Palestinian camps with informal settlements inhabited mainly by poor Lebanese). 
Juxtaposing Palestinian gathering dwellers, Palestinian camp dwellers and Lebanese urban 
poor can be expected to yield important insights in how vulnerable communities relate with 
both formal and informal institutions, and how being a refugee mediates these dynamics 
(Yassin et al. 2016: 357). A final axis across which these groups are governed concerns the 
nature of the services. Thus, in the case of Maashouk, whereas waste services were 
provided, building construction services were denied point blank. Here, the popular 
committees complemented, replaced, reshaped and contested services denied or provided 
by the municipality and the electricity board. 
Even though many observers consider it highly unlikely that Palestinians in Lebanon will gain 
full citizenship status (and by implication, Syrians if they were to stay for many more years), 
their wellbeing may be dramatically improved through other means. Yassin et al. thus 
propose, given that residents also associate formality with certainty, formalising the urban 
spaces in which they live, and advancing the official representative status of popular 
committees in dealing with the municipalities (Yassin et al. 2016). 
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6 Jordan 
6.1 Governance context – Jordan 
Jordan, when compared to Lebanon, enjoys more political stability, and a highly centralised 
and more effective governance system. King Abdullah remains at the heart of all key 
decisions in the country, although recent reforms include widespread electoral and budgetary 
changes and devolution of powers to the municipal and governorate levels. Press freedoms 
are weaker and civil society less vibrant when comparing Jordan to Lebanon. However, 
Ababsa (2011) notes that municipalities are gradually being held to account by their 
residents. Islamic charity NGOs are very active and based in the poorest neighbourhoods 
along with ‘Royal NGOs’ (such as the Jordan River Foundation and the Jordan Hashemite 
Fund for Human Development). 
Sluggish economic growth, structural adjustments, high unemployment (15.8 per cent of the 
labour force in the third quarter of 2016) and weakening remittance inflows from the Gulf 
Arab states have affected living conditions (EIU 2017a). There have been protests from 
disaffected young people struggling with poor job prospects. 
The government estimates that absorbing the Syrian influx amounts to US$8.6 billion for 
education, health, subsidies on electricity, water, healthcare, infrastructure and municipal 
services, plus indirect costs of US$3.1–3.6 billion a year since the beginning of the refugee 
crisis (ibid.). The government has successfully sought support from Western governments 
and multilateral agencies, and the International Monetary Fund agreed a US$723 million 
extended fund facility (EFF) for 2016–19. As part of this deal, the government will seek to 
improve the business environment for the private sector, and strengthen employment 
prospects for Jordanians and Syrians. The government tries to meet budget deficit targets (to 
0.3 per cent of GDP by 2018) and debt reduction targets, but the risk is that this further 
squeezes living standards of low and middle income earners. Political pressure and high 
unemployment will also make it more difficult to reduce jobs in a bloated public-sector. The 
government’s efforts to address the country’s socioeconomic challenges will be hindered by 
concerns over political stability, with competing views held between tribal and other groups 
loyal to the king versus urban constituents and Palestinians who form the main support base 
for various Islamist political groups (EIU 2017a). 
6.2 National policy and law in Jordan 
6.2.1 Border regimes 
Jordan is not a party to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (1951 
Convention) or its 1967 Protocol. Jordan’s non-signatory status is often explained by 
reference to the politically and socially complex Palestinian refugee issue, popular sentiment 
against refugee integration, lack of resources and capacity to provide for refugees, and 
misinformation about the perceived social and economic burden of refugees and related 
questions of national security (Saliba 2016). 
And while Article 21(1) of the Jordanian Constitution provides that ‘[p]olitical refugees shall 
not be extradited on account of their political beliefs or for their defense of liberty’, Jordan has 
not enacted specific legislation that regulates the status of refugees. Jordan is, however, 
party to several other human rights treaties, many of which establish similar obligations as 
the 1951 Refugee Convention (Bidinger et al. 2015). It is party to the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention 
against Torture) in 1991, which Article 3 prohibits refoulement (ACAPS 2013). It is also party 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protects the rights of 
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freedom of movement within the country, due process and to refrain from arbitrary detention. 
Being party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Jordan is obliged to 
ensure freedom from discrimination and equality before the law. Jordan also is party to the 
2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights, which establishes many principles protected under the 
1951 Refugee Convention, including access to courts; freedom of movement; and freedom 
from arbitrary detention (Bidinger et al. 2015: 59–60). 
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) of the Government of Jordan is the key actor governing 
refugees. Significantly, it views its obligations towards refugees primarily through a national 
security lens (Bidinger et al. 2015: 56). In the absence of special legislation addressing the 
conditions under which refugees can be admitted into the country, refugees and asylum 
seekers are subject to Law No. 24 of 1973 concerning Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs 
(Saliba 2016). This law applies to all foreigners without distinction between refugees and 
non-refugees. It does not identify conditions under which individuals will be eligible for 
asylum – however, the law requires that those entering the country as political asylum 
seekers present themselves to a police station within 48 hours of arrival (Sadek 2013). 
Article 10 gives the Minister of Interior the authority to regulate documentation and status for 
entry. Moreover, while this law does not impose any sanctions against asylum seekers who 
entered the country illegally, the Minister may issue regulations concerning the travel 
documentation refugees require within its borders, based on the recommendation of the 
Director of General Security. Moreover, Law 24 grants the Minister the power to determine 
on a case-by-case basis whether persons that entered illegally will be deported (Sadek 
2013). 
In the absence of national legislation for refugees, the legal framework for their treatment is a 
1998 Memorandum of Understanding signed between Jordan (Ministry of Interior) and the 
UNHCR. Under this MoU, refugees can receive temporary protection from UNHCR, which is 
responsible for processing asylum claims and refugee status determination. However, since 
the Syrian crisis erupted, border policies have changed significantly (Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1 Changing border regimes in Jordan 
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Jordan’s initial response to the Syrian crisis entailed an open-border policy, exempting Syrian 
refugees from visa requirements to enter and residence permits to stay (Bidinger et al. 2015). 
Syrians mainly came from Dara’a, Aleppo and Homs, and most arrived through the eastern 
border crossing, having travelled a long and dangerous road, often across lines of fighting 
(Achilli 2015). In some instances, Syrian refugees are closely linked to the Jordanian 
population. In border areas, tribal ties are pronounced and original refuge was granted with 
host families related either by blood or marriage (Chatty 2017: 31). However, as the influx of 
Syrian refugees swelled to unmanageable numbers (3,000 per day), the government started 
imposing controls (Bidinger et al. 2015). By 2012, just one border crossing between Syria 
and Jordan remained open: Naseeb-Jaber, near the Jordanian town of Ramtha. Moreover, 
as Syrian border guards turned people back in large numbers, many crossed the border at 
night with the help of the Free Syrian Army (HRW 2012b), via approximately 25 unofficial 
crossing points (Bidinger et al. 2015). Since April 2012, Palestinian refugees from Syria 
crossing into Jordan via such routes were, however, automatically detained by the Jordanian 
authorities, without the possibility of release (HRW 2012b). 
From January to April 2013, Jordan permitted only about 300 border crossings per day, 
prioritising children, particularly unaccompanied minors, the injured or sick, and the elderly. 
From amongst the adults, former members of the military were separated out, in order to 
maintain the ‘civilian nature’ of the general camps (Bidinger et al. 2015). While the 
Government of Jordan denied a change in the open border policy, access to the country was 
drastically limited (Achilli 2015a). Human rights groups reported that Jordan denied entry to 
four highly vulnerable groups: all Palestinians living in Syria (a similar policy of Palestinian 
non-admission was implemented during the Iraqi refugee crisis); all single men of military 
age, regardless of whether they are combatants; Iraqi refugees living in Syria, and anyone 
who is undocumented (Amnesty International 2013; Frelick 2013). This is likely to have 
occurred not only in response to the massive refugee influx, but also as Jordan fears 
infiltration by militants, in response to its participation in US led campaigns against Islamic 
State and affiliated groups (Achilli 2015a). Following an attack on Jordanian soldiers, Jordan 
fully closed the border with Syria in June 2016. The various and growing restrictions on entry 
and the potential of being forcibly returned to Syria poses a substantial risk to life and liberty 
of the refugees (Bidinger et al. 2015). 
6.2.2 Legal status: residence permits, bail outs and birth certificates 
Foreigners cannot live in Jordan without acquiring a residency permit, which in most cases 
are valid for one year only. Applications are submitted to the Ministry of Interior, which can 
reject an application for residence or revoke a residence permit without specifying the 
reasons for that decision (Bidinger et al. 2015). These permits are typically granted in small 
numbers to refugees. Syrians entering the country as asylum seekers or who are registered 
as refugees with UNHCR are rarely given a residency permit (ILO 2015a). As part of the 
MoU with UNHCR, the Government of Jordan has agreed to ensure refugees are free from 
overstay fines and departure fees (Bidinger et al. 2015: 59). 
Similarly, prior to the Syrian crisis, just 30 per cent of UNHCR registered Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan were granted residency permits (Sadek 2013). Without a residency permit, access to 
legal work is limited. However, the Government of Jordan has generously extended the right 
to education and access to health care to Iraqi refugees, similar to the services available to 
Syrians with the MOI Service Card (Bidinger et al. 2015). Besides Syrians, Iraqis and 
Palestinians, and a growing number of Yemenis, there are Sudanese and Somali refugees. 
This group is particularly affected by discrimination, deprivation and poverty (pers. comm. 
Director Urban Programmes, Jesuit Refugee Services May 2017), and suffered from a 
redirection of financial aid to the Syrians by UNHCR. More than half of the Sudanese and 
Somali refugees have had their monthly allowance withdrawn since the Syrian crisis 
(Bidinger et al. 2015: 72). 
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According to the Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Jordan, UNHCR is 
responsible for processing asylum claims and refugee status determination. Refugees fleeing 
Syria who enter through the official border are typically brought to the Khalda centre for 
registration. Upon first contact with UNHCR, an Asylum Seeker Certificate is issued, as well 
as a Verification Appointment Card, which documents the appointment for a subsequent 
interview for verification of refugee status. All refugees then undergo an interview for UNHCR 
registration purposes, which results in a registration card. In parallel, a separate security 
clearance interview with government officials is undertaken, when biometric scans are also 
taken (Bidinger et al. 2015). Successful applicants for status determination are legally 
considered ‘asylum-seekers’ in Jordan and become ‘refugees’ only upon securing a 
resettlement space to a third country. However, in practice, UNHCR uses the term ‘refugee’ 
as a term of convenience. In turn, the Government of Jordan prefers to refer to Syrian 
refugees as ‘visitors’, ‘irregular guests’, ‘Arab brothers’ or simply ‘guests’, which has no legal 
meaning under domestic laws. This was also the approach to Iraqi refugees arriving a 
decade or so earlier (Saliba 2016). 
Asylum seekers can remain in Jordan for six months after registration, during which time the 
UNHCR has to find a resettlement country for them or voluntary repatriation has to take 
place (ACAPS 2013). This provision has not been enforced in practice, and rather acts to 
establish that the residence is temporary (Bidinger et al. 2015: 59). However, in the absence 
of safe repatriation as the civil war in Syria continues, and limited resettlement slots in third 
countries, there is little realistic prospective for the refugees from Syria to be relocated. 
Durable solutions are even more limited for Palestinians from Syria, as resettlement is not 
negotiated by UNRWA in order to preserve the right of return; and integration into the 
population is deemed undesirable by the Jordanian government. Moreover, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization in Jordan has stated that individual Palestinian refugees have the 
right to choose resettlement on an individual basis – however, they also maintain that 
collective resettlement undermines the demand for Palestinian refugees to return to their 
homeland (Bidinger et al. 2015: 69). 
Following the status determination process, refugees go to live in camps (such has Za’atari; 
the Emirati Jordanian Camp; King Hussein Park; Azraq and – previously – Cyber City), or 
leave for other, often urban, areas. Those refugees that move to a camp are issued a ration 
card. It grants access to camp services, which are all provided by non-government agencies: 
these include a World Food Programme (WFP) food voucher; health services; core relief 
items provided by Norwegian Refugee Council; and psychosocial services provided by 
several NGOs. 
Refugees entering from unofficial border crossings are gathered at various collection sites by 
the International Organization for Migration and then brought to Raba’al-Sarhan, or one of 
the other 11 reception centres in Jordan. A report by ILO (ILO 2015b: 15) describes how 
many Syrians who enter through unofficial border crossings are met by the Jordanian 
authorities. The military provides these refugees with shelter or takes them to one of the 
camps, however their identity documents are taken away on arrival, in order to limit their 
freedom to move inside the host country. Refugees can have their documents returned to 
them when they are ‘bailed out’ of the camps, however, UNHCR’s re-verification process in 
2015 found that 35 per cent of refugees’ documents had been lost or displaced by the 
government after arriving in the host country (ILO 2015b: 15). Moreover, as these Syrians do 
not have proof of legal entry into Jordan, they cannot get security clearance from Ministry of 
Interior and in turn cannot obtain legal residency status, MoI cards, work permits and access 
to healthcare, etc. (Rummery 2016). This is particularly problematic as the UNHCR’s 
Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) Baseline Survey (UNHCR Jordan 2015) found 
that 20 per cent of low vulnerability cases arrived via informal border crossings, compared 
with 77 per cent of severely vulnerable cases. So the most vulnerable face the most difficult 
reception. 
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Since Za’atari camp was raised in 2012, those refugees wanting to leave the camps for 
urban areas were required to find a Jordanian national willing to step forward to act as a 
guarantor, enabling them to ‘bail out’ from a camp or holding facility. Formal bail out ap-
plications must be submitted to the Syrian Refugee Assistance Department (SRAD). The 
guarantor (or sponsor, or kafeel) must be someone over 35 years of age, married, with a 
stable job, no police record, and in a direct family relation with the applicant. The guarantor 
undertakes to look after them and to cooperate with the authorities if any issues arise relating 
to the person in their care. Initially, the vast majority of Syrian asylum seekers were able to 
comply with the requirements within days, to then set off for their new place of living. 
However, those unable to find a guarantor were transferred to one of two holding centres – 
Cyber City or Ramtha Stadium – where they waited for weeks or months to find a guarantor. 
This was the case for about 750 people in 2012 (HRW 2012b). 
Those Syrians moving on to urban areas do not obtain a ration card but a Ministry of Interior 
‘service card’, entitling them to education and health services in urban locations.20 
Commendably, these refugees are given equal access to these services to that of Jordanian 
nationals in many respects (Bidinger et al. 2015), though entitlements have reduced as the 
crisis endured and the government was less able to provide support. The service card acts 
as official identification documents, listing basic information about cardholders and their 
families, as well as the place of residence (Aide Médicale Internationale, 2014, p. 21). 
The Government of Jordan estimates that there are over 500,000 unregistered Syrians in 
Jordan. If one accepts that these figures are correct, the question arises as to why this is the 
case, given the benefits that registration incurs in terms of assistance for education, 
healthcare and formal employment (work permits). 
From late 2013, all Syrians in the country were expected to report to the police and go 
through a biometric iris scan to obtain a new MoI service card, required to access 
government provided health and education services. This approach started in December 
2013 with the establishment of a new registration centre near the border; it was then applied 
to the camps in 2014, and rolled out in urban areas in the rest of the country from February 
2015 (Lenner 2016). High fees and bureaucratic obstacles delayed the roll out of the re-
registration programme, but intense negotiations between the Government and UNHCR 
reduced these hindrances, after which roll out accelerated.21 
By the end of 2014, the Jordanian government was taking increasing control of humanitarian 
assistance, with negative implications for protection and service provision to urban refugees. 
The Government was reported as having instructed humanitarian organisations to serve only 
refugees with complete documentation, undermining trust in these organisations (Achilli 
2015a) – however, a number of organisations continue to work explicitly targeting 
undocumented Syrians (Swan 2017). Simultaneously, a growing number of evictions of 
informal tented settlements have been witnessed. In one instance, around 1,300 Syrian 
refugees living in an ITS in the proximities of Amman were forcibly evicted and sent to Azraq 
camp (REACH 2014a). 
At the start of 2016, 250,000 Syrians were estimated to be without updated government 
registration and 152,000 of 515,000 registered Syrian refugees living outside of camps had 
not yet received a new MOI card. Moreover, since April 2014, close to 14,000 Syrian 
refugees had been involuntarily relocated to Za’atari and Azraq Camps as a result of not 
having the required documentation or for working without a permit (NRC 2016a). In 2015, 62 
per cent of families of Syrian refugees in urban areas transited through Za’atari camp upon 
                                                
20 For those refugees who will live in a camp, the cards chiefly serve as documentation of government registration (Bidinger 
et al. 2015). Syrian refugees had access to free services until late 2014, when the costs were considered prohibitive, although 
vaccination and treatment for communicable diseases is still free of charge (EIU 2017a). 
21 By May 2016, re-registered non-camp residents amounted to 366,134, while the population in camps totalled 137,068; 
totalling less than 40 per cent of the government’s census figure (Lenner 2016). 
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arrival in Jordan (and a further 3 per cent through Azraq). This compares with 67 per cent 
entering straight into host communities the previous year, indicating a change in border 
regime towards encampment (CARE 2015). Achilli (2015) also argues that the Jordanian 
government has made increasing attempts to curtail the urban refugee population. 
Government officials’ previous flexible attitude towards refugees meeting all the requirements 
for ‘bail out’ has hardened. Since July 2014 the Jordanian authorities have instructed 
UNHCR to stop issuing Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASCs) to Syrian refugees that had left 
the camps without proper ‘bail out’ documentation. Without an ASC, obtaining access to 
UNHCR as well as government basic services is not possible. Moreover, since the opening 
of Azraq camp in April 2014, the overwhelming majority of bailout applications have been 
denied by SRAD, which appears to have discretionary power in determining the number and 
type of applications to approve (Achilli 2015). 
Prior to the Urban Verification Exercise (UVE) already significant shares of urban refugees 
lacked the MoI card. CARE (2015, p. 23) surveyed 1300 Syrians in urban Jordan to find that 
26 per cent of families who arrived between January and June 2014 did not have a valid MoI 
card, as compared to 21 per cent of those who arrived after 2014 (up until the time of the 
study). Eight per cent of those who arrived in the first half of the year were not registered with 
UNHCR, and 18 per cent of those who arrived in the second half of the year. Of those 
without MOI card, half failed to access health care, and 61 per cent of families without MOI 
card, and 74 per cent without UNHCR registration, did not have children in school. 
Our analysis of primary data finds that between 2015 and 2016, the share of urban 
households (identified using night light analysis) surveyed in three Jordanian cities with at 
least one member having a valid MoI card has improved in Amman, but reduced in Mafraq 
and Irbid (Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.2 Syrian families in urban Jordan having at least one member 
holding a valid MoI card (2015–16) 
 
At the same time, the UVE was successful in bringing more Syrian refugee households into 
the fold of the MoI card regime. Figure 6.3 shows that the share of households having at 
least one member without an MoI card has come down dramatically in Mafraq and Irbid. This 
is an important advancement as these households will have gained access to key services 
for which the MoI card is a prerequisite, while it also indicates that the Government is better 
able to monitor the influx, to possibly generate a greater sense of security. Nevertheless, 
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many Syrian refugee households (a share of 9 per cent in Irbid to 16 per cent in Amman) still 
have one or more members that do not yet have the MoI card, and are thus deprived of its 
benefits. 
Figure 6.3 Syrian families in urban Jordan having at least one member 
without valid MoI card (2015–16) 
 
The Urban Verification Exercise (UVE) thus seemed to improve the relative coverage of 
families holding at least one card amongst its members, but reduced the number of people 
within these families carrying valid MOI cards. The UVE also led to a compounding of 
documentation challenges: in order to be re-registered for a MoI card, Syrians needed a 
UNHCR asylum-seeker certificate, rent agreement and birth certificates of children. However, 
if unable to complete the UVE because of missing documentation, the refugee is now also 
lacking a new MoI card in addition to these other documents. The UVE hence also raised the 
issue of children for whom no birth certificate had been obtained. At the beginning of the 
Syrian Refugee crisis, marriage and birth registration among Syrian refugees in Jordan was 
very low. One study noted that refugees stated that among the barriers to obtaining this 
documentation were a lack of understanding of their importance and how to proceed to 
register. They also were unable to provide the documents required to register marriages and 
births, such as identity papers and marriage certificates. Furthermore, many gave birth at 
home without an authorised midwife, or were refused notification from the hospital if they 
were unable to pay the full cost of the delivery (ARDD-Legal Aid undated). In response, 
ARDD-Legal Aid, UNHCR and the Jordanian Government launched two national campaigns 
to raise awareness among refugee population about the importance of the issue, and to 
mobilise families to correct the status of the children, in late 2014 and May-July 2015. 
Importantly, registration fees were waived and personal status offices were opened in 
Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps, as well as sharia’a courts to document marriages. 
Validation (affixing) of marriages is key in order to affix the kinship of the children, and thus, 
to facilitate the registration of children according to Jordanian law. Additionally, the 
Government of Jordan decided to allow for documents indicating proof of marriage or birth to 
be copies and not the original documentation (ARDD-Legal Aid undated). Despite these 
various measures, the UVE estimates for January 2016 suggest that 30 per cent of Syrian 
refugee children in Jordan did not have birth certificates and could therefore not receive new 
MOI cards (NRC 2016b). 
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Figure 6.4 shows the ways in which residency policy for Syrian refugees has changed over 
time in Jordan. 
Furthermore, Figure 6.5 summarises the interlocking of border regimes, encampment and 
urban pathways, legal status and other policy related outcomes for Syrians in Jordan. It 
draws on data for February 2018 regarding 657,628 UNHCR registered Syrians, sourced 
from UNHCR data portal. 
 
Figure 6.4 Policy change regarding legal residency status in Jordan 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Interlocking policies – Jordan 
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Historically, Jordan has granted full citizenship rights to Palestinian refugees, with the 
exception of approximately 140,000 refugees who originated from Gaza (Bidinger et al. 2015: 
72). Article 2 of the country’s nationality law, Law No. 6 of 1954, grants Jordanian nationality 
to all Palestinians that lived in Jordan between 20 December 1949, and 16 February 1954 
(Sadek 2013). Citizenship was granted as part of Jordan’s territorial claims over the West 
Bank, which it controlled from 1950–1988. Yet, Palestinians have not been treated as equal 
citizens, facing many forms of discrimination and exclusion (Lenner 2016). Some Jordanian 
citizenship laws are gender discriminatory, with significant social implications. Unlike men, 
Jordanian women cannot pass their citizenship to spouses or children. A child born to a non-
Jordanian man is thus not considered a citizen. It has been estimated that these laws directly 
affect more than 65,000 Jordanian women and as many as 500,000 children. In instances 
where children are born to Jordanian mothers and a stateless Palestinian man, the offspring 
becomes statelessness too (Emanuel 2012). 
A different situation pertained to the Palestinian Refugees from Syria. Many, having relatives 
in Jordan, were entitled to find a guarantor until April 2012. Since then, authorities began 
excluding all Palestinians which had not crossed into Jordan through an official border post, 
taking them to ‘Cyber City’, a camp closed recently. Here, they lived in crowded conditions, 
and were guarded by police posted 30 metres from the front door, not allowing them to leave 
the immediate area. The way Palestinians were held at Cyber City, with no possibility of 
release, allegedly met UNHCR’s definition of detention (HRW 2012b). Yet, while UNHCR 
intervenes and advocates for refugees in detention and those subject to deportation, this 
mandate does not extend to the Palestinians. 
As in Lebanon, UNRWA is responsible for Palestinian refugees in Jordan. UNRWA records 
rather than registers Palestinian refugees in order to maintain their right to return to Syria 
when the conflict ends. This has become even more important as President Assad has 
declared that Palestinians who leave Syria will not be welcomed back (Bidinger et al. 2015). 
There are only 12,500 Palestinian Syrian refugees recorded with UNRWA in Jordan and 
estimates suggest that there may be 5,000–20,000 unregistered compatriots. The willingness 
of Palestinian refugees from Syria to come forward to record their presence and obtain 
services is limited by their fear of the Jordanian authorities. As a result of the non-admission 
policy, since January 2013 all Palestinians who have entered have technically committed an 
immigration offence, and are therefore at risk of detention and deportation. Human rights 
observers assert that Palestinians from Syria have been deported for entering Jordan since 
the non-admission policy was put in place (Bidinger et al. 2015: 61). Deportation is usually 
carried out within 24 hours. Intelligence services often come at night and execute the return 
without any option for intervention or judicial review (Bidinger et al. 2015: 64–65). In October 
2017, Human Rights Watch issued a report that noted that the Jordanian authorities 
deported about 400 registered Syrian refugees each month in the first 5 months of the year 
(HRW 2017c). The Government retorted by rejecting the claims as ‘groundless’ (Ghazal 
2017). 
6.2.3 Economic participation 
The Syrian crisis has affected the Jordanian economy in multiple ways. Economic growth 
has been lower (1.8 per cent per year in 2015–16) than government projections (2.4 per 
cent), dragged down by weak industrial and tourism performance. Conflicts in Iraq and Syria 
have hampered access to traditional markets, with agricultural exports particularly heavily 
affected by the closure of trade routes. About 9 per cent of the budget comes from ODA and 
development funding (EIU 2017a: 3, 7). 
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There are about 1.4 million Jordanians currently working, plus an estimated 210,000 
unemployed (Razzaz 2017). Forecasts note that job creation will struggle to keep pace with 
job demand from both nationals and refugees, and unemployment will stay high (EIU 2017a: 
3, 7). Living conditions are affected by weakening remittance inflows from the Gulf Arab 
states and structural adjustment policies. 
In the last few years, policies directed at access to work for the Syrian refugees have 
changed significantly. Before looking at the changes initiated since late 2015 that have 
sought to enable absorption of Syrians in formal labour markets, we first review a set of 
policy measures that highly constrained such access. As in Lebanon, key policy instruments 
include a list of restricted professions, as well as a work permit regime determining access to 
jobs in the formal sector of the economy. Partially as a consequence of these measures, 
many Syrians work in the informal economy, and this work is deemed illegal by the 
government. 
The 1998 MoU with UNHCR states that the Government of Jordan should allow refugees a 
right to work, i.e. have access to employment to support themselves to the extent that ‘the 
laws and regulation permit’. The latter clause is key, as Jordan has ‘significantly limited the 
occupations available to refugees’ (Bidinger et al. 2015: 69–70). Firstly, encampment of a 
significant share of the Syrian refugees has entailed restrictions on working outside the 
camps. This has particularly affected people in camps that were not located near to urban 
labour markets, such as in Azraq. Secondly, the Jordanian Ministry of Labour publishes a list 
of restricted professions and industries in which only Jordanian citizens are allowed to work. 
These include medical, engineering, administrative, accounting and clerical professions; 
telephone and warehouse employment; sales; education; hairdressing; decorating; fuel 
sales; electrical and mechanical occupations; guards; drivers; and construction workers 
(Sadek 2013). The list of restricted professions has prevented most white-collar 
professionals from officially working in their professions (ILO 2015a). Thirdly, there is the 
issue of work permits. Even prior to the start of the crisis, all foreigners in Jordan required a 
work permit from the Ministry of Labour to legally work (in the formal sector). These permits 
were employer and job specific, and thus limited labour mobility. Non-Jordanians with legal 
residency and valid passports could obtain work permits only in the unrestricted professions 
if the prospective employer paid a fee and showed that the job requires experience or skills 
not to be found among the Jordanian population (Achilli 2015a: 2). Fees could range from 
170 to 800 JOD (248 and 1,128 USD) depending on the sector, and because work permits 
also imposed the costs of paying social security premiums, it thus doubly disincentivised 
employers to hire workers formally (ILO 2015a). 
Consequently, very few work permits were granted to Syrian refugees in the early years of 
the crisis.22 People without residency status (itself a possible consequence of missing or 
expired identity papers, or of irregular entry into the country) were unable to obtain a work 
permit. Consequently, public policy made it effectively impossible for Syrians to conduct any 
low or medium skilled work in a legal manner (ACAPS 2013). The Government was found 
reluctant to allow for any humanitarian programming that could train refugees for (self-) 
employment, and its response was characterised by Lenner (2016: 16) as ‘an unofficial yet 
clear reluctance to grant Syrians formal access to any means to gain a living’.23 Moreover, in 
many ways, the constrained options to access (formal) employment to Syrian refugees 
reflected the experience of Iraqi refugees a decade before (Lenner 2016). 
                                                
22 One UNHCR study showed that only 1 per cent of surveyed refugee households had a member with a work permit (UNHCR 
2014b). 
23 Stevens (2013) explains the policy emphasis on temporariness and a reluctance to support socio-economic integration of the 
Syrians including in formal labour markets as being informed by the historic experience of integration of a large influx of 
Palestinian refugees. While relatively successful, the influx affected the demographic and ethnic composition of political 
groupings in Jordan. 
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Nevertheless, Jordan’s informal labour market has commonly accommodated Syrians. Well-
established prior to the Syrian conflict, informal work made up 44 per cent of all employment 
(UNDP et al. 2013: 32). By 2013, the Ministry of Labour estimated that about 160,000 
Syrians were working illegally in Jordan (ACAPS 2013). Besides informal private businesses, 
government agencies were also noted as hiring Syrian workers, mediated by contractors 
(Lenner 2016). 
Typically, work in the informal sector is subject to higher levels of hazards and exploitation, 
lower labour protections and very low or absent levels of social protection. In their 
desperation to make a living, many families resort to child labour. Estimates suggest that 
32,000 refugee children are working in Jordan (Bidinger et al. 2015). An ILO study (ILO 
2014a) reports, for example, that close to half of the families have one working child, while 
one study (UN Women 2013) estimated that 47 per cent of households’ paid employment 
came from children. An unrecorded number of women are forced into prostitution (Bidinger et 
al. 2015). Informal workers are at risk of arrest and detention, and in some cases have been 
deported back to Syria. Peculiarly, such deportations did not prevent immediate re-entry. 
This possibility for re-entry is not applicable to other refugee populations – for example, Iraqis 
who are returned get a stamp on their documents are denied entry for five years, and 
Palestinians who leave or are refouled cannot return (Bidinger et al. 2015: 64). 
From late 2015, the Government’s stated policy position has shifted significantly. In 
November 2015 the Minister of Labour announced a cabinet decision that effectively allowed 
Syrian refugees to work in the sectors open to foreign workers, and to waive some 
restrictions for providing work permits. Then, in February 2016, the ‘Jordan Compact’ 
between donors and the Jordanian government24 set out Jordan’s intention to create 
hundreds of thousands of job opportunities for Syrians and Jordanians by 2021, reframing 
the Syrian refugee crisis into a development and economic opportunity (Government of 
Jordan 2016a). Jordan is now trying to align refugee interventions with its long-term 
development planning, as set out in the Vision 2025 development strategy and the 
Governorates Development Programme for 2016–18. Government and foreign donors are 
also coordinating their efforts towards achieving the Response Plan targets (EIU 2017a). 
The Jordan Compact sets out that the Government of Jordan is now officially committed to 
providing formal access to the labour market, in return for donor support to its economy and 
infrastructure (Lenner 2016). The Compact envisaged issuing 200,000 work permits for 
Syrians (Government of Jordan 2016a), effectively seeking to formalise existing jobs and 
create new ones. King Abdullah envisaged that for every job created for a Syrian, five jobs 
would be created for Jordanians (Howden et al. 2017). The Compact is a ten-year deal that 
utilises Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as a way to attract foreign direct investment. It gives 
Jordan access to the EU’s market free of tariffs or quotas, as long as the products being 
exported are produced within the SEZs by a labour force that is at least 15 per cent Syrian 
(with the goal of being 25 per cent Syrian by 2019). In addition to attracting foreign capital, 
SEZs are minimally taxed and face few bureaucratic hurdles. The Compact reflects a 
growing donor pressure, who, faced with rising numbers of refugees in Europe, seek to 
improve the living and working conditions that may entice Syrians to stay in the region 
(Lenner 2016). However, the demands of formulating and carrying out such comprehensive 
planning requires a major upgrading of the capacities of Jordan’s national, regional and local 
authorities (EIU 2017a). 
  
                                                
24 The Jordan Response Plan has a budget of US$7.6 billion over 2016-19, but the Government does not believe that even that 
fully reflects the costs that the country is bearing in hosting the refugees. The government estimates that it has been forced to 
find an extra US$8.6 billion for education, health, subsidies on electricity, water, healthcare, infrastructure and municipal 
services, plus indirect costs of US$3.1-3.6 billion a year to absorb its new Syrian population since the beginning of the refugee 
crisis (EIU 2017a). 
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The Compact has been accompanied by a range of policy changes and project initiatives. 
These include a pilot project seeking to provide 2,000 work permits for Syrians in the 
garment sector in industrial zones, and efforts to formalise the status of Syrians working 
informally in the construction, agriculture, and food and beverages sectors (Lenner 2016). 
The Ministry of Labour removed the need for a passport from the work permit application 
process, recognising that many refugees had fled Syria without one (Howden et al. 2017) 
and instead accepting Ministry of Interior service cards and UNHCR-issued asylum-seeker 
cards (Dunmore 2016). Moreover, between April 2016 an April 2017, the Government of 
Jordan declared multiple ‘grace periods’ (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/ 
55936), in which employers of informally employed Syrians pay neither application fees for 
their permits (>US$500), nor fines (US$280-US$2,100) for not having applied for them 
before. Critically, however, the 200,000 work permits are not to be issued for jobs restricted 
to Jordanians (Howden et al. 2017). This is a key red line for the Government, as high levels 
of unemployment amongst young host populations makes this politically incendiary. 
The policy change had a fair start: by January 2017, 35,000 Syrians had been granted work 
permits (EIU 2017a). Nevertheless, the goal of issuing 50,000 permits by the end of 2016 
was missed. In response, the government made it easier for agricultural workers to get 
permits (Howden et al. 2017).25 Other measures were taken in the construction sector. The 
Ministry of Labour, with support from the ILO, has issued a new programme together with a 
federation of unions to issue 10,000 work permits to Syrian refugees in the construction 
sector, that are neither job nor employer specific (Jordan Times 2017). This arrangement 
allows day labourers to work legally without being tied to a single employer. Here too, 
requirements were relaxed. Initially, Syrians were required to present a Certificate of Prior 
Learning, but this was later scrapped, and instead of having to register for social security, 
Syrians had to pay roughly US$70 for annual private health insurance. In all sectors, the 
labour ministry removed the need to present proof of social security registration to apply for a 
work permit and scrapped the requirement for a health certificate for those refugees who had 
a valid Ministry of Interior ID card (Howden et al. 2017). 
Other explanations for the slow uptake of the work permit schemes consider the incentives 
for employers and Syrian workers. Employers may not have adequate incentives to formalise 
employment of Syrians for various reasons. Jordan has strict ratios of Jordanian nationals to 
foreign employees in some sectors. Hiring more Syrians in formal positions would require 
adding more Jordanians to the payroll to maintain the ratio. In many cases, employers were 
already struggling to meet their quota for national staff in industries not traditionally attractive 
to Jordanians (Howden et al. 2017). There may also be strong disincentives to formalising 
informal Syrian workers. Those small businesses such as shops and restaurants that employ 
Syrians often do not have any formal registration (ARDD-Legal Aid 2016b; UNDP et al. 
2012). Formalising the status of their Syrian employees – some being children – might get 
them into trouble with the authorities. Employers may also not be keen to start paying social 
security contributions for these workers. Moreover, work may be casual in nature and not 
amenable to formal contracts. Indeed, it may be precisely their precarious status that makes 
it attractive for employers to hire and fire these workers, and there may be little interest in 
formalising them (ARDD-Legal Aid 2016b). 
Others point out that the new schemes may not account for some incentives built into the 
structure of the labour market. For instance, in agriculture, hiring is reportedly organised 
through middlemen, who are mostly Egyptian and who are paid generous sums by Egyptians 
willing to work, but may not be incentivised similarly to hire Syrians (Lenner 2016: 20). 
                                                
25 Farm labourers working seasonally typically did not have a permanent employer who could apply for their permits, so the 
ministry allowed refugees to apply through agricultural cooperatives. Syrians could use these permits to move between farms, 
working for any of the farmers in the cooperative (Howden et al. 2017). 
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Syrians themselves also have various motives for not taking up the work permits. One recent 
large scale survey commissioned by CARE (2017: 4, 5) found that just over one fifth of 
Syrian refugees of working age had a work permit. Respondents noted that this was 
because: there was no work available (66 per cent), costs too high (10 per cent), employers 
refused to pay associated costs (10 per cent), fear of losing assistance (8 per cent) and other 
reasons (16 per cent). The study also highlighted that refugees were hesitant to obtain work 
permits due to confusion about the application procedures. 
Prior to the Compact, Syrians caught working without permits could be sent to refugee 
camps, as part of a clear monitoring and securitisation strategy. The World Bank successfully 
asked Jordan to stop this practice (Howden et al. 2017). Nevertheless, the memory of such 
policy measures may well last and trust in the new schemes may need time to grow. 
Moreover, people may be distrustful that with the new work permit policy in place, there may 
be greater justification for cracking down on informal work. Moreover, the new work permits 
may not be accessible for encamped Syrians, as current regulations only allow residents to 
leave the camp for a period of up to 15 days (Lenner 2016). 
Moreover, as work permits are issued annually, and policy can be easily changed and have 
done so in the past years, there is uncertainty amongst Syrians if benefits may last. 
Additionally, Ministry of Labour (MoL) directorates responsible for issuing work permits are 
reportedly engaging in working practices that conflict with the new rules. Lenner (2016) 
suggests that such ambiguity and the partially overlapping nature of rules and regulations in 
Jordan may function to give a semblance of policy coherence between fragmented 
institutions while allowing for some wiggle room. However, for vulnerable refugees it creates 
greater insecurity, as rules and regulations cannot be relied on. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on job creation in Special Economic Zones has been criticised. 
Its current workforce are typically single female South Asian workers living on-site at the 
factories; it is unlikely that Jordanians are willing to do this, at minimum wage levels and in 
sweatshop-like conditions. There are concerns that Jordanian industry’s production costs are 
simply too high, and productivity levels too low for new jobs to be generated at the level 
needed (Lenner 2016). Moreover, Syrians have declined this kind of work because wage 
levels are insufficient to cover urban rents; women workers are unable to find childcare 
facilities; long transport times; and, critically, the perceived risk that taking up poorly paid 
formal work may in future lead to loss of humanitarian assistance packages. For Jordan’s 
urban refugees, working in the SEZs would require a long commute for a minimum wage that 
probably would not cover rent or transport, while they may also have earned better money in 
other sectors like construction or in restaurants, which required less commitment and offered 
more freedom (Howden et al. 2017). 
Discrimination may be another factor that determines access to formal jobs for refugees. It is 
noteworthy that despite enjoying full citizenship, Jordanian Palestinians are reported to suffer 
discrimination in employment opportunities, and are not allowed the same opportunities to 
work within the government, police, security or social services (Bidinger et al. 2015). 
Moreover, policy and media discourses regarding the Syrian refugees, as previously for the 
Iraqi refugees, have often been negative, stirring up resentment amongst Jordanians. These 
discourses emphasised that Syrians would take the jobs of Jordanians, even though there is 
little credible evidence that this is the case. Arguably, this discourse of blaming the refugees 
has redirected attention away from public spending cuts by the government, a part of 
structural adjustment packages agreed with the International Monetary Fund, that have 
affected the living conditions of ordinary Jordanians (Lenner 2016). King Abdullah’s public 
support for the permit policy is, however, providing an important means to overcome such 
legacies. 
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6.2.4 Housing 
The majority of Syrians entering Jordan live in the governorates in the north, along the Syrian 
border: Al Mafraq hosts over 12 per cent of the Syrians, not including those in Za’atari camp; 
Irbid hosts nearly 30 per cent as does Amman; and over 10 per cent live in Zarqa (Bidinger 
et al. 2015). Za’atari camp provides perhaps the best known image of the Syrian refugees in 
Jordan. As one of the largest camps in the world, it has housed fluctuation populations. While 
there were over 200,000 Syrians in April 2013, numbers have hovered around the 80,000 
mark since August 2015 (http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/settlement.php?id=176). Other 
camps include the Emirati Jordanian Camp, King Hussein Park, Azraq, and Cyber City 
(Bidinger et al. 2015). The camps are managed by UNHCR and supported by the 
Government of Jordan, which also made the land available (Saliba 2016). 
Globally, countries requiring displaced people to live in camps typically do so because of 
concerns about public order, control over movement, tension between displaced and local 
communities, competition over limited economic opportunities, or for fears that displaced 
people will be less likely to return home if they establish a life in an urban centre (UNHCR 
2014a). While leaving the camp is discouraged, one reason to stay is that access to services 
within the camps is generally better than outside, with Governments and NGOs providing 
access to health care, education and food aid. At the same time, it is clear that over time the 
camps are becoming more and more like a town or city, or a ‘city-camp’ (Agier 2002). 
Nevertheless, over 80 per cent of Syrian refugees in Jordan live outside of camps (Achilli 
2015a). Most find housing in urban areas, where over 520,000 refugees are estimated to 
live. Their influx has heavily increased the demand on schools, sanitation, housing, food, 
energy and water in Jordanian cities. Housing rent has tripled or even quadrupled in border 
zones and other areas of high refugee density. While these affect both Jordanians and 
Syrians, the latter tend to pay higher rents for the same housing unit, by cramming in more 
people (Achilli 2015a). 
Whilst basic short-term needs were met in Jordan’s camps, after years of living in these 
conditions a large proportion of refugees began aspiring for a higher standard of living, jobs, 
permanent shelters, education, and community participation (Sullivan and Simpson 2017: 6). 
Living conditions for Syrian refugees ‘vary widely: while so-called ‘informal tented 
settlements’ have grown, and other refugees live in ruins, building shells and garages, more 
than half rent regular accommodation’ (Lenner and Schmelter 2016: 124). Jordan’s cities 
also incorporate historic camps for refugees from Palestine that over time have become fully 
urban in form and outlook and, that increasingly have absorbed Syrian and other refugees. 
There are ten official refugee camps overseen by UNRWA, and three unofficial refugee 
camps for Palestinian refugees.26 
About one in five Syrians is estimated to live in substandard accommodation, such as 
garages, chicken coops, and tents (Achilli 2015a). In addition, a smaller number of refugees 
reside in informal tented settlements (ITS) spread through the country, often lacking access 
to basic services such as health, education, water and food. Our analysis of the CFSME 
primary data sets held by Impact Initiatives noted – unsurprisingly – that people living in tents 
or tented settlements are particularly prevalent in rural areas of Jordan (Figure 6.6). City 
dwellers predominantly lived in rented accommodation, reporting comparatively higher 
satisfaction with their standard of accommodation. Moreover, rural dwellers also reported a 
much higher incidence of exploitative relations with landlords. This suggests that moving to 
cities, for those who can afford it, may involve paying higher housing costs, but also involves 
lessoning the risks of exploitation experienced on rural farms, as it unties work from access 
to housing and thus may allow refugees to achieve greater dignity. Nevertheless, not all is 
well in urban areas. For instance, while written rental contracts are commonly used, these 
                                                
26 As of 2017, the official camps housed nearly 370,000 Palestine refugees, or 18 per cent of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan. 
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often provide limited legal protection; in case of dispute, a rental contract will not be accepted 
by a court unless it is registered with the local municipality, and tends to favour the landlord 
over the tenant (CARE 2015). 
Figure 6.6 Accommodation in tented settlements or tents 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on analysis of primary data from WFP and REACH (2016, 2015) 
6.3 Local urban responses: municipalities and other actors 
As for Lebanon, the academic literature on the role of urban local government authorities in 
managing the refugee influx is limited. Both academic and grey literature on Jordan offers a 
variety of statistics, figures and analysis, but these are typically not oriented towards specific 
urban areas, and directed towards the governorate or national level. As such, Betts et al. 
(2017: 2) detect differences in reception within Jordan at the governorate level: ‘Mafraq was 
relatively more open, followed by Sahab and Zarqa’. They explain these findings by the 
influential role of tribal affiliation and the historical relationships between the area and 
Syrians. But they also note the role of perceptions of economic opportunity by local elites 
seeking resources from the central government. 
Jordan has 93 municipalities spread out over 12 governorates (mohafazat), which are in turn 
sub-divided into districts (liwa), sub-districts (qada) and municipalities (nahia). The 2007 
Municipal Act introduced a considerable element of decentralisation and the direct election of 
municipal councils, with the exception of the Greater Amman Municipality.27 According to the 
[Jordanian] Municipal Act 2007, municipalities are responsible for urban planning, public 
health, education, culture and sport, public safety, etc. Municipalities are ruled by elected 
officials, yet are also placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. At the 
governorate level, there are offices of the main government actors for refugee response – 
MoMA, MoPIC, CVBD – who oversee the rollout of national level policy. As such, 
                                                
27 Amman’s City Council has 20 of its 40 members, plus the mayor appointed by the Prime Minister, in order to represent public 
institutions and civil society organizations. The other half is elected through local elections. This allows the central government 
to exercise political control over the capital. Moreover, the distribution of parliamentary seats favours the rural and tribal areas 
inhabited by native Jordanians, leaving under-represented the areas where most Palestinian-origin Jordanians live (Pavanello 
and Haysom 2012). 
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municipalities ‘are much more considered as semi-public entities providing public services 
than as autonomous self-governed authorities’ (OECD 2016: 1). The law has enabled a 
group of municipalities to jointly implement the public services they are responsible for. 
However, the central government has privatised functions ‘that should be a priori devolved to 
municipalities, and the range of their responsibilities is now limited to solid waste 
management, street lighting, storm water drainage, public markets and others’ (ibid.). 
While this review found little empirical evidence on the prevalence of urban informal 
settlements in Jordan, since the 1970s the Jordanian government has taken a range of 
actions to improve urban slum areas (Government of Jordan 2016b). The Palestinian camps 
were extra-territorial pockets within Jordanian towns for 50 years, until the launching of 
Community Infrastructure Programs in 1997 by the Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation (HUDC) (Ababsa 2011). This Corporation also implemented projects to improve 
the service infrastructures of squatter areas, e.g. in East Amman. At the same time, the 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs amended building regulations in order to limit the squatter areas, 
while it issued instructions to municipalities to monitor construction and irregularities and not 
allow any type of construction to be built without certified drawings. Moreover, land use plans 
were adopted by municipalities to enhance urban planning (Government of Jordan 2016b). 
Focusing on Amman, in recent years government-sponsored urban upgrading projects in 
informal settlements and camps have virtually stopped, and the focus has shifted largely to 
the provision of social housing and the beautification of Amman’s tourist areas (Oesch 2010). 
However, efforts towards social housing have not always been successful. For instance, in 
2006 and 2008, the Government embarked on an active policy of social housing, giving 
homes to the poorest citizens, and creating working class suburbs built on state land outside 
urban centres (Zarqa and Marka). The settlements were well built, but lacking services and 
transport, and were deemed to stigmatise the poor (Ababsa 2011). 
Most cities in Jordan are affected by poor built environments and low quality of services, as a 
consequence of ineffective urban management. However, ‘effectiveness differs across 
municipalities and across cities, based on financial, technological, and human differences’ 
(Alnsour 2014: 274). In this respect, it is noteworthy that ‘Nearly all of the constraints 
preventing municipalities from better addressing the impact of the refugee crisis are related 
to problems that existed prior to the Syria crisis, such as bureaucratic hurdles, lack of 
capacity among staff, and insufficient means of obtaining financial resources’ (Chatham 
House 2015: 2). 
The Jordan Compact and the Jordan Response Plan include a portfolio of interventions to 
support areas like municipal services and infrastructure28 (EIU 2017a). Since 2013, the World 
Bank has been supporting a Jordan- Emergency Services and Social Resilience project, 
using a trust fund comprising US$53 million with the objective to support Jordanian 
municipalities affected by the influx of Syrian refugees in delivering services and employment 
opportunities for Jordanians and Syrians (World Bank 2016a). It seeks to provide annual 
block grants to municipalities most impacted by the Syrian crisis. Through an innovation 
fund, municipal grants will also be awarded to projects that demonstrate creativity in offering 
solutions to challenges facing the community. Moreover, the fund seeks to support the 
institutional capacity of municipalities, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and the Cities and 
Villages Development Bank to strengthen their implementation, oversight, monitoring and 
reporting capacities. 
Some observers have noted that the centralised Jordanian government system prevents 
more effective municipal service delivery, inhibiting their role in addressing the impact of 
Syrian refugees on Jordanian host communities. Chatham House (2015) thus argues for a 
shift in mentality and approach as to how refugee-concentrated areas are governed, 
                                                
28 The Jordan Compact had secured US$1.7 billion in pledged grants and concessional financing, including US$700 million for 
2016 (EIU 2017a). 
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recommending that local authorities are given a greater role in addressing impacts and 
providing services to hosts and refugees. Alnsour (2014: 271), in the same vein, 
recommends that improved urban planning requires a reassessment of the funding allocated 
to municipalities from the public budget, increasing the participation of people in the decision 
making process, and the development of public-private partnerships. However, hopes for this 
to occur is not great, and some authors observe 
…absence of political will in the central government to decentralize the allocation of 
financial and human resources to municipalities or to remove the highly centralized 
oversight of their operations. This is partly due to central government concerns about 
municipal capacity, as well as a consequence of the general security environment in 
the country. 
(Chatham House 2015: 2) 
Meanwhile, our analysis of primary data (see Figure 6.7) of Impact Initiatives for urban 
respondents in five Jordanian districts finds that between 16 per cent and 46 per cent of 
Syrian respondents are dissatisfied with the service provision by their municipalities. Pearson 
Chi-square test rejected the null that this perception of municipal services is equal across the 
cities (Chi2=73.115, p-value<0.001). Further analysis of this result using pair-wise Chi-square 
test revealed significant differences between six pairs of cities out of the total ten pairs 
considered (see 0 for details). The data thus underlines the argument that there are 
significantly different performances in municipal service delivery across major Jordanian 
cities. 
Figure 6.7 Satisfaction with municipal services 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on analysis of primary data from REACH (2014b). 
Unlike Lebanon, for Jordan a significantly smaller academic literature investigates the 
governance of informal settlements and the role of non-state actors in urban governance. In 
Jordan, ‘citizen groups are able, albeit in minor but remarkable ways, to organize themselves 
if not to manage at least to change their urban setting’ (Ababsa 2011: 60). In some 
instances, residents associations have been active in Amman, to oppose developmental 
interventions such as against the building of a wall around the citadel (Ababsa 2011). Faith-
based organisations also play a prominent role. From the 1960s onwards, the Muslim 
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Brotherhood was able to develop an extensive network of charities in Jordanian towns and 
cities. By 2010, these included 14 clinics and two hospitals, and the Muslim Brotherhood 
manage, through the Islamic Centre Society, 50 primary and secondary schools (the Dar al-
Aqsa network) for 16,000 middle class students, 56 orphanages (for 12,000 children) and a 
university in Zarqa. Furthermore, since the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has 
faced competition from an emerging Salafi movement (Ababsa 2011: 58). Such faith-based 
organisations played a crucial role supporting Iraqi refugees in Syria (Sassoon 2008) and in 
Jordan (Libal and Harding 2011). However, the sheer size of the refugee flows has strained 
the limited capacity of such local groups to provide comprehensive aid (Libal and Harding 
2011: 169). 
For the Syrian refugees in Jordanian cities, informal institutions have emerged to support 
everyday life. For instance, as a consequence of displacement, many refugees lack the 
necessary civic documents such as birth, marriage and divorce certificates. In their absence, 
alternative, informal adjudication mechanisms involving local religious leaders are adopted 
that ‘meet cultural standards of formality’ (Riach and James 2016: 555). Syrian refugees in 
the largest camp in the country were thus found ‘more likely to discuss disputes or legal 
issues with kinship groups such as family members, community leaders/elders or religious 
leaders over Jordanian, UNHCR or NGO administrations’ (ibid.). 
News sources offer stories of mayors speaking out about the refugee crisis. However, these 
often centre on the impact of refugees on the towns/cities, specifically the strain on public 
services, and not so much on what strategic or policy interventions are taken. With the 
exception of Amman, which is part of the 100 Resilient Cities network supported by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and an NRC shelter programme specific to Irbid, very few of these 
articles describe policies or activities that are implemented to manage the refugee crisis. As 
such, Amman will be launching a resilience strategy plan document in the coming months. 
Existing strategy documents refer to how the city plans to tackle issues that have arisen from 
the refugee crisis – although these are high level, rather than giving specifics around the 
policies and programmes that will be implemented. One aspect includes a centre to be set up 
in Amman to help refugees integrate into Jordanian society, assisting them to register 
businesses and look for housing. However, as noted, even such a city-specific response is 
made under the oversight of the national level government. 
Searching through more official sources, such as press releases from government sites, also 
found very few, if any, announcements of city-specific plans that refer specifically to the 
refugee response. Subsequent consultations by Impact Initiatives with key stakeholders were 
thus undertaken as part of this project to affirm that at the local government level, yet again, 
there is very little in the way of documentation that outlines a specific town’s or city’s policy 
towards refugees. As policies addressing the refugee influx are set at the national 
government level and merely enacted by local actors, some contacts suggested that policies 
on refugees with regard to residency, economic participation, and housing simply do not exist 
in any form at the municipal level, while others suggested that if such documentation does 
exist, there are only hard copies available at the local offices. Contacts also indicated that 
municipal governments rarely stray outside of their mandates and when they do, there is little 
documentation to support what they are doing. In fact, even for their officially mandated 
activities, record keeping practices are very poor and finding accurate information about past, 
present, and planned activities as they relate to specific pieces of policy is very challenging. 
Finally, consultations suggest that NGOs and UN Agencies in the early years of the crisis 
sidestepped local governments, though there is now a much stronger engagement with 
municipalities. Aid agencies have also typically gone through the national-level government 
departments when planning activities, because it is the national authorities that have sought 
to offer firm oversight of local responses and who ultimately reserve the right to sanction any 
activities. 
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7 Wellbeing of urban refugees and their hosts 
in Jordan and Lebanon: A systematic 
review of the academic literature 
This section presents the findings of the systematic review of the academic literature that has 
focused on the wellbeing of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. We embellish these findings 
with new analysis of primary data collected by Impact Initiatives as part of other research 
engagements. Though our study has a specific focus on the Syrian refugees and their hosts 
in Jordan and Lebanon, to better understand their condition it was important to situate their 
experiences within a broader historical context of how refugees have been received in these 
two countries. To achieve this, the review focuses on the recent/ongoing flow of Syrian 
refugees, but also draws on the experiences of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan and 
Lebanon. We also provide some comparison with other migrant worker groups in the 
countries, where relevant. As pointed out earlier, the review uses three thematic lenses to 
assess wellbeing outcomes of refugees/hosts: housing, economic participation, and legal 
status. The rest of this section analyses the relevant literature by separating them under 
these three thematic areas. 
In the following sections we summarise findings from our review regarding the material, 
subjective and relational dimensions of wellbeing with respect to the modalities of reception 
that regard registration and legal status; housing; and economic participation. 
7.1 Registration 
Both Jordan and Lebanon’s historic experience of hosting Palestinian and Iraqi refugees ‘has 
led to a reluctance to admit a new population of refugees as anything more than temporary 
guests’ (Lenner and Schmelter 2016: 122). There are no laws that can assign refugee status 
with accompanying rights. Hence, whereas in liberal democracies civic rights are linked to 
permanent residency, here nationality serves as a primary source from which civil rights and 
entitlements are derived (Knudsen 2007: 4). Consequently, in the absence of refugee or 
asylum law, Jordan and Lebanon consider refugees and asylum seekers foremost as 
‘foreigners’. 
A sense of cultural identity as a nation significantly shapes the way that concepts such as 
reception or integration are approached (Ager and Strang 2008). For instance, the 
Government of Jordan refers to Iraqi and Syrian refugees as ‘visitors’, ‘irregular guests’, 
‘Arab brothers’ or simply ‘guests’, which has no legal meaning under domestic laws but 
express a proud custom of offering generous hospitability (Akash 2015; Saliba 2016). 
Stevens thus summarises Jordan’s analysis of its obligations to Iraqis as follows: 
A visitor or guest to a country is offered hospitality but is not owed protection as such. 
Protection is associated with asylum; hospitality is a cultural (and religious) tradition. 
The guest is alien [..], subject to legal rules on residence, and generally to be treated 
with courtesy; in return, the guest is expected to respect the laws of the hosting state, 
comply with temporary residence obligations, and leave once these have expired. 
(Stevens 2013: 24) 
Mason (2011: 354) argues that ‘the figure of the refugee is regarded in the Arab world as 
synonymous with the Palestinian situation’, with the result that ‘refugee, as a term, is also 
rejected by many Iraqis themselves’. Hence, in the context of enduring displacement, the 
terminology of ‘guests’ connotes hospitality, but also the temporary nature of refugees’ 
presence in the country, and ultimately their lack of rights (Nusair 2013: 21). 
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7.1.1 Registration and status determination: material wellbeing 
In Lebanon, refugees face daily exploitation and are extremely marginalised due to their 
precarious legal status (Allan 2014; Lenner and Schmelter 2016: 126). The legal 
mechanisms that create this vulnerability for Syrians are not new; there are important 
parallels with those used in respect of Palestinian refugees, Iraqi refugees and migrant 
workers in the country. 
Enduring displacement in a context of limited opportunities to gain income and high costs of 
living, including significant costs of retaining legal status, has absorbed refugees’ savings 
and pushed many into poverty. While in 2014, poverty assessments found that less than half 
of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon were assessed to spend less than a minimum expenditure 
basket, by 2015 this was the case for more than two-thirds of Syrian refugees (https://data. 
unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=9098). Refugees’ average monthly household 
income was a third of their Lebanese counterparts’ average monthly income (Harb and Saab 
2014). 
Public policy has made it difficult to renew residency permits, which has caused a drastic 
increase in the number of Syrian refugees who lack valid legal status in Lebanon (Janmyr 
2016). It is very common for Syrian households in Lebanon to have members that lack legal 
residency status, due to the accumulation of costs involved and the difficulty of finding a 
sponsor. The Government of Lebanon does not issue residence permits to Syrians without 
identity papers (Bidinger et al. 2015) and does not publish regular statistics on Syrian 
refugees who lack legal residence status. However, the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian 
Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) conducted by WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF surveyed a 
representative sample of 5,000 Syrian refugee households throughout Lebanon during May 
and June 2017. It found that whereas 58 per cent of surveyed households in 2014 had all 
members having legal residency, this figure had dropped sharply and by 2017 only 19 per 
cent did so (Figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1 Households that reported having all household members with 
legal residency 
 
Source: UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP (2017: 13) 
The lack of complete and valid legal documentation has serious consequences. Lebanese 
security services have conducted mass raids, arresting refugees without legal residency 
(HRW 2016a). Where Syrians have been put in detention, Palestinian refugees from Syria 
have been forcibly repatriated to Syria (Bidinger et al. 2015: 51). Another key consequence 
relates to the ability to earn a livelihood; its wellbeing effects are discussed in detail in section 
7.3. 
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The lack of legal status has left refugees vulnerable to a range of abuses, including labour 
exploitation and sexual abuse, unable to turn to the authorities for protection for fear that 
police may arrest them for expired residency (HRW 2017b). Reports of sexual harassment, 
assault and forced sexual exploitation of women and girls, sometimes by other Syrians, but 
mostly at the hands of local men, have dogged settlements in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. 
The latent threat of sexual violence, combined with extreme poverty, have caused an 
upswing in the number of child marriages among Syrian refugees (Anderson 2013).29 Half of 
all studies reviewed by Wells et al. (2016) for Jordan noted the fear of abuse outside the 
home. 
In Jordan, thousands of Syrians have been able to use the bail out system successfully, yet it 
has led to the exploitation of refugees, many of whom have, in their desperation to leave the 
camps, paid ‘middlemen’ around US$500 to arrange to be ‘bailed out’ by Jordanian citizens 
unknown to them (UNHCR 2013a). Stave and Hillesund (2015: 32) found that 87 per cent of 
refugees in Za’atari, and 58 per cent of out-of-camp Syrians, are from rural backgrounds, 
with the former less likely to have completed secondary or university education than the 
latter, who in turn are significantly less well-educated than the Jordanian population. The 
‘bailout’ system hence contains an important class element. It has often enabled those 
Syrians with sufficient access to capital and connections to leave refugee camps and move 
into Jordanian urban host communities, but also consigned the poorest Syrians to the 
camps, and it is these people who could exert the strongest downward pressure on wages 
(Turner 2015: 395). 
Legal precariousness is now a reality for the majority of Syrian refugees, but is even more 
strongly affecting Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS). In Lebanon, their opportunities for 
residency renewal ‘existed only within an extremely restricted time frame and, in practice, 
were virtually impossible for PRS to benefit from’. Even in the few cases that were 
successful, renewal was granted for only three months (NRC and IRC 2015: 8). 
For Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, not being able to gain citizenship has translated in not 
being entitled to work, health care, or higher education, and being barred from social and 
political rights beyond those secured by UNRWA. Reduced work opportunities both in 
Lebanon and abroad have contributed to a devaluation of education among many youth – 
this, in sharp contrast to the past, when education was highly valued (Feldman 2017). The 
enduringly temporary status of the Palestinians ‘limits the extent to which they can control 
and improve their lives and surroundings; consequently, their children are deprived on many 
fronts’ (Makhoul et al. 2003: 259). 
Jordan initiated a policy of obligatory renewal of MoI service cards for all Syrians since 2014. 
The Government noted that one factor of why refugees lack valid documentation relates to 
the renewal of expired UNHCR documentation (Aide Médicale Internationale, 2014, p. 17). 
Achilli (2015a: 7) observes that the government has instructed humanitarian organisations to 
serve only refugees with complete documentation. In its own right, it is not unreasonable for 
the Government to insist that Syrians must have the right documents, and the GoJ works 
with UNHCR to try to achieve that. Yet, applications for residence permits based on UNHCR 
registration are routinely rejected in contravention of official regulations (UNHCR et al. 2016). 
This has led to refugees in host communities not being able to access basic humanitarian 
services, and exposing them to arrest and exploitation (Achilli 2015: 7). In response to this 
concern, various humanitarian agencies specifically target groups lacking full documentation. 
One significant finding emerging from the review is the difficulties, frustrations and fears of 
refugees in navigating complex bureaucratic procedures. Prohibitive paperwork requirements 
and fees, combined with arbitrary application of rules, have hindered Syrians from renewal of 
                                                
29 More broadly, reports have noted the gender inequity embedded in personal status laws governing aspects such as divorce 
within Christian, Shia, Druze, Sunni communities (HRW 2015c). 
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their residency status. A study in the city of Mafraq, Jordan, finds that while there are no 
gender differences in people lacking valid paperwork, a disproportionate number of 
undocumented Syrian refugees are children. While awareness about legal documentation is 
equal among males and females, the women were found to be the driving forces in resolving 
documentation problems – for instance by seeking legal advice, going to the police station 
and the courts. Men, however, sought to avoid engaging with the authorities, often due to 
fear and past trauma experiences involving the police (Swan 2017). 
A systematic review by Wells et al. (2016: 3) finds that for Syrian refugees in Jordan, 
‘Difficulties associated with complicated registration processes were reported to limit access 
to healthcare, education, and services’. In Lebanon too, bureaucratic processes of 
registration and residency permission create ‘hierarchies of eligibility and deservingness’ that 
pitch ‘Lebanese versus Syrian, registered versus unregistered’ (Parkinson and Behrouzan 
2015: 329). These authors argue that Lebanese public hospitals and healthcare providers 
seemed to be ‘actively working against refugees’ interests’, using bureaucratic strategies to 
disincentivise Syrians staying in Lebanon by depriving their access to healthcare. The 
slowness of administrative and legal services is of particular concern for refugees, 
considering the temporal nature of residency status and high levels of mobility. Uncertainty 
about one’s future plans and about one’s ability to complete legal administrative processes 
leads many to prefer quick fix alternatives including non-registration (Riach and James 
2016). Refugees experience the renewal process as abusive and arbitrary (HRW, 2016a; 
Lebanon Support, 2016a). 
Lack of valid documentation has also hindered Syrians’ ability to register marriages and 
births in Jordan and Lebanon. ‘For refugees from Syria in Lebanon, the simple matter of 
registering a child under these circumstances becomes a fraught bureaucratic endeavour 
involving multiple Lebanese government officials’ (Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015: 328). An 
estimated 10,000 Syrian babies born in Lebanon were estimated to require birth certificates 
in 2013 and a growing number of children are undocumented (Bidinger et al. 2015). A 2014 
UNHCR survey of 5,779 new-borns found that 72 per cent do not possess an official birth 
certificate (UNHCR 2015a, in Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015: 328). Without at least a birth 
notification document from the hospital or an authorised midwife, a child will face difficulties 
registering with UNHCR and accessing assistance such as food, education and healthcare. 
In addition, without an official birth certificate a child may have difficulties obtaining Syrian 
identity papers and may therefore not be able to cross the border to Syria (Bidinger et al. 
2015: 52). Statelessness consigns these children to significant structural vulnerability in 
future. 
7.1.2 Registration and status determination: subjective wellbeing 
Historically, mental health issues among refugees have been viewed as the result of 
exposure to traumatic events in war, and refugees are at higher risk of psychiatric morbidity, 
including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Kazour et al. 2017). A significant body of 
literature, however, also points to the sizable contribution of chronic stressful conditions in 
the post-migration context (Farhood et al. 1993; Harrell-Bond 1997; Miller and Rasmussen 
2017, 2010; Rasmussen and Annan 2010; Watters 2001). Chronic daily stressors such as 
poverty, social isolation, and family violence ‘erode people’s coping resources and tax their 
mental health’ (Miller and Rasmussen 2010: 12). 
Protracted displacement typically generates amongst displaced groups a sense of ‘being in 
limbo’, characterised by deep uncertainty about the future (Horst and Grabska 2015). Illegal 
residency status in Lebanon is also creating various forms of psychological pressure (Janmyr 
2016). Fear of arrest and possible refoulement restricts refugees’ movement, affecting the 
ability to work, get health care or send children to school (Achilli 2015a; Bidinger et al. 2015; 
HRW 2016a). Such fears are deemed a factor implicated in half of the nearly 500,000 Syrian  
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school-age children registered with UNHCR in Lebanon not getting a formal education  
(HRW 2016a). And while refugees highlight the benefits of volunteering and active 
engagement in community life, their offers to volunteer are all too often ignored by 
humanitarian organisations (Wells et al. 2016). 
7.1.3 Registration and status determination: Relational wellbeing 
Historical relations of social and economic proximity means that ‘the raw material to unite 
Syrians and Jordanians in common causes exists in the form of shared identity markers such 
as family ties, qabilah/’ashira [tribal, ed] networks and pan-Arab nationalism’ (Stevens 2016: 
61). Such relations were important in Lebanon too, and enshrined in cultural principles, 
practices and politics of hospitality. 
Undoubtedly, the cultural and normative obligations on hosts to offer hospitality to the 
Syrians and other refugees have enabled the tremendous number of refugees being hosted 
in the region. Such norms of hospitality can facilitate relational wellbeing between host and 
refugees, however it is not necessarily extended in an even manner. Mason (2011: 357) 
notes that ‘cross-border mobility has been experienced unevenly across the Arab world’, with 
its limits saliently demonstrated by the Palestinian case. Thus in Lebanon, progressively 
greater restrictions and legal discrimination underlies the social, economic and political 
marginalisation of Palestinian refugees (Allan 2014; Knudsen 2007). Moreover, ‘The power 
structures within hospitality also mean that the “guest” is compelled to demonstrate 
“gratefulness” for the hospitality, and there is always a debt to be repaid in return for the 
hospitality’ (Gibson 2007: 159, in Mason 2011). Moreover, an inability to live up to hospitality 
norms may be burdensome, both to hosts and refugees. For instance, the material 
deprivation suffered by the Syrian refugees leads them unable to afford hospitality while also 
fearful of being a burden on others if they visited them (Wells et al. 2016). 
In Jordan, ‘the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis and its negative, real or perceived, 
impact on the living conditions of Jordanians has meant that Jordanians, who at first 
welcomed refugees, have become hostile: those who were originally dyuf (guests) are now 
laji’in (refugees)’ (Achilli 2015a: 2). This change in the social terms of reception, is likely to 
deteriorate the relational wellbeing of Syrians, and likely to interact with the policy terms of 
reception. In this respect, Mourad and Piron (2016: 35) darkly note that one consequence of 
the regulations faced by Syrian refugees in Lebanon is that these create ‘yet another source 
of social cleavage within the country, with potentially dangerous effects for social cohesion’. 
In urban Jordan, the size and enduring nature of the crisis has meant that social networks 
among Syrian refugees have collapsed, to impede economic betterment, emotional wellbeing 
and opportunities for communities to support themselves (Stevens 2016). In the Palestinian 
camps of urban Lebanon, deepening legal and economic precarity has driven shifts in the 
nature of social support networks, from traditional village, kinship and family ties to more 
opportunistic, neighbourly and friendship ties (Allan 2014). In the absence of adequate 
resources, humanitarian agencies such as UNRWA have to decide who is most deserving of 
support, and have rationed healthcare for people over 60 years of age. Communities not only 
find this deeply offensive as it devalues and disrespects the elderly – it also underlines its 
material inability to maintain desired social practices of elder care, and rationing is viewed as 
a systematic attempt to harm the community (Feldman 2017). Substantial levels of distrust 
towards the humanitarian organisations have been reported amongst Syrian refugees and 
hosts (e.g. Harb and Saab 2014) and between Palestinian refugees and multilateral aid 
agencies (Allan 2014). 
In this respect, our analysis of primary data from a survey spanning urban areas in five 
districts of Jordan noted that while the majority of people considered that aid supported 
communities, people were also unhappy about the equity of aid distribution. Only 8 to 19 per 
cent of respondents across the districts agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that 
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support had been evenly distributed amongst Syrians and Jordanians. Moreover, when 
asked whether support was distributed to those most in need, between just 16 and 35 per 
cent agreed or strongly agreed that this was the case. 
7.1.4 Conclusion 
For those people who have been able to cross the boundary into Jordan and Lebanon, 
policies determining who has legal status (residence permits, bail outs, sponsorship, UNHCR 
registration), and their temporary validity lie at the heart of many material, relational and 
subjective wellbeing challenges for Syrian (and other) refugees in both Jordan and Lebanon. 
These policies and laws generally treat women and men equally, although their effects may 
be distinct by gender. 
People fleeing from Syria are not all treated equally; it clearly matters who one is. Palestinian 
refugees from Syria have been received on less generous terms than people bearing the 
Syrian nationality. From early on in the conflict, borders have been shut for Palestinian 
refugees from Syria in both Jordan and Lebanon. Historically, Jordan has extended 
citizenship rights to most Palestinian refugees, whereas Lebanon has resisted this and 
actively marginalised this group. Nationality is a key factor, but there is also some evidence 
that modalities of reception discriminate on the basis of class and religious affiliation. 
There is evidence that as the crisis endures and negatively affects the wellbeing of the lower 
income groups amongst host communities in particular, through pressures on affordable 
housing, availability of work, and security in economies that are slowing down (and in case of 
Jordan, subject to fiscal austerity), hosts’ attitudes towards extending hospitality have 
changed for the worse. This appears to have led to a social re-categorisation, with Syrians 
less considered ‘guests’ and more ‘refugees’, denoting a group less worthy of support, and at 
risk of scapegoating. At the same time, host communities also struggle to reconcile socio-
cultural norms obliging extending generous hospitality in contexts of growing scarcity and 
pressured services. 
Frequent changes in public policies and complex bureaucratic processes make it hard for 
refugees to both stay updated on their obligations regarding temporary stay, and entitlements 
and protections that may be enjoyed. Moreover, government officials appear to have a 
significant level of discretion in applying these policies, creating further uncertainty and 
unevenness in the application of policy. 
As the crisis and resulting displacement endures, large numbers of displaced people from 
Syria have consumed their savings and becoming impoverished. The costs of staying legal, 
both through government levied fees and the costs involved in navigating complex 
bureaucracies, have contributed to this impoverishment, making legality unaffordable. 
Affecting a significant majority of Syrian households in Lebanon, but also a large share of 
those in Jordan, illegal status creates multiple vulnerabilities, distinct regimes of care for 
those who are legal vs those who are deemed illegal, and generates significant wellbeing 
failures for the refugees. For those who become illegal residents, host states withdraw 
provision of essential services (e.g. health, education, birth registrations); offer uncertain 
judicial or police protections; and threaten arrests, locking up and deportation. The fear and 
anxieties of detection physically immobilise refugees, and there is evidence that these are 
associated with individual and social harms such as depression and mental health disorders; 
child labour; early marriages as a way of protecting vulnerable young girls and women from 
abuse; and statelessness for newborns. The latter is a particularly serious concern, given 
that its highly detrimental effects are likely to endure beyond the end of the Syrian conflict. 
The deplorable condition of stateless Palestinians in the region offers a strong cautionary 
tale. 
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7.2 Housing 
In this section, we will first set out the material wellbeing aspects that are pertinent to housing 
in urban and peri-urban areas, including camp spaces. We will then consider associated 
subjective and relational wellbeing outcomes. 
7.2.1 Housing: material wellbeing 
Globally, the overwhelming majority of displaced people in urban areas live in individual 
accommodation, rather than planned or managed camps (Kirbyshire et al. 2017; UNHCR 
2016). 
The population influx of Syrians has placed substantial additional pressure on already 
inadequate basic infrastructure servicing urban populations. In Jordan, demand for water, an 
acutely scarce resource, has risen by as much as 40 per cent in some areas of the country, 
an estimated 19 per cent of solid waste not sent to landfills because of a lack of capacity, 
and demand for electricity grown. In Amman, the influx of 400,000 Syrian refugees has been 
associated with a 25 per cent increase in levels of waste generation, to necessitate 
strengthening of the solid waste management infrastructure (EIU 2017a). With the majority of 
newcomers ending up in deprived areas with poor water and sanitation provision, the influx is 
likely to have a negative impact on the wellbeing of all residents in these areas. Moreover, 
Jordan’s courts are overloaded owing to higher levels of crime concomitant with higher 
population levels, and an increased workload as refugees seek to regularise their status (EIU 
2017a). 
Because of the rapid population influx and the inability of the supply of affordable housing, 
property rents have rapidly increased since 2011 (Bidinger et al. 2015: 46; EIU 2017a, 
2017b; Goyes et al. 2017). While increased rents have affected host communities too, in 
Lebanon it is common for Syrians to pay higher rents for the same housing unit (UN-Habitat 
2017). A chronic shortage of affordable housing is listed among the key problems 
experienced in urban areas in Jordan and Lebanon (Alnsour 2014; Stevens 2016). As such, 
in case of urban informal settlements in Beirut, conditions prior to the Syrian influx were 
noted for: the precarity of rental options, regular evictions (households had typically moved 
four or five times in a period of 10–12 years), deteriorating living conditions, growing 
population densities, increased pressure on water and electricity services, loss of privacy, the 
hostility towards (foreign) migrants, as well as the tensions between religious communities 
(Fawaz 2009). 
For Syrian refugees, ‘living conditions vary widely’ (Lenner and Schmelter 2016: 124) but 
often are substandard. Open sewers, polluted drinking water and faulty electrical wiring 
represent clear health hazards, while housing conditions including leaking roofs, plastic 
sheets for windows, mould and moisture contribute to health complications (Goyes et al. 
2017: 7). The main housing options available are: (1) rental housing; (2) squatting in and 
further overcrowding one of UNRWA’s camps for Palestinian refugees and in unofficial 
‘Palestinian gatherings’; (3) forming or joining informal tented settlements (ITS) on rented 
private or public land (often in conjunction with providing low-wage labour; (4) living with local 
hosts; and (5) encampment (in Jordan only). ‘Each of the options presents its own problems, 
and they collectively fail to meet the need for housing’ (Bidinger et al. 2015: 46). In Lebanon, 
24 per cent of refugee households live in substandard buildings (UNHCR et al. 2016). 
Limited access to housing has led to Syrian refugees squatting on public property, living in 
unsafe and unsanitary conditions, with hundreds of thousands living in garages and 
occupying the nooks and crannies of buildings under construction (Onishi 2013). For 
instance, in the small town of Bebnine, near Tripoli in northern Lebanon, refugees had 
‘turned shops, garages, store rooms, hallways and even a slaughterhouse into provisional 
housing, while others lived in simple plastic tents’ (Thorleifsson 2016: 1076). Syrians named  
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‘poor living conditions (including hygiene, sanitation, poor isolation to cold and humidity, lack 
of privacy)’ as a key issue they were dealing with in Jordan (Aide Médicale Internationale, 
2014, p. 42). 
Throughout Lebanon and Jordan, refugees have gathered in informal tented settlements. By 
2015 there were over 1,000 informal settlements of displaced Syrians, generally on the 
margins of towns and villages, and in unused or fallow agricultural fields (Chatty 2017). In 
Lebanon, 10 per cent of refugee households were estimated to live in informal settlements 
(UNHCR et al. 2016). Other studies estimate that 50 per cent of Syrian refugees live in 
rented properties, 26 per cent in nomadic camps, and 24 per cent hosted by families or in 
community shelters (Kazour et al. 2017). A national opinion poll of 900 Lebanese citizens 
aged 18 and older conducted by Fafo shows that 8 per cent of all Lebanese households 
consisted of at least one member who was a Syrian refugee (Christophersen et al. 2013). 
Another study reports that one in five Lebanese households provide accommodation to the 
Syrian refugees; about a quarter of these were doing so for free, the rest for rent 
(Thorleifsson 2016: 1075). While extending commendable hospitality, it also stands to reason 
that parts of the middle and upper class have materially benefited from mass displacement 
through renting out properties at inflated rates. 
In both Jordan and Lebanon, Palestinian camps have become important areas within which 
Syrian refugees have started living, both in tents or makeshift apartments (Jabbar and Zaza 
2016). The pressures of housing rents have made the relatively low-rent conditions of the 
camp attractive. Thus, by 
August 2013, the South Beirut districts of Chiyah and Burj al-Barajna, which house 
the Mar Elias, Shatila, and Burj al-Barajna Palestinian refugee camps (as well as the 
heavily Palestinian neighborhoods of Tariq al-Jadida, al-Da’uq, and Sabra) hosted the 
two largest populations of Syrian refugees in the Beirut region, at 18,143 and 10,312 
people respectively (UNHCR 2013b). By April 2014, there were 40,538 registered 
Syrian refugees in Chiyah and 20,658 living in Burj al-Barajna (UNHCR 2014c). 
(Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015: 325). 
Besides Syrians, other poor groups – whether hosts or other migrants – have also moved 
into the camps, which are thus having increasingly diverse populations. Martin (2015) 
estimated that 30 per cent of Shatila camp in Beirut comprises of non-Palestinians, which 
includes Lebanese, Syrians, Turks, Egyptians, and Bangladeshis. Another study of the 
unofficial Gaza camp found similar figures: 70 per cent of households in the settlement were 
Palestinian refugees to Lebanon, but other minorities living here included Lebanese (12 per 
cent) and Syrian citizens (12 per cent) (Zabaneh et al. 2008). The camps offer a level of 
anonymity and safety: 
Besides offering cheap housing and proximity to work opportunities, the Palestinian 
camps also offer a specific form of security; many Syrian refugees and PRS [ed. 
Palestinian Refugees from Syria] who have not acquired or cannot maintain legal 
status choose to live in these communities because Lebanese security forces do not 
patrol them. 
(Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015: 325). 
After the Lebanese civil war (1975–1992), Syrian influence over Lebanese decision-making 
led to the transfer of unemployed Syrian labourers to Lebanon, in a move to re-invigorate the 
Syrian economy (Halabi 2004: 42). Palestinians benefited from neither the construction boom 
nor the economic recovery: ‘ruined camps were not rebuilt, repairing or enlarging existing 
houses was banned’ and the camps ‘slowly amalgamated into low-income neighbourhoods 
and slums’ (Knudsen 2007: 8, 10). As the land allocated to the 12 official Palestinian camps 
has remained largely unchanged since 1948, the fourfold increase in population has resulted 
in chronic overcrowding (Ramadan 2009: 154) and tremendous pressures on fragile 
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conditions. In Jordan, density levels in some of the ten official Palestinian camps have also 
kept on rising. For instance, in Baqa’a, 115,000 people live within an area of one square 
kilometre (Alnsour and Meaton 2014).30 Palestinians also live in informal settlements outside 
of UNRWA camps, known as Palestinian ‘gatherings’, ‘occupying a grey space between the 
official camp and the city as neither the host state nor the camp officials provides assistance 
to them’ (Sanyal 2017: 119). In general, while the Palestinian camps and gathering are 
under-protected, vilified, and at risk of attack and erasure (Ramadan 2009), they also 
constitute safe and secure spaces of hospitality, identity formation and maintenance, and 
refuge (Knudsen 2007; Ramadan 2009, 2008).31 
These dynamics are, however, nothing new. In Lebanon, a study of three urban informal 
settlements in Beirut prior to the Syrian influx noted the precarity of rental options, regular 
evictions (households had typically moved four or five times in a period of 10–12 years), 
deteriorating living conditions, growing population densities, increased pressure on water and 
electricity services, loss of privacy, the hostility towards (foreign) migrants, as well as the 
tensions between religious communities (Fawaz 2009). 
Several authors note that the Lebanese State has withheld support for strengthening the 
infrastructure and basic public services of informal settlements, and of unofficial (Allan 2014) 
and official camps (Ramadan 2013; Sibai et al. 2017). There is strong political antipathy to 
develop these camps as they signal the acceptance of Palestinians’ permanent stay in 
Lebanon; a political anathema. Knudsen (2007: 8) notes that in early 1998, Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri made an official televised statement that acknowledged that the refugees’ 
situation was ‘extremely bad’ but that improving their living conditions would facilitate their 
permanent integration into Lebanon. ‘Lebanon was not prepared to foot the bill for their 
integration, nor were the refugees themselves in favour of permanent settlement’ (Knudsen 
2007: 8). 
7.2.2 Housing: subjective wellbeing 
‘The effect that housing has on refugees’ overall physical and emotional wellbeing, as well as 
on their ability to feel “at home”, is well established’ (Ager and Strang 2008: 171). Their 
fieldwork in refugee impacted communities in the UK found that, instead of concern over 
housing conditions, respondents were more preoccupied with the social and cultural impacts 
of housing. And according to Eastmond (2006: 153), ‘home is where “normal life” can be 
lived, providing economic security, a social context, and a sense of belonging’. Home may 
have multiple locations simultaneously. Thus, for forced migrants, the place of origin and the 
place of refuge together represent home. Similarly, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon consider 
their camps as ‘temporary cities... where we stay until we can return to Palestine’ (Ramadan 
2013: 73).32 Indeed, the wellbeing of the Palestinian community in Lebanese camps partially 
depends on pursuing a politics of restoration and return (Feldman 2017). 
In this respect, our analysis of Impact Initiative primary data for Syrians living in urban areas 
of five districts in Jordan showed that between 53 and 61 per cent of respondents agreeing 
or strongly agreeing with the statement that they feel part of communities in which they live, 
with a significant share of the populations not indicating such a sense of belonging (Figure 
7.2). Statistical testing revealed that these city differences were not significant (see the 
overall chi-square test results in 0). 
                                                
30 This is a density similar to the most densely built up cities such as Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
31 Keeping Palestinians in refugee camps, separate from the rest of the Lebanese body, is part of a strategy of maintaining the 
transient nature of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Palestinian refugees, according to this logic, are temporary visitors to 
Lebanon, awaiting their return to Palestine (Ramadan 2009: 158). 
32 However, Allan (2014) notes that the public discourses insisting on the right and moral necessity to return as the only option 
are often in private interjected with the strong pragmatic desire to make a better life here and now, in Lebanon. 
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Figure 7.2 Feeling part of a community 
 
Note: A small number of “I prefer not to answer” and “I don’t know” responses are not reported. 
Source: Authors own, based on analysis of primary data from REACH (2014b). 
Wells et al.’s (2016: 3) systematic review of psychosocial concerns among Syrian refugees in 
Jordan found that: 
Rent costs were reported to be excessive and increasing, with some households 
selling food rations to pay rent. The conditions in which many forced and voluntary 
migrants travel, live and work make them particularly vulnerable to physical and 
mental health risks (IOM 2015). Many Syrian refugees reported that landlords were 
exploiting the increased demand for housing by raising the rent. CARE found that in 
urban areas, Syrian refugees, Jordanian citizens, and other minority refugees each 
identified cash and cash for rent as key primary concerns (CARE 2017). They lived in 
constant fear that their inability to pay the rent would result in their summary eviction 
(Thorleifsson 2016), also due to the lack of legal safeguards that could preserve their 
rights (Musa 2017: 19). In the words of a father of 6 children: ‘Rent is the most 
important thing for us, if we don’t have a roof over our heads we will have to go back 
to Syria… If you are going to give us anything give us rent first and then blankets!’. 
(Wells et al. 2016: 10) 
Those refugees living in informal tented settlements are also facing an ever imminent threat 
of eviction by local municipal authorities. Cash transfers, a popular instrument adopted in 
humanitarian programming, were reported as enhancing psychosocial wellbeing amongst 
recipients in income poverty, as it alleviated anxiety and stress in the household relating to 
their inability to pay their rent (Ulrichs et al. 2017: 5). 
The review by Wells et al. also notes that overcrowding and cramped living conditions affect 
refugees’ psychological health, and is related to the occurrence of domestic violence, ‘bad 
behaviours’ and family conflict. ‘There is no privacy any more, with the large number of 
people in every room. We no longer feel comfortable or at peace’ (Wells et al. 2016: 10). 
Moreover, in Jordan it was reported that frequent relocations in search of affordable 
accommodation has crucially impacted Syrian refugee families’ ability to maintain legal 
status, as they are required to update their place of residence on government-issued service 
cards (Goyes et al. 2017: 7). 
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Within the context of protracted displacement, one underexplored area of enquiry concerns 
the placemaking processes through which people spatially organise, build, make, attach 
meaning, and derive wellbeing (or not) from and in their urban living and working 
environments. These processes, within the home or through economic exchange in the 
streets, can contribute to innovation and reconfigure cities (Hall 2015). White (2016: 2, 3) 
argues that ‘space and place constitute critical dimensions of wellbeing that deserve much 
greater attention’ because constructions of wellbeing are intrinsically connected to the places 
in which they are generated. The auto-construction, architecture and design of urban spaces 
by displaced communities entail important socio-cultural processes that gives shape to and 
expresses feelings of belonging, identity and placemaking. Housing is one amongst many 
sites of enquiry in this respect, yet an important one. As noted by Brun and Fábos (2015: 14), 
“making home” in the displacement context ‘represents the process through which people try 
to gain control over their lives’. In a study of the daily lives of Syrian women in Amman, such 
home-making efforts were found to both maintain valued traditions, but also enable the 
expression of new and multiple belongings (Fakhry 2017). What is less well known is how 
placemaking processes can advance social cohesion, in terms of both the maintenance of 
fragmented extended familial and caring relations, as well as the ability to live well together 
with host communities in the context of Jordan and Lebanon. Brun and Fábos (2015: 9) in 
this respect note that informal housing for refugees is often associated with low-standard 
housing, lack of tenure security as well as social security, and accompanied by fewer 
possibilities for modifying the domestic spaces and making homes. 
In the literature on refugees, housing and shelter are often related to aspects of safety and 
security (Ager and Strang 2008; Brun 2015). Ager and Strang (2008: 172) found that in the 
UK, safety and security issues associated with particular housing environments for refugees, 
such as their proximity to host populations with multiple social problems, were common. In 
Jordan and Lebanon safety is a key concern of Syrian refugees, particularly to girls and 
women (Sanyal 2017: 122). Safety relates to the fear of other inhabitants’ threats to personal 
and bodily integrity. In one study of the Syrian refugees living outside the camps in Jordan, 
conducted by UN Women in 2013, ‘it was found that over 20% of girls under the age of 16 
and nearly 19% of women never leave their homes and nearly 50% of both women and girls 
very rarely left the home’ (Akash and Boswall 2016: 3). Syrian girls and women in urban 
Jordan often live in extreme social isolation and ‘referred to their homes as a prison’ (Akash 
and Boswall 2016: 3). Jamila, an Iraqi university professor living in Jordan, told Nusair (2013: 
25) that ‘I do not leave the house much because going out costs me financially and 
psychologically. I am in pain. Sometimes I wonder whether it is better to go back to Iraq and 
die there’.33 
Insecurity and safety are hence also significant concerns to host communities. In Lebanon, 
vulnerable host communities strongly complained about unequal and unfair treatment by 
international aid agencies, to heighten perceptions of threat from the Syrians (Harb and Saad 
2014). The fear of single male migrant labourers living in dense urban neighbourhoods has 
been a longstanding issue, and is interwoven with fear of economic competition. For 
instance, well before the current crisis, Syrian migrants in the Palestinian camps, former 
enemies in the civil war, were seen as a source of moral corruption, but also as hoarding 
economic opportunities and taking over control of local markets (see e.g. Halabi 2004). 
Our analysis of primary data provided some additional insight. When asked why people felt 
unsafe, it was noted that in urban areas in Ajloun, Al Mafraq, Az Zarqa and Jerash districts in 
Jordan, around half of all respondents noted that youth roaming around in the cities made  
 
 
                                                
33 In other displacement contexts too, feeling ‘safe’ is linked to mental health. In a study of daily stressors among Darfurian 
refugees in Chad, for example, a lack of basic needs and a lack of safety were found to be better predictors of post-traumatic 
stress disorder than war exposure (Rasmussen and Annan 2010). 
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them feel unsafe. This is potentially an interesting finding, as much of the debate regarding 
safety in public space is framed in terms of Syrians vs Jordanians and these findings suggest 
that greater attention may need to be focused on youth. 
There is also increasing recognition that camps for displaced people have significant 
negative long-term impacts for both displaced and host communities (Kirbyshire et al. 2017). 
For example, camps limit the ability of displaced people to make choices about their lives 
and may lead to unwanted dependencies. Camps incur significant infrastructural investments 
that risk being lost once refugees return, and with displacement now typically lasting for a 
decade or more, there is a growing sense that humanitarian investment ought to be made 
taking a longer term developmental lens. Living outside of camps is also considered as 
providing displaced people with the possibility of living with greater dignity and independence 
within a host community (UNHCR 2014a).34 Put otherwise, ‘Camp and non-camp 
spaces…induce different experiences of exile’ (Fakhry 2016: 10). This review, however, 
found inconclusive evidence on the wellbeing effects of being located in camps or cities. One 
study noted that Syrians in a small town highlighted how they preferred living in Lebanon to 
being encamped in Jordan, even if it meant struggling harder to make ends meet. They had 
heard discouraging testimonies about the intolerable living conditions and lack of work 
opportunities in the fenced refugee camps. One Syrian who had lived in Za’atari camp in 
Jordan for a few months before escaping testified ‘It was just like a prison’ (Thorleifsson 
2016: 1076). Other studies come to different conclusions. Shammout (2016), for instance, 
finds that Syrian refugee students living in Jordanian cities felt a greater sense of alienation 
than those living in camps. 
This may be attributed to the fact that the residents in the city feel more alienation, 
because they mix with citizens who enjoy stability and security without alienation 
feelings. So, the Syrian refugee students feel that they are a burden and strangers. 
(Shammout 2016: 146) 
Overall, few studies comparing camp vs city conditions and their effects on wellbeing have 
been carried out in Jordan. One key consideration is that some forms of shelter offer security 
at the price of constrained agency, while others offer the latter but at the expense of a more 
precarious existence. We surmise that people with different socio-economic profiles (having 
dependents, being educated, being young, etc.) may face and are willing to accept different 
trade-offs – however, studies have not explored this in any detail. 
7.2.3 Housing: relational wellbeing 
As a result of the deep historic bonds between Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians, many 
Syrians moved to Jordan and Lebanon to stay with relatives and friends at the start of the 
conflict. However, the enduring nature of displacement means that providing on-going 
hospitability is becoming a challenge. In cities like Irbid, Jordan, the relentless financial and 
social pressures faced by host groups mean that traditional social networks are no longer as 
effectively contributing to the financial and emotional support of Syrian refugee households 
(Akash and Boswall 2016: 2). At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Jordanian host 
communities, expecting the crisis to be short-lived, welcomed Syrians into their homes or 
supported their accommodation financially (Stevens 2016: 59). It was common for people to 
follow Arabic and Islamic norms that inspire them to offer support and assistance (Musa 
2017: 15). However, ‘It can be argued that a ‘compassion fatigue’, similar to that of ‘donor 
fatigue’ (UN 2014), has taken place since the initial displacements of 2011’ (Al Akash and 
Boswall 2016: 2). 
  
                                                
34 Consequently, humanitarian agencies like UNHCR have adopted a Policy on Alternatives to Camps (UNHCR 2014a) and 
policy on protection in urban areas (UNHCR 2009). 
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In Lebanon, the combination of house rent inflation and severely diminished water supplies, 
daily power outages, higher unemployment rates, rising poverty, and the inability of 
healthcare providers and educational institutions to cope with demand under the Syrian 
influx, have challenged already delicate societal and inter-communal balance (World Bank 
2013). In Jordan too, an elevated level of social and economic anxiety across both refugee 
and host communities in the context of inadequate affordable housing and regional turmoil 
threatens to further weaken community resilience, to induce violent unrest across these 
fragile communities (Musa 2017: 19). 
Our analysis of primary data held by Impact Initiatives for Syrians living in urban areas of five 
Jordanian districts also indicated that in each, a large majority considers that obtaining 
access to housing is a cause for tension in their communities. Moreover, a Pearson Chi-
Square test rejected the null that this perception is uniform across the cities (Chi2=11.76, p-
value=0.019). Further analysis of this result using pair-wise Chi-square test revealed 
significant difference between two pairs of cities: Al-Mafraq/Irbid and Al-Mafraq/Jerash (see 
Appendix E), underlining that local differences occur in matters such as the role of housing 
as a cause of tension amongst Syrian refugees (Figure 7.3). Yet, the primary data also 
indicated that such tension is chiefly caused by the cost of housing, and 82 to 90 per cent of 
these respondents felt positive or very positive about their neighbours. 
Figure 7.3 Accessing shelter causes tension in the community 
 
Source: Authors own, based on analysis of primary data from REACH (2014b). 
Prior to the Syrian crisis, despite or possibly because of the impoverished conditions and 
economic and political exclusion, youth in Palestinian camps were found showing high levels 
of civic engagement, relatively higher rates of trust, feelings of safety and community control 
prior to the crisis (Khawaja et al. 2006). The influx of Syrians and Palestinian refugees from 
Syria has exacerbated already fragile relationships between opposing factions within the 
Palestinian camps in Lebanon: violent clashes with multiple killings occurred in April 2017, 
August-September 2016 and August 2015 in Ain al-Hilweh (EIU 2017b). 
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Research on intercommunity relations and perceptions by Harb and Saab (2014) is also 
showing large discrepancies in perceptions of inequality and threats between Syrian 
refugees and Lebanese nationals. Many refugees complained about their treatment by local 
businesses (such as being charged higher prices than locals), health care services (for 
instance, restricted access to emergency hospital services), property owners (such as 
inflated rental costs), municipal officials and the police. One in three refugees deemed 
international NGOs to be corrupt and biased in their treatment of refugees. Conversely, 
Lebanese nationals saw Syrian refugees as disproportionately benefiting from international 
aid and attention, including housing subsidies, cash stipends, employment opportunities and 
basic health care services, while disadvantaged local communities did not receive such 
treatment. These experiences of inequality heighten perceptions of threat (Harb 2016). 
Generally, gender based violence is associated with reception, for example in Lebanon 
(Yasmine and Moughalian 2016) and Europe (Freedman 2016), and interacts with 
experiences of loss to negatively affect psychosocial wellbeing (Carswell et al. 2011; Fazel et 
al. 2012). Displaced populations, particularly women and youth, are often affected by 
violence in relations within the displaced community, between host and displaced 
communities and with the authorities. Yasmine and Moughalian argue that Syrian refugee 
women in Lebanon face institutionalised violence rooted in sexism, classism and racism by 
the hosting community, governmental institutions, and within interpersonal circles. They are 
disproportionately affected by elevated levels of gender based violence (particularly intimate 
partner violence), transactional sex and sexual assaults, while early marriage is seen as a 
means of keeping daughters safe and protecting them from poverty. Some of the factors 
associated with the risk of violence are associated with housing aspects, such as 
overcrowded living spaces and unsafe shelter. Other factors include poor social cohesion, 
gender-based discrimination, limited rights and protection services, while changes in 
traditional gender roles that accompany displacement can cause intra-household conflicts 
(Pavanello et al. 2012). Thus, fathers in Jordanian camps noted that ‘the teens are now 
disrespectful, defiant, and rudely talking like I’m a sibling, not parent. This is no way to raise 
a kid in a camp. They don’t respect or listen to us anymore- only listen if we beat them’ 
(Wells et al. 2016: 12). 
Within informal tented settlements, refugees and hosts engage on the basis of patron-client 
relationships with agricultural ‘gang-master’ hierarchies. ‘In some cases the relationships 
were cordial, but in others, they were exploitative and descended into significant acts of 
bullying, violence and harassment’ (Chatty 2017: 27). 
In Jordanian camps, women perceived more cases of domestic violence occurring in the 
camp than while living in Syria but were fearful of negative consequences if they reported 
experiencing violence (Krause et al. 2015: 5). In Za’atari, women expressed concerns about 
the lack of lighting and their fears of using the toilets at night, while in Irbid City, women 
reported feeling unsafe sending their daughters to school on public buses (Krause et al. 
2015: 5). 
In urban settings, with rapidly rising housing rents, and written lease agreements being rare, 
landlords are in a very powerful position to conduct significant numbers of arbitrary and 
forced evictions (Bidinger et al. 2015: 46). However, our primary data suggests a slightly 
different story. This 2014 survey suggests that, regardless of where Syrian refugees are 
located in urban, peri-urban and rural areas of Jordan, it appears that the incidence of 
eviction or forced removal in Jordan is not as frequent as was reported for Lebanon (four or 
five times in a period of 10–12 years). About 65–70 per cent of Syrians surveyed had not 
been evicted/removed at all since their arrival in Jordan (Figure 7.4). And in urban and peri-
urban areas, about 15 per cent have on one occasion. This leaves 18–21 per cent of 
participants, of whom the majority were evicted three times. 
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Figure 7.4 Eviction of Syrian refugees in Jordan 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on analysis of primary data from WFP and REACH (2016). 
Many Syrian women report violence and exploitation by the hosting community’s landlords, 
employers, and the police (Harvey et al. 2013). The situation is particularly dire for female-
headed households, as unmarried or recently widowed women are more vulnerable to 
inappropriate sexual advances from men offering financial and material assistance in 
exchange for sex. Reporting harassment or rape is particularly difficult due to the severe 
social stigma attached to this, but it also entails a lack of trust in, and the possible risk of 
harassment by the police (Yasmine and Moughalian; Wells et al. 2016). These authors 
further note that the Lebanese media depicts Syrian refugee women as ‘stealing the men’ or 
being ‘cheap wives’ for accepting lower dowry, leading to further harassment, shaming, and 
bullying of refugees by the host community (Yasmine and Moughalian 2016: 31). The 
vulnerability of unmarried Syrian women in Lebanon leads many to marry into abusive 
relationships or polygamous marriages, a situation similar to that of Iraqi refugees having fled 
to Jordan. 
Finally, the continuous search for more affordable housing that characterise the poorest 
groups living in urban areas of Lebanon and Jordan also results in frequent relocations that 
shake up the social networks important to everyday relational wellbeing. This also is likely to 
make it harder to foster more enduring contacts that could facilitate greater social cohesion 
with host communities. On the other hand, as significant shares of the Syrian refugees live 
with Lebanese host families in rented accommodation, and in a quarter of cases for free 
(Thorleifsson 2016: 1075), these could be sites where stronger community cohesion is 
fostered. 
7.2.4 Conclusion 
In terms of housing and shelter, the main difference between Jordan and Lebanon is the 
former’s efforts towards encampment of refugees, with several large scale camps adopting 
about 20 per cent of the refugees, and some camps likely to become future cities, whereas 
Lebanon has adopted a ‘no-camp policy’. The Jordanian government uses policy to 
incentivise or force (in the case of people illegally having crossed the border) encampment,  
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by offering greater access to essential services in camps than in urban areas. Enhanced 
material wellbeing, however, comes at a costs of confinement to camp spaces, reduced 
agency and subjective wellbeing. 
Within cities in Jordan and Lebanon, the shortage of affordable housing and rapid inflation of 
rental costs is a top material wellbeing concern for both host communities and Syrian 
refugees. Poor host communities, refugees and other migrants are ever-seeking the most 
affordable options for housing, driving a further densification of low-income neighbourhoods 
and a race to the bottom in terms of living conditions. For instance, urbanised Palestinian 
camps, which historically have been neglected by public policy and municipal service 
delivery, have now become important sites where poor hosts, Palestinian and Syrian 
refugees and other impecunious migrants are living together. Arguably, the high mobility of 
refugees impedes the development of enduring and cooperative social relations and thus 
social cohesion with host communities, and makes it more difficult to retain legal residential 
status. Where informal tented settlements arise on peri-urban public lands, they are subject 
to ever-threatening eviction. 
With most refugees settling in the poorest areas, there is fierce competition for employment, 
basic services and provisions. Severely diminished water supplies, daily power outages, 
higher unemployment rates, rising poverty, and the inability of health-care providers and 
educational institutions to cope with demand are exacerbating perceived inequalities and 
inter-group tension (Harb 2016: 126). Overcrowded, unsanitary and unsafe living conditions 
affect subjective wellbeing in various ways. Worries and anxiety about one’s ability to pay the 
rent now and in the future are common. Overcrowded housing limits privacy, dignity, and 
affects people’s peace of mind, while the lack of safety outside, and the risk of arrest by 
security forces and the police due to one’s irregular legal status, immobilises and keeps 
women and girls in particular confined to their homes. Within refugee communities, relational 
wellbeing is strained within families, and people associate inadequate shelter conditions with 
family conflict, domestic violence against women, and rebellious and badly behaved children. 
Host communities feel that they are suffering the consequences of the refugee influx, while 
being largely overlooked by the humanitarian and aid system, driving resentment towards 
refugees and distrust of the humanitarian effort. On the other hand, highly unequal power 
relations between owners and tenants are conducive to exploitation and abuse, while legal 
safeguards are largely absent and judicial systems weakly equipped to offer protection to 
refugees. It is not clear whether these function better for poor Jordanian and Lebanese 
citizens living in cities – however, at least they do not need to fear approaching authorities for 
lack of legal status. In peri-urban locations, we are also witnessing a growing number of 
semi-feudal arrangements between private landlords who offer space for tents and 
improvised housing structures in exchange for refugee labour. 
7.3 Economic participation 
Economic participation can generate positive wellbeing outcomes for refugees, ‘including 
promoting economic independence, planning for the future, meeting members of the host 
society, providing opportunity to develop language skills, restoring self-esteem and 
encouraging self-reliance’ (Ager and Strang 2008: 170). However, the terms under which 
economic participation by refugees or hosts occurs are critical, and work that respects rights, 
grants autonomy and confers dignity is too often in short supply. 
The literature on the economics of forced migration, for example as analysed by Ruiz and 
Vargas-Silva (2013), considers its impact from the perspective of the forced migrant and/or 
that of their hosts. They note that for the former, forced displacement often leads to worse 
labour market outcomes and to less consumption smoothing. The impact on host 
communities seems to be mixed and there are both winners and losers. 
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The refugee/host bifurcation in wellbeing generation provides a useful framing and in this 
subsection the literature is analysed to draw out how refugee influxes have shaped wellbeing 
outcomes of refugees and their hosts in Jordan and Lebanon. This analysis of the literature, 
similar to the two previous subsections, is organised around whether the issues discussed in 
these works primarily fit within the material, subjective and relational dimensions of 
wellbeing. 
7.3.1 Economic participation: material wellbeing 
The economically active share of Syrian refugees is estimated to be 28 per cent in Jordan 
(Stave and Hillesund 2015) and 47 per cent in Lebanon (ILO 2014b: 20). Turner suggests 
that the labour force participation of Syrians is higher in Lebanon because of the relatively 
liberal stance by its government (Turner 2015). In Jordan, Syrians face high unemployment 
rates, estimated at 61 per cent for refugees living outside camps in Jordan, and 80 per cent 
for those living in the biggest camp of Zaatari (Stave and Hillesund 2015). In Lebanon, such 
rates amount to a lower, but still high, 33 per cent (Ajluni and Kawar 2015). However, 
participation rates and employment figures might have substantially decreased as a result of 
the recently introduced ‘pledge not to work’ for Syrian refugees. 
Section 5 of this report illustrated that while in Jordan efforts are now made to enhance 
access, Syrians in both Jordan and Lebanon continue to face barriers in participating in 
formal labour markets (Lenner and Schmelter 2016; Turner 2015). Section 5 discussed in 
detail the legal and practical barriers encountered by Syrians and also by other 
refugees/migrants. As a result of these barriers the primary livelihood strategy for Syrian 
refugees in Jordan has been informal work (Akash and Boswall 2016; Bellamy et al. 2017; 
Lenner and Schmelter 2016). In Lebanon, albeit for different reasons – the non-encampment 
policy, historical connection with Syrian labour, etc. – the informal sector also plays an 
important yet precarious role in shoring up material wellbeing for the refugees (Lenner and 
Schmelter 2016). For example, 92 per cent of jobs held by Syrian refugees in Lebanon have 
no contracts (ILO 2014b). Turner notes that male as well as female labour force participation 
is higher among Syrians in Lebanon than those in Jordan (Turner 2015).35 In contrast, while 
Syrians are reported as having created employment opportunities for the locals in Jordan, in 
Lebanon the Syrians are seen as a threat (Chatty 2017). Chatty argues that the 
unemployment rate in Jordan has dropped by 2 per cent since the start of the Syrian crisis 
due to the opening of 200 Syrian-owned factories and the employment of an estimated 6,000 
Jordanians in these. Yet in Jordan too, a recent survey by Stave and Hillesund (2015) noted 
that 95 per cent of Jordanians reported believing that Syrians had to some or to a great 
extent taken jobs that otherwise would have gone to Jordanians. However, in governorates 
with large numbers of Syrian refugees (Amman, Irbid, and Mafraq), the Jordanian 
participation rate in the labour market is slightly higher than in those governorates with low 
levels of Syrian refugees. This suggests that ‘Syrian refugees largely compete against other 
Syrians for employment’ (ILO and Fafo 2015 in: Kelberer 2017: 6). 
One reason why cities are attractive to the Syrians is because they offer employment 
opportunities. A recent World Bank (World Bank 2016b) report estimates that 69.2 per cent 
of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan live beneath a poverty line of 50 JOD per capita, per 
month. These figures vary by governorate, education level, gender, marital status, family 
size, and place of origin and destination in Jordan. Notably, in Tafilah governorate, with the  
 
 
 
 
                                                
35 It is estimated that only 51 per cent of working-age Syrian men and 7 per cent of women living in Jordanian host communities 
are economically active, and of these only 43 per cent and 12 per cent respectively are employed (ILO and Fafo 2015 in: Turner 
2015). Contrastingly, in Lebanon, 70 per cent of working-age Syrian men and 19 per cent of women are economically active, 
and 79 per cent and 32 per cent of these respectively are employed (ILO 2014a in: Turner 2015). 
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highest rate of poverty among Syrians, 83 per cent live beneath the poverty line; in Amman, 
with the lowest rate of poverty among Syrian refugees at 59 per cent36, there are more 
opportunities for Syrians to work (until now, informally) and earn income. 
It is evident that in attempting to manage risks to their material wellbeing, the refugee 
families may be forced to make trade-offs (Bellamy et al. 2017). For example, a majority of 
Syrians are displaced to cities in Jordan work without permits, which increases the chance of 
labour exploitation, the risk of being forced back into a camp and even the risk of being 
deported to Syria (Carrion 2016). Choosing to not do this work would mean increasing their 
debts, running down on savings or skipping vital services such as education/health, all of 
which can be detrimental to material wellbeing (Bekkers 2017; Moghaddam et al. 2017; 
Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015). 
A critical fallout of refugees’ competition over jobs in the informal sector has been the fall of 
wages in the sector, which has affected material wellbeing of refugees as well as the poorer 
Jordanians and Lebanese who depend on the sector. Many working in these low-wage jobs 
remain poor and unable to meet their basic household expenses. Lowering of wages in 
Jordan’s informal sector is often cited as constituting the factor that is having the most 
negative impact on the Jordanian informal workforce (Francis 2015; Stave and Hillesund 
2015). Stave and Hillesund (2015), using a sample of 3,860 households (1,528 Jordanian 
hosts, 144 other hosts, 1,398 Syrians outside camp and 790 in Zaatari camp) find that ‘A 
majority of Syrian refugees (57 per cent in Zaatari camp and 56 per cent outside camps) do 
not agree that Syrians are pushing wages down, but 93 per cent of Jordanians believe that 
they are’. It must be emphasised that the finding is based on perceptions of the surveyed 
individuals, and also that nearly all Syrians in this sample were employed in the informal 
sector while only about half of the Jordanians were working in that sector (ibid.: 68). 
According to FAO (2013, p. 36) citing an unspecified source, ‘The recent large influx of 
refugees has created increasing competition for unskilled work, resulting in wages dropping 
as low as JD 150 for 30 days of work’. 
A similar effect was reported in Lebanon, particularly in the Bekaa Valley where casual 
labour wages have fallen by up to 60 per cent due to the influx of Syrians (FAO, 2013, p. 36). 
A series of rapid Emergency Market Mapping and Analyses (EMMA) conducted in Lebanon 
also support these claims (IRC et al. 2013a, 2013b). In the context of rapidly expanding 
labour force in Lebanon, by as much as 50 per cent in 2011, one-third of young Lebanese 
labourers are unable to compete in the informal sector, which contributes to more than 56 
per cent of total employment in the country (Cherri et al. 2016). There is evidence that 
Lebanese workers desperate not to be replaced by Syrians and willing to work for low pay 
under poor working conditions are also expressing a willingness to work for lower pay (ILO 
2014b). Therefore, the material wellbeing of Lebanese workers, whether by losing their jobs 
to Syrians or by bargaining to an income that is inadequate to maintain their pre-crisis 
standard of living, has worsened (Thorleifsson 2016: 1078). 
Historically, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have also depended heavily on the informal 
sector which, as discussed in Section 5, includes opportunities created by non-state actors 
such as the PLO and UNRWA. In the 1970s, particularly after the PLO leadership was 
moved from Jordan to Lebanon, various industries such as textile, leather, iron, and furniture 
were set up (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997; Hanafi and Long 2010). During this period the PLO 
may have employed close to two-thirds of the Palestinian labour force in Lebanon (Sayigh 
1995). Access to these jobs were strongly determined by one’s party or faction: hospitals and 
other social services run by PLO-aligned factions usually employed only their own supporters 
(Hanafi and Long 2010). Palestinians in Lebanon require a work permit for other jobs, but as 
                                                
36 While it was unclear in this case what criteria were used, in case national poverty lines are used to estimate poverty, higher 
costs of living in urban areas are unlikely to be taken into account, to systematically underestimate the number of the urban 
poor. 
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discussed in Section 5, 72 occupations are restricted and not accessible to Palestinian 
refugees and other foreigners (Habib et al. 2006; Hankir and Sadiq 2013). Moreover, 
Palestinians earned less for the same work compared to the Lebanese across all educational 
and occupational categories (Abdulrahim and Khawaja 2011). The cost of work permits 
(ranging from US$133 to US$1,200) was so high that not many Palestinians applied for them 
(Knudsen 2007). Similarly to the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the Palestinians also competed 
for casual work primarily with foreign workers and not with the locals (Makhoul et al. 2003). 
The current economic participation of Syrian refugees in Jordan is reminiscent of the 
experience of Iraqi refugees in Jordan, whose jobs were also chiefly confined to the informal 
sector (Almakhamreh and Hundt 2012; Chatelard 2010). Informality and irregularity of work 
compelled less wealthy Iraqis to keep a low profile and live in poor or lower middle-class 
urban neighbourhoods (Chatelard 2010). The ‘guest’ status in Jordan created a situation of 
legal and social insecurity for the Iraqis, which limited economic opportunities as the 
authorities sought to reserve these for Jordanians (ibid.). 
The lack of access to formal sector jobs is surely one reason why, according to Fakih and 
Ibrahim (2016), there is no evidence that Syrian influx has had a significant impact on the 
formal labour market in Jordan. They forward several alternative explanations which basically 
suggest that Jordanians and Syrians operate in two separate labour markets. The apparent 
segmentation of the Jordanian labour market in the context of the Syrian influx and a rapidly 
growing informal sector was observed as a cause for concern by others (Almakhamreh and 
Hundt 2012; Kattaa 2016). 
Restrictions on economic participation by Syrian refugees in the formal sector of the 
Lebanese economy was primarily the result of their lack of legal status in the country, but 
also of the restricted entry to listed professions. In addition to poor pay there are other forms 
of exploitation endured by the refugees that had implications for their material wellbeing. 
Janmyr (2016) argues that Syrians under the kefala system in Lebanon are forced to endure 
poor work conditions due to fear of dismissal and even deportation. Securing a sponsor, 
which could cost US$500–1000 in the black market in Lebanon, and switching employers 
which can again cost significant amounts, have implications for material wellbeing of Syrians 
in Lebanon (Janmyr 2016: 76). Moreover, there is a clear connection between residence 
permits requiring sponsorship (for unregistered Syrians in Lebanon) and the labour 
exploitation risk: 
My boss makes me work more than 12 hours a day at his shop. Sometimes I 
complain but then he threatens to cancel my sponsorship. What can I do? I have to 
do whatever he says. I feel like his slave. 
(Testimony of Syrian refugee sponsored by his employer, in HRW 2016b) 
Such exploitation is, however, far worse and more likely to occur in the informal sector. For 
instance, in Zarqa, Jordan, informal jobs in the service industry, construction, skilled fields 
and skilled and unskilled agricultural work commonly leave refugees with no employment 
protection, long hours and denial of leave, in addition to low pay (Bellamy et al. 2017). 
Exposure to additional risks such as increased chemical exposure in farming is common 
(Doocy et al. 2016). In Jordan this is compounded by the fact that Syrians refugees typically 
work only at night or weekends to avoid Ministry of Labour patrols (Bellamy et al. 2017; 
Ulrichs et al. 2017). A Syrian male in Irbid, Jordan, explains the situation in August 2014: ‘I 
worked as a cleaning man in a big shopping mall in Irbid and I chose the night shift because 
there is [sic] no inspection campaigns from the office of labour at night’ (Akash 2015). 
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7.3.2 Economic participation: subjective wellbeing 
The financial status of refugees, which crucially depends on their ability to earn, has various 
connections with their mental health and subjective wellbeing. Palestinians from Syria report 
suffering severe trauma from the psychosocial burden of double displacement and the fact 
that not only their standard of living, but also previously enjoyed employment and property 
rights, were degraded in Lebanon (Bidinger et al. 2015: 51). Studies of the enduring 
displacement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon spanning multiple generations also 
highlights the burden. 
Because of the conditions of pervasive poverty, restricted opportunity, and 
inadequate health coverage, many younger Palestinians in Lebanon’s refugee camps 
think about their lives with a shortened horizon, and live with dying in mind…people 
still relatively young often talk about their lives as being ‘over’. They may have hope 
for their kids, but imagine little for themselves. Refugees…do not view themselves as 
failing to thrive, or being allowed to fail to thrive, but as being killed. 
(Feldman 2017: 58) 
In Jordan, ‘Many of the Iraqis are well educated or were economically stable so that the lack 
of work or only low status work has impacted on their self-esteem (Fafo et al. 2007; ICMC 
and USCCB 2007)‘ (Almakhamreh and Hundt 2012: 381). 
Negative psychological wellbeing due to lack of economic participation is evident among 
Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. For example, there is evidence on how the pressure 
to provide for their families while working illegally in Jordan put Syrian refugee men at greater 
risk of mental illness (Aide Médicale Internationale, 2014; Bellamy et al., 2017; Mercy Corps, 
2015; Musa, 2017; Wells et al., 2016). Al Smadi et al. (2016: 940), analysing a survey of 765 
Syrian refugees in six Jordanian cities, conclude that job status is an important factor that 
influences post-traumatic stress disorder. Moreover, men’s mental health is known to 
translate into violence towards their wives or children, putting the subjective wellbeing of the 
whole household at risk (Achilli 2015b; Shdayfat 2017; Wells et al. 2016). The domestic 
violence reported by Iraqi women in Jordan was similarly linked to the lack of employment 
(Chynoweth 2008). 
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Figure 7.5 Reasons why accessing employment causes tension in the 
community 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on analysis of primary data from REACH (2014b). 
Our analysis of primary data from Impact Initiatives underlines some of these findings. A 
survey amongst Syrians in urban areas of five Jordanian districts shows that 69–79 per cent 
of all respondents within a district consider that accessing gainful employment is a cause of 
tension. Respondents also note a clear variation in the reasons why this was the case 
(Figure 7.5). Security issues at work were deemed the most important concern (ranging from 
36–46 per cent of respondents across districts); followed by discrimination in the workplace 
(11–32 per cent); while lack of documentation was a further consideration (8–18 per cent). 
Work, according to some of the studies reviewed by Wells et al. (2006), offers a sense of 
purpose to the Syrian refugees in Jordan. Even jobs with poor pay and work conditions may 
be better in subjective wellbeing terms compared to being inactive. Clearly this position 
depends on the circumstances and can be very subjective, as other studies illustrate. For 
example, Janmyr’s (2016) study linking job status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their 
subjective wellbeing suggests that work can be traumatic to some if it signifies downward 
social mobility compared to the status back home. Janmyr gives the example of a highly 
skilled female refugee who felt that being sponsored as a ‘helper’ was demeaning. Al Heresh 
et al. (2013), referring to this issue within a Palestinian refugee camp setting in Jordan, 
argues that it is not enough to simply give people something to do. They argue that ‘the 
absence of meaningful occupations means that people survive yet do not necessarily thrive’ 
(Al Heresh et al. 2013: 4). 
Since authorities hardly enforce the law against child labour, Syrian children who work 
illegally have become important breadwinners for refugee families in Jordan (Akash and 
Boswall 2016; Dhingra 2015; UNICEF and IMC 2014). Historically, Palestinian refugee 
families routinely took their children out of school to provide extra income as well as to cut 
down on school expenses (Hejoj 2007). Wells et al.’s (2016: 3) systematic needs 
assessment of Syrian refugees in Jordan found 13 studies that documented evidence on 
how child labour has led to an increase in school dropouts. The Government of Lebanon with 
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the United Nations (2014) reported that 66 per cent of Syrian children registered as refugees 
with UNHCR have dropped out of school. Doocy et al. (2013) studied Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan and Syria to estimate that only 10 per cent of refugee teenage boys were in school, 
and that many were taking part in the informal labour force. UN Women (2013) surveyed 613 
individuals in Jordan to find that 47 per cent of households having had paid employment 
within the previous month reported that most of it was earned by a child. Though child labour 
was used as a coping mechanism to shore up refugee livelihoods, the practice predates the 
crisis and was widespread in Syria (UN Women 2013). Syrian adolescents, and even 
younger children, often shoulder the emotional burden of insecure livelihoods despite their 
parents’ attempt to shield them from such burdens (UNHCR 2014d). DeJong et al. (2017: 28) 
quote an adolescent girl (age 15–16) thus: 
When we left the house [Syria] I was 13 I didn’t think it’s a big deal and I continued to 
play where we went. But now I think about what happened to us. I could have been 
growing up in my country and I could have been in school grade 10. I was a good 
student and I wanted to go to college but instead I’m working here in a workshop. 
Now when I think of this I feel bad and sad we lost everything. 
Al Akash and Boswall (2016: 3) note that some parents have their daughters married at an 
early age, and UN Women (2013) show that the rate of child marriages among girls (51.3 per 
cent) was higher than among boys (13 per cent). The practice of child marriage seems easily 
explained using cultural reasons and predates the crisis. Yet, there are also strong economic 
participation-related reasons that could be at play (DeJong et al. 2017; UN Women 2013). 
Overall, for boys the employment rates tend to increase with age, whereas girls are more 
likely to work when they are very young and the employment rates tend to decrease as they 
grow older (UN Women 2013). The same study reports that 80 per cent of employed Syrian 
girls work in either domestic work or in agriculture and argue that both these sectors are both 
known to be high-risk sectors for physical and sexual exploitation. These economic 
participation-related compulsions are attributed to the higher rate of child marriages among 
Syrian girls. Early marriages, depriving children of schooling can cause lasting subjective 
wellbeing failures (DeJong et al. 2017). 
In Lebanon, the great majority of Syrians work without work permits and if caught run the risk 
of criminal and financial penalties. This is one reason that 10 per cent of displaced Syrian 
children in Lebanon are forced to work to complement family income. Even though this law is 
essentially unenforceable in the face of the sheer number of people working without permits, 
and because of benefits accrued to the Lebanese who employ them (Turner 2015), the 
possibility of enforcement creates fear and insecurity (Bidinger et al. 2015: 45). Other 
developments, such as municipal curfews, closure of informal businesses run by Syrians and 
vigilantism have meant that Syrians in Lebanon are afraid to go out in the evening or work 
extra hours. 
7.3.3 Economic participation: relational wellbeing 
Host country policies towards refugees, whether at national or local level, are a key factor 
determining how refugees negotiate economic participation and how they define and enact 
relations with different actors in the labour markets in the host country. Turner (2015), using 
a political economy approach, argues that efforts restricting the Syrians to camps, were 
expected by the Government of Jordan to protect the employment interests of the Jordanians 
(Musa 2017; Turner 2015). The Lebanese government’s policy of non-encampment has 
benefited Lebanese entrepreneurs who have traditionally relied on a cheap supply of Syrian 
labour (Turner 2015: 398). 
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In Jordan, the effect of restrictive policies are compounded by misperceptions about them 
(ILO 2017; Ulrichs et al. 2017). Even when employment policies are positive towards 
refugees (for example, the recent introduction of work permits for Syrian refugees in Jordan) 
they are often unclear or badly communicated, resulting in confusion and anxiety for 
refugees. Syrian refugees are sceptical and worry that policies may change again in future, 
and many fear that UNHCR assistance will be taken away if they enter into formal work 
(Bellamy et al. 2017: 34). 
Historically, Palestinian refugees in Jordan have also linked their poverty and economic 
difficulties with government policy. Hejoj’s (2007) study, for example, found that about 70 per 
cent of their respondents thought that policy and legal status were the reason why they are 
poor. Others, studying Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have identified that the barriers 
against refugee rights are located within policy but arbitrary barriers also crop up during 
policy implementation – authorities are known to deny work permits for Palestinians without 
explanation, which adds to the confusion and frustration (Hanafi et al. 2012; Hanafi and Long 
2010). ‘Palestinians in professions, such as doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, lost the right 
to practice their professions outside the refugee camps, and Palestinian engineers, of whom 
there were many, were denied jobs in the lucrative business of postwar reconstruction’ 
(Hanafi and Long 2010: 12). 
Tensions between Syrian refugees and their hosts in both Jordan and Lebanon are a critical 
determinant of relational wellbeing of refugees. Increased job competition is escalating 
tensions between Jordan’s refugee and host communities (Achilli 2015b; Akash and Boswall 
2016; Chatty 2017; Mercy Corps 2015; Moghaddam et al. 2017; Musa 2017). Musa (2017) 
surveys 2,500 households, enquiring into personal/work experiences to build up a picture for 
the cities of Irbid and Mafraq, Jordan. She suggests that in 2015 approximately 59 per cent 
of Jordanians and 27 per cent of Syrians considered employment as a key issue causing 
tension among them. 
Authors also refer to the dynamic nature of refugee-host relations and how these relations 
are nudged and shaped by economic compulsions, particularly in the medium term: ‘Many 
Jordanians told me that at the beginning of the crisis, their families supported Syrians and 
welcomed them as guests, but they all agreed that exploitation of refugees started later 
knowing that the crisis will not be ending anytime soon’ (Musa 2017: 16). Yet, despite the 
perceived concerns of the locals, the Syrians working in the informal sector in Jordan are 
largely replacing Egyptians, not Jordanians, in the work force (Chatty 2017: 29). In Lebanon, 
the entry of many Syrians to the informal sector, for instance in agriculture, construction or in 
small businesses, has had the most severe impact on the poorer segments among the 
Lebanese. 
Guay (2015), using a systematic review covering 66 studies, summarises how social 
cohesion in Jordan and Lebanon had been shaped by the intensity and the duration of the 
Syrian influx. He identifies economic competition for the limited number of jobs available as 
‘core-issues’ for social cohesion in both countries. Guay’s analysis is helpful in recognising 
that economic competition, thought attracting much attention, is only part of the story of 
tensions between refugees and their hosts. Equally important are historical/structural factors 
that pre-date the Syrian crisis and aggravating factors, like the role of media in stirring up 
resentment. 
Thorleifsson (2016) thus stresses that the Syrian workers, even before the crisis, were able 
to work at a lower wage than the locals because of the cheaper cost of living in Syria.37 
Furthermore, after the crisis commenced, the registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon have  
 
                                                
37 Chemali et al. (2017) provides a detailed update of the refugee-host relations. The main focus of their paper is, however, on a 
training of fieldworkers to operate in local contexts strained by poor refugee-host relations. 
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become even more wage competitive: ‘Now the Syrian refugees compete with Lebanese for 
even lower wages, since they can combine work and assistance from UN organisations and 
local and international NGOs. Refugees accept lower pay for performing identical work, since 
it is the total household income that matters’ (ibid.: 1077). Consequently, Thorleifsson (2016), 
using data from a national survey done in May 2016 (by Fafo) illustrates that: ‘98% think 
[Syrians] are taking jobs from the Lebanese and pushing down wages, while 63% believe 
that they are supported financially to an unfair degree’. Yet, Mackreath’s (2014) research 
conducted in Karr, north Lebanon, describes more mutually respectful refugee-host relations 
at that time. The following quotation from Mackreath is indicative of an enhanced level of 
relational wellbeing which seem to have opened up opportunities for economic participation: 
A system of job swapping is also evident amongst skilled manual workers and 
teachers. These small-scale bargains between refugees and their hosts are useful for 
both populations to get by and highlight both the importance of dignified ‘autonomous’ 
trade for the refugee, and the significance of the role of the host community in 
providing assistance by accepting the refugees into the informal economic life of the 
community. 
(Mackreath, 2014, p. 20) 
Various economists have also argued that an understanding of the economic effects, and by 
implication of the relational effects of the refugee influx, requires looking beyond labour 
markets. Betts and Collier (2017) thus note that Special Economic Zones (SEZs) could tap 
into idle refugee labour pools to benefit both refugees and host countries. Others argue that 
the arrival of refugees itself boosts the output of host economies: ‘Refugees, even if poor, are 
additional consumers, boosting demand with immediate effect, in particular for basic 
necessities’ (Errighi and Griesse 2016: 7).38 Related to this, Chatty writes: 
  
                                                
38 As a result, the GDP of host countries have grown. But because the populations have grown even faster with the influx of 
refugees the end result is that per capita GDP in these refugee-hosting countries will fall. 
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A discrepancy between what is widely written about in the local press (the burden of 
Syrians on the Jordanian economy) and what policy makers and practitioners feel is 
actually occurring has emerged. Many policy makers feel that Syrians are contributing 
to the Jordanian economy in a greater fashion than is widely being written about and 
circulated in polite society. Some point to a recent United Nations report (cf ILO) 
suggesting that the unemployment rate had dropped by 2 per cent since the start of 
the Syrian crisis due to the surge in Syrian-owned factories opening (200) and the 
heavy employment of Jordanians (estimated at about 6,000). 
(Chatty 2017: 29) 
Cultural norms from Syria traditionally stipulated clear gender roles for men and women; 
fathers tended to look after household income and make key household decisions whereas 
the mothers managed the home. DeJong et al. (2017), using data from focus group 
discussions conducted in 2014 in two cities in the Bekaa valley, confirm that even adolescent 
Syrian refugees were clearly aware of these gender roles. Yet in negotiating the difficult 
terrain of ensuring economic participation, as a refugee household the Syrians refugees have 
had to reluctantly put these gender norms aside (Jabbar and Zaza 2016). Research on 
female-headed households conducted in 2014 in Jordan and Lebanon revealed that 
Ninety-four per cent of the women interviewed felt their responsibilities had shifted 
since becoming the head of household, with a small number of the opinion that this 
was empowering and positive. But most – 95 per cent – indicated that the role 
change was a negative one 
(UNHCR 2014d: 45) 
Another study found that none of the unemployed Syrian woman had worked back in Syria, 
indicating that the crisis has forced them to enter into the labour market for the first time (ILO 
2014b). 
Research in four cities in Jordan by Ulrichs et al. (2017) also noted that women face gender-
specific barriers, such that their involvement in the labour market is considered either 
inappropriate because of gender-related norms, or incompatible with their care duties at 
home. (Ulrichs et al. 2017). Conversely, an inability of men to fulfil the role of breadwinner is 
associated with greater spousal interference with women’s mobility. Shifts in gender roles 
within the family are apparent, with men’s mobility hampered due to fear of arrest, detention 
and deportation as a result of illegal residential status. Women find themselves looking for 
employment while burdened by childcare and unpaid domestic work. As Qabelias, a 15–16-
year-old female, notes: 
I work at the factory and all the women who work with me also do housework. I am 
proof. My dad is home…They mostly rely on me. Although I have brothers, one of 
them works and the other one works sometimes. I go out to work at 7 am and return 
at 5 or 6. When I come home, my mother asks me to do the housework. 
(DeJong et al. 2017: 30) 
However, shifts in gender roles are associated with an increase in intimate partner violence 
(Harvey et al. 2013). 
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7.3.4 Conclusion 
In a context of enduring urban displacement, economic participation is critical for the 
wellbeing of refugee communities. Humanitarian assistance is neither designed nor sufficient 
to provide for the full scope of refugee needs. Work is critical for catering to basic needs and 
material wellbeing, but also potentially offers the perspective for longer term improvement, 
provided the terms under which work is engaged in are conducive. The systematic analysis 
of the literature related to economic participation of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon yielded 
the following conclusions. 
Government policies in Jordan and Lebanon are geared to protect the formal sector 
economic interests of the host communities. This has meant that the Syrian refugees, as well 
as Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in these two countries, have had to primarily rely on the 
informal sector for work. However, there is also some evidence that formal sector 
companies, and the government, flexibly hire labour in an informal manner, without contracts 
or social security protections. 
As the lower skilled jobs in Jordan and Lebanon are typically conducted by migrant workers, 
and the poor amongst host communities, public policies that have made it difficult to 
participate in the formal sector have enhanced competition in low-skilled, low pay jobs. A 
collapse of wages and of loss of jobs for local workers because of the rapid increase in 
refugee labour have been observed in the informal sector. This meant that poorer Jordanians 
and poorer Lebanese, as well as other poor migrants in the countries who rely on the 
informal sector for income, had to bear most of the costs of the various refugee crises. In 
contrast, there is no evidence that Syrian influx has had a significant impact on the formal 
labour market in Jordan in terms of employment rate or unemployment rates, as public policy 
has until late 2015 insulated the sector from absorbing Syrian labour. However, since then, 
the Government of Jordan has adopted formalisation policies that seek to issue up to 
200,000 work permits to Syrians. 
Informal jobs entail refugees’ bearing significant risks of exploitation. However, even in the 
formal economy, some features of public policy and law are associated with poorer wellbeing 
outcomes. Under the kefala system, in operation in various forms in Lebanon and Jordan, 
migrant workers require a domestic sponsor for obtaining a work permit. The relationship 
between these workers and their employers is characterised by structural power inequalities. 
In Lebanon, legal labour protections for 250,000 female migrant domestic workers are 
devised to be weaker than afforded to almost all other categories of workers, such as the 
right to a weekly day of rest, paid leave, benefits, and worker compensation in case of injury. 
Moreover, as legal status is dependent on continued employer support, the conditions are 
fertile for abuse, particularly in the absence of effective policing and judicial protection. For 
instance, in Lebanon, migrant domestic workers lose their legal status if their sponsor 
terminates their contract, or if they decide to leave the employer. In addition to lower pay, 
which the poorer locals also had to endure, other forms of exploitation such as longer hours 
of work, poor labour conditions, rights violations and use of child labour are common. In 
Jordan, there is considerable momentum towards formalisation of jobs with employers 
sponsoring Syrians. Jordan, in contrast to Lebanon, is attempting to formalise the migrant 
domestic labour system to reduce abuse. There is an active anti-trafficking unit within the 
Jordanian police, and the Ministry of Labour has shut down recruiting agencies for 
misconduct (Su 2017). 
Various coping strategies used by the Syrians in economic participation in exile have 
resulted in negative subjective wellbeing outcomes. The use of child labour to secure some 
form of economic participation achieved the desired effect only at a substantial psychosocial 
cost. This type of trade-off between material and subjective elements of household wellbeing 
was common. Syrian boys were the most exploited in the labour market but girls, because of 
the gendered nature of economic opportunities available for them, were more at risk of child 
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marriages. For both boys and girls, the material wellbeing generated through child labour 
involves the discounting of their future wellbeing, where education is compromised, or 
children are exposed to dangerous working conditions. For Syrian men, the lack of economic 
opportunity closely associated with illegal residency status has impacted their subjective 
wellbeing by being unable to fulfil traditional bread winner roles within a household. Men’s 
subjective wellbeing failures have had the perverse effect of spilling over to other members 
of the households in the form of familial conflict and domestic violence. 
The relational wellbeing of refugees with regard to their interaction with the host populations 
is defined by the tensions, real or perceived, that have been created by the increased 
competition for jobs and other resources. Labour markets are the points of friction, and these 
frictions have increased with time, generating increasing levels of negative relational 
wellbeing. 
Since late 2015, in Jordan the compact with donors has led to a concerted effort to issue 
200,000 work permits, formalising existing jobs and aiming to generate new jobs for 
Jordanians and Syrians. Its roll out is progressing, albeit not as fast as planned, and its 
effects are as yet unclear. Comparable efforts in Lebanon have focused on job creation and 
livelihoods, but have not led to policy change simplifying access to the formal labour market 
for Syrians. 
The relations that Syrian refugees have with local urban/municipal authorities is largely 
structured by highly centralised national policymaking systems, though officials’ discretionary 
behaviour generates differences in their local application. In Lebanon, mayoral initiatives 
were noted, both positive (e.g. hosting social events for hosts and refugees) and negative 
(e.g. curfews) for the wellbeing of Syrians. No such reports were found for Jordan. 
Portraying refugees as a resource that can be harnessed for the benefit of the host country is 
a strategy that is likely to improve relational wellbeing of refugees as well as the hosts, 
provided this can be embedded in mainstream media discourses. Both countries have 
specific example projects that have begun to look at refugees as a resource. However, the 
case must be made for hosts, refugees and migrants to have a right to decent work. 
  
84 
8 Conclusions and recommendations 
In this section of the report we identify conclusions and recommendations, addressing the 
second research question set out as “In what ways can policymakers, practitioners and 
donors support modalities of reception that promote gender equitable, improved wellbeing 
outcomes for urban refugees and host communities?”. We first offer reflections on policy and 
programming, followed by a section on emerging research implications. 
Recommendations – policy and programming 
The comparison of Jordan and Lebanon has been fruitful in showing similarities and 
distinctions between the two countries’ approaches regarding the themes of legal status; 
housing; and economic participation. Table 8.1 provides a sketch of policy trends. 
Table 8.1 Policy trends Lebanon and Jordan 2011–2017 
 Jordan Lebanon 
Governance Centralised, fairly strong, civil 
society relatively curtailed, stable 
Centralised, weak, civil society 
relatively free, historically unstable 
National policy 
● Borders Progressive tightening Progressive tightening 
● Temporary residency Relatively accessible, little change Accessible to the rich, liberalisation 
in 2017 
● Housing Encampment + urban No camps 
● Economic participation Restricted professions, annual 
update 
Restricted professions, annual 
update 
Work permits: enhanced access 
since 2015 
Work permits: highly constrained 
Municipal efforts 
● Monitoring Not reported Routine 
● Curfews None Widespread, regular 
● Integration Not reported Sporadic 
Recommendations – policy and programming 
This report has found that modalities of reception in the domains of legal status, housing and 
economic participation all have distinct, and unequal, gendered wellbeing outcomes. In some 
instances, public policy and law itself have generated and underwritten these. 
The current modalities of reception for Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan can be explained with 
reference to the historical ways in which influxes of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees were 
managed. As such, it pays to ‘look back in order to look forward’. Lessons may be derived 
from the humanitarian responses supporting these previous refugee groups that have 
relevance today – for instance, regarding the needs, opportunities and constraints to support 
and build capacity amongst local authorities in charge of everyday management of the influx. 
The plight of non-Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan is serious and humanitarian and 
aid agencies and multilateral donors must equitably address their condition, even if the size 
of the Syrian influx particularly draws their attention. 
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Urban 
The evidence outlined in this report strongly suggest that emerging aid responses focusing 
on the Syrian influx into urban areas would do well to account for differences between cities 
and within these in Lebanon and Jordan. Particularly in Lebanon, we have outlined the great 
and significant variety between areas even within the same cities, in terms of build 
infrastructures, service provisioning and the role of non-state actors in its governance. 
Urban informal settlements now comprise key locations where the poorest refugees, foreign 
migrants, and poor host communities are situated. However, these settlements are deemed 
illegal by the state in both Jordan and Lebanon, to constrain service provisioning. In 
response, assemblages of actors (private, aid, government, non-government, faith-based 
organisations, NGOs) have stepped in, but this has led to fragmentation and geographical 
patchworks of service and aid provisioning. Consequently, the terms under which some of 
the most vulnerable groups in urban areas access services (such as sanitation, drinking 
water, electricity, waste management, etc.) diverge by location and by population (with 
nationality and legal status key markers). Urban modalities of reception for refugees are 
hence not just based on who they are, but also where they are. 
The localisation agenda adopted by the World Humanitarian Summit 2016 has underlined 
the need to be more responsive to local specificity in humanitarian crises and in protracted 
urban displacement contexts. Responses require building on pre-existing support networks 
and acknowledging that local cultural values can contribute to wellbeing success, but also 
failure, for different people – sometimes simultaneously. Moreover, they require ascertaining 
the role and suitable ways for aid agencies to engage important non-state urban actors such 
as formal and informal real estate and employment brokers, and understanding how their 
roles are related to the ways in which public policy organises city planning and manages 
refugee populations. 
In the context of Jordan, questions remain over which types of refugee households stay in 
camps and which move to urban communities. Their demographic, socio-economic and 
gender profiles may be distinct, as cities offer opportunities for advancement, but also the 
risk of exposure to greater deprivations than faced in camps. Conversely, host communities 
often are assumed homogenous in aid responses but may need greater specification. In 
Lebanon and Jordan, emerging evidence suggests that religious affiliation performs an 
important role in reception of displaced groups, generating spatially distinct hosting practices, 
yet humanitarian and developmental agencies may underplay their importance. Religious, 
tribal, or other local institutions shape hosting practices and approaches, to complement, 
intersect and mediate government policy. 
In Lebanon and Jordan, national urban policies addressing planning and addressing poverty 
and vulnerability in cities and towns could be promoted and established, to explicitly devise 
strategies supporting the equitable development of those urban areas in which the most 
vulnerable groups reside, using participatory approaches. Strengthened definitions of what 
constitutes the urban, combined with stronger data collection and publication, and greater 
political appetite to resolve this will be needed. In this respect, humanitarian and 
development agencies, and the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan could promote 
networks and communities of practice amongst mayors and urban municipalities to source 
learning, share best practices and feed into response plans and policies. 
Legal status, rule of law and human security 
Irregular residency status is a key factor in producing highly gendered material, subjective 
and relational wellbeing failures for refugees. Lack of legal status leaves refugees vulnerable 
to a range of abuses, including labour exploitation and sexual abuse, unable to turn to the 
authorities for protection for fear that police may arrest them for expired residency. While 
men without valid legal residency status fear arrest, their mobility and livelihood options 
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become limited. In response, women and children become key income earners and exposed 
to attendant risks, while traditional gender roles concerning who is the breadwinner are 
challenged, producing conflict within families. Child labour for boys has become widespread. 
And as reports of sexual harassment, assault and forced sexual exploitation of women and 
girls have dogged settlements in Lebanon and Jordan, the latent threat of sexual violence, 
combined with extreme poverty, is driving child marriages amongst Syrian refugee girls. 
Accordingly, in both Jordan and Lebanon, efforts to promote displaced individuals’ access to 
legal documentation remain critical as it is an issue which affects every aspect of refugee life, 
not least because residency policy interlocks with other policies governing access to work, or 
ability to register the birth of newborns. Birth registration is a particularly critical issue and 
should be prioritised for immediate advocacy efforts. 
Frequent policy change in the realms of legal status, border regimes, economic participation 
and housing have had, and will continue to have, significant implications for the material, 
subjective and relational wellbeing of refugees and hosts, distinctly affecting women and 
men, girls and boys. Policy reforms, such as Lebanon’s residence fee waiver in 2017, 
warrant careful monitoring and cannot be assumed to have gender neutral effects. 
In Lebanon, UNHCR registration should resume to ensure the GoL has a clear and 
documented understanding of the number of refugees on its soil – this can contribute to 
improved assessment and budgeting of needs, as well as ensuring refugees have access to 
basic legal protection provided through the UNHCR. Recent advocacy efforts have made 
progress in obtaining a fee waiver for significant but selective groups of Syrian refugees. 
Further efforts should seek for these waivers to be extended, to encourage regularised 
status, especially those who were not able to maintain valid UNHCR registration continually 
since their arrival, or those who turned 15 since they entered the country who are not able to 
access residency as they do not have valid personal identification. 
There is a significant opportunity for humanitarian and development programming in Jordan 
and Lebanon to mainstream awareness on the wellbeing impacts of limited legal 
documentation across all types of aid programs engaging with refugees. To date, awareness 
raising on these legal issues has primarily remained within the mandate of legal protection 
actors. Humanitarian, development and government actors focusing on sectoral interventions 
regarding education, shelter, wash, and employment, etc., often do not address legal status, 
even though its relation to outcomes in sectoral areas is clear. Use of common 
communication channels sharing demonstrative videos and policy updates could be 
promoted between these actors. 
Refugees have rights to protection and assistance under international humanitarian law. In 
the absence of effective and equitable policing and legal safeguarding mechanisms for 
refugees, greater advocacy for and support to deliver this is needed in Jordan and Lebanon. 
The international community should support local civil society capacity to advocate with 
governments to take a more rights-based approach to protection and livelihood issues and 
equitable reforms of the legal and judicial system to work better for marginalised groups. 
Development agencies may also critically review the potential of locally present non-formal 
justice mechanisms to deliver justice and protect rights equitably for women and men. 
Progressive reforms and monitoring of the kefala system, in operation in various forms in 
Lebanon and Jordan, could be initiated to reduce its potential for abuse. Here too, new 
informal justice mechanisms may be considered to help counter structural power inequalities 
embedded in the kefala system. 
Although a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Syria remains urgently needed, and while 
some Syrians may choose to return home to newly stable areas, these developments must 
not be used as a pretext to encourage or mandate the return of Syrian refugees from Jordan 
or Lebanon to Syria. As neither resettlement nor repatriation are realistic options for the 
majority of Syrian refugees, more resettlement places in third countries continue to be badly 
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needed. The international community must continue to seek building up greater domestic 
support for the temporary or permanent reception of asylum seekers from Syria, who are 
currently in Lebanon and Jordan. 
Housing 
Humanitarian and development actors should closely involve host communities in identifying 
and designing shelter responses. Housing solutions could focus on improving the areas 
where refugees live, rather than seeking options that lead to further displacement, and 
rupture of current social and economic networks. 
With growing numbers of poor host groups living in informal settlements and urban ‘camps’, 
practitioners and donors could advocate and work with national and local governments to 
adjust laws that prohibit the provision of services and that inhibit concrete investments in 
these localities to demonstrably benefit host and refugee communities. In this respect, 
shared urban public spaces (parks, street markets, etc.) are important sites for fostering 
social cohesion through everyday interactions. Development investments in the quality and 
accessibility of these areas may enhance safe spaces to potentially provide important outlets 
for people confined to highly crowded housing. Moreover, given the wellbeing issues and 
effects on gender-based violence highlighted in this research, protection considerations can 
be taken into account in the design and targeting of shelter programs, and may help to raise 
awareness in the donor community to facilitate fundraising for these critical needs. 
Simultaneously, policymakers and donors could explore options to jointly provide support for 
social housing schemes that benefit poor members of hosts communities and temporary 
residents from Syria while seeking to halt rapidly rising housing rents, which are a key cause 
of anxiety. Finally, the mixing of populations in urban informal areas also suggests a review 
of aid agency mandates, and the aid community should agree on an operational framework 
to address humanitarian needs of all vulnerable populations within these urban settings. 
Economic participation 
Livelihood support programmes for vulnerable groups will remain essential in coming years 
in both Jordan and Lebanon, irrespective of when safe return to Syria can be ensured for 
displaced populations. In this respect, Lebanon could seek to learn from the processes put in 
place as part of the Jordan Compact towards supporting refugees’ access to formal work, 
and enabling them to make significant economic contributions, including employment 
generation for host groups. 
Advocacy and awareness raising on decent working conditions is important, notably for 
vulnerable hosts and displaced groups working informally. This may, for instance, be done 
through supporting associations or unions of informal workers in sectors known to provide 
many job opportunities for vulnerable populations such as in construction and agriculture. 
Aid and governmental support programs typically focus on youth/women. Promoting income 
generation opportunities for men and involving them in community development, and 
educating them on protection issues, etc., can have positive wellbeing outcomes not just for 
them, but indirectly for other members of the household. Similarly, aid donors may incentivise 
practitioner organisations to develop volunteering programmes that provide meaningful, 
appropriate and fulfilling opportunities to contribute to local society and the quality of urban 
life. Such programmes could be designed to correspond to the aspirations and needs of 
women and men, adolescent girls and boys but generally would seek to combat boredom, 
harness untapped energies and comprise both host and refugee groups to shore up 
community relations. 
The urban informal economy provides an important source of livelihoods for refugees. It 
absorbs Syrian workers without legal residency status and without work permits – however, 
they are often at risk of being harmed by hazardous and exploitative working conditions. As 
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barriers to accessing formal labour markets remain, developmental efforts should recognise 
and remediate the ills, but avoid demonising the informal sector. Instead, it could aim to 
lessen the sharp edges of informality, such as offering alternatives for child labour absorbed 
by it. Lessons from other countries suggests that worker organisations that can represent the 
interests of migrant workers with employers and the state can have an important role in 
improving working conditions, although this is likely to meet resistance. 
Efforts to formalise jobs are ongoing in Jordan. Formalisation has developmental potential 
but cannot be assumed to suffice in its own right. There is a need to adjust such schemes to 
the aspirations, concerns and protection needs of informal Syrian workers if they are to be 
successful. This includes creating greater certainty and clarifying the duration for which 
policies are put in place, and clearly communicating how these interact with aid provisioning 
in the short and medium term. Formalisation is, however, not necessarily a panacea. In 
Lebanon, the discussion of migrant domestic workers shows that even for people with a work 
permit, other labour laws and the kefala system enshrines discrimination, weak protection, 
and highly unequal power relations between employers and workers, making female workers 
subject to high levels of exploitation and abuse, sexual or otherwise. 
In Jordan, amnesties have been periodically announced to enable formalisation of work, for 
instance for employers of informal workers, and workers lacking proper documentation. Such 
amnesties may also be promoted to support high rates of birth registration completion for 
newborns in coming years, and retrospectively for children of Syrian descent who were born 
in host countries, in order to reduce their vulnerabilities and advance their wellbeing now and 
in future. Other measures may include supporting access to locally based ‘one-stop shops’ to 
simplify birth registration, reduce transaction and travel costs involved in the process, and 
enhance awareness amongst communities about the process and its benefits. 
As policy and programming efforts increasingly focus on livelihoods and resilience, this 
should not come at the cost of a significant reduction in humanitarian aid, as Syrian refugees 
continue to rely upon humanitarian support to supplement incomes gained through formal 
and informal work. 
Social relations 
Globally, greater dialogue is needed about the ways in which cities can host displaced 
groups in equitable and dignified manners, to enable newcomers’ economic participation, 
social cohesion and finding new ways in which to live well together with host communities. 
Lessons from Jordan and Lebanon set out in this report may well have relevance to cities 
beyond the region. 
Managing host-refugee community relations is critical for sustaining significantly strained 
solidarity ties and hospitality cultures that underpin the welcome of refugees, whose erosion 
risks a deep challenge to human security. Aid agencies should support social relations by 
deliberately including the Jordanian and Lebanese poor and this is already happening on a 
significant scale. Practitioners, governments and donors can identify and celebrate 
champions at the local government level or within civil society that promote dialogue and joint 
action to support urban neighbourhoods. It is important for such positive case studies to 
feature in mainstream media to combat powerful entrenched discourses that victimise 
refugees and undermine community relations. 
National policymakers and donors can reward and incentivise local leadership in 
municipalities that effectively fosters social cohesion between host communities and 
refugees. In this respect, in Jordan, the decentralisation of powers to municipalities offers a 
window of opportunity engaging with locally elected councillors, who are now exploring new 
mandates set out in the municipal law. These actors could be engaged, supported and 
incentivised to initiate measures that foster community relations between hosts and refugees. 
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Simultaneously, it will be important to draw and widely share lessons from such 
engagements to accelerate good practice working with municipalities. 
Research agenda 
A wellbeing approach offers a fruitful organising framework that allows analysts to take a 
rounded perspective on the effects of protracted urban displacement, both for displaced 
groups as well as for host communities. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that 
displacement management and urban development programmes often tend to focus on 
improving material conditions (e.g. by cash transfers or through developing economic 
benefits of refugees through a ‘Compact’) but ignore the subjective and relational dimensions 
that are important for wellbeing. Wellbeing research can thus be highly relevant to policy and 
programming in connecting material to subjective and relational outcomes valued by people. 
Though local urban authorities in Jordan and Lebanon bear the brunt of dealing with the 
everyday challenges that the refugee influx poses, their efforts doing so are poorly 
documented and have not been subject to adequate in-depth analysis. Within the larger 
cities, intra-city differences in reception are occurring, but these are, with the exception of 
Palestinian camps, not particularly well documented. This constitutes a missed opportunity 
for learning about spatial differentiation in reception and its wellbeing effects in large 
conurbations, where large numbers of Syrians are hosted. This also hinders learning and 
identification of new routes for support by domestic and international policymakers, 
practitioners and donor agencies. 
In marginalised urban contexts in Lebanon and Jordan, informal institutions have emerged to 
provide critical services and forms of political representation to marginalised groups. Informal 
brokers and mediators appear to play an important role in providing access to informal jobs, 
housing, services and credit. They may be involved in aid distribution and offer protection. 
Their brokering practices need to be investigated to understand in what ways and why they 
affect the wellbeing of refugee and host communities, to inform possible policy and 
practitioner programming responses. 
Political and religious organisations such as Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well 
as Palestinian Committees, can be important actors in marginalised urban contexts in 
Lebanon and Jordan. They have historically performed important representative and 
advocacy functions towards local government authorities, and provided and organised 
access to essential services for their constituents. Their treatment of Syrian refugees of 
different confessional backgrounds are not necessarily (gender) equitable and there is a 
need to better understand when this is the case, or not, and how programming responses 
may seek to sensitively engage such actors. 
While municipalities in Lebanon and Jordan directly engage Syrians, activities are often 
directed by the central governments, and this review found little evidence of self-initiated 
strategic plans or policies to manage the influx. However, significant idiosyncratic responses 
by municipalities were found to occur in Lebanon, and measures taken included curfews and 
closure of informal businesses, as well as social events that seek to unite host and refugee 
communities. Their modalities and wellbeing effects are poorly documented but worthy of 
further investigation, as potential intervention points that can better manage strained 
community relations at the municipal level. One question here concerns: under what kind of 
conditions can municipal and higher administrative levels interact to generate positive 
wellbeing outcomes for host, refugee and other migrant communities? 
In order to provide an appropriate response in urban contexts, it is important to collect 
information on all the different segments of the urban population, and their distinct 
vulnerabilities to highlight how conflicting interests may come into play. Whereas 
international attention has been largely on the Syrian population and increasingly on host 
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communities, effects of the Syrian influx on other vulnerable refugee and migrant groups 
present in Jordan and Lebanon remain underexposed. This includes questions about labour 
displacement effects and its role in community relations. 
Effort should be made to analyse positive factors in relationship building and maintaining 
peaceful dynamics in urban contexts. Analysis to date has focused on ‘drivers of tension’, but 
research focused on the rationale and interpersonal practice of acceptance and peaceful co-
existence, temporary or otherwise, and including the urban spatial dimensions to this could 
be advanced to inform aid programmes and mass communication efforts. For instance, in 
Lebanon, Social Development Centres have delivered important welfare services and aid to 
both vulnerable host and refugee groups, and its role in promoting wellbeing and fostering 
community relations could be explored further. Similarly, given that there is some evidence 
that Syrians have successfully established factories in Jordan to generate employment for 
both refugees and amongst hosts, there could be scope to investigate whether and how this 
may be replicated in the context of Lebanon, and what role local authorities have played in 
enabling this. 
Finally, research may also explore the scope for Syrian refugees to self-organise in new 
forms of collective action, through which they can engage and represent their interests with 
local and supra-local forms of government as alternatives to informal institutions. 
  
91 
References 
Ababsa, M. (2011) ‘Citizenship and Urban Issues in Jordan’, in M. Ababsa and R. Daher 
(eds) Cities, Urban Practices and Nation Building in Jordan, Presses de l’Institut français du 
Proche-Orient: 39–64 
Abdulrahim, S. and Khawaja, M. (2011) ‘The Cost of Being Palestinian in Lebanon’, Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37(1): 151–166, doi:10.1080/1369183X.2011.521363 
ACAPS (2013) Legal Status of Individuals Fleeing Syria, Geneva: ACAPS 
Achilli, L. (2015a) Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Reality Check, Policy Brief 2015/02, 
Florence: The Migration Policy Centre, doi:10.2870/821248 
Achilli, L. (2015b) ‘Becoming a Man in Al-Wihdat: Masculine Performances in a Palestinian 
refugee camp in Jordan’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 47(2): 263–280,   
doi:10.1017/S0020743815000045 
Ager, A. and Strang, A. (2008) ‘Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework’, 
Journal of Refugee Studies 21(2): 166–191, doi:10.1093/jrs/fen016 
Ager, J. (2015) Faith, Secularism, and Humanitarian Engagement: Finding the Place of 
Religion in the Support of Displaced Communities, Springer 
Agier, M. (2002) ‘Between War and City: Towards an Urban Anthropology of Refugee 
Camps’, Ethnography 3(3): 317–341, doi:10.1177/146613802401092779 
Aide Médicale Internationale (2014) Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Syrian Crisis: Health 
Needs Assessment, Ministry of Health Jordan 
Akram, S.M.; Bidinger, S.; Lang, A.; Hites, D.; Kuzmova, Y. and Noureddine, E. (2015) 
‘Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing’, Middle East 
Law and Governance 7(3): 287–318, doi:10.1163/18763375-00703003 
Al Akash, R. (2015) ‘Protracted Displacement and Invisible Future: Experiences of Urban 
Syrian Refugees in Irbid-Jordan’, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 
5(5): 48–53 
Al Akash, R. and Boswall, K. (2016) ‘Listening to the Voices of Syrian Women and Girls 
Living as Urban Refugees in Northern Jordan: A Narrative Ethnography of Early Marriage’, in 
E. Aksaz and J.-F. Pérouse (eds) “Guests and Aliens”: Re-Configuring New Mobilities in the 
Eastern Mediterranean After 2011 – with a Special Focus on Syrian Refugees, Istanbul: 
Institut français d’études anatoliennes: 142 
Al Heresh, R.; Bryant, W. and Holm, M. (2013) ‘Community-based Rehabilitation in Jordan: 
Challenges to Achieving Occupational Justice’, Disability and Rehabilitation 35(21): 1848–
1852, doi:10.3109/09638288.2012.756944 
Allan, D.K. (2014) Refugees of the Revolution: Experiences of Palestinian Exile, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press 
Almakhamreh, S. and Hundt, G.L. (2012) ‘An Examination of Social Work Interventions for 
Use with Displaced Iraqi Households in Jordan’, European Journal of Social Work 15(3): 
377–391, doi:10.1080/13691457.2010.545770 
92 
Alnsour, J. (2014) ‘The Effectiveness of Urban Management in Jordanian Municipalities’, WIT 
Transactions on Ecology and Environment 191: 271–282, doi:10.2495/SC140231 
Alnsour, J. and Meaton, J. (2014) ‘Housing Conditions in Palestinian Refugee Camps, 
Jordan’, Cities 36: 65–73, doi:10.1016/j.cities.2013.10.002 
Alsayyad, N. and Roy, A. (2006) ‘Medieval Modernity: On Citizenship and Urbanism in a 
Global Era’, Space Polity 10(1): 1–20, doi:10.1080/13562570600796747 
Al-Shdayfat, N.M. (2017) ‘Emotional Abuse Among Syrian Refugee Women in Jordan’, 
Global Journal of Health Science 9(3): 237 
Al-Smadi, A.M.; Halaseh, H.J.; Gammoh, O.S.; Ashour, A.F.; Gharaibeh, B. and Khoury, L.S. 
(2016) ‘Do Chronic Diseases and Availability of Medications Predict Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) Among Syrian Refugees in Jordan?’ Pakistan Journal of Nutrition 15(10): 
936–941, doi:10.3923/pjn.2016.936.941 
Amirthalingam, K. and Lakshman, R.W.D. (2013) ‘Impact of Displacement on Women and 
Female-Headed Households: A Mixed Method Analysis with a Microeconomic Touch’, 
Journal of Refugee Studies 26(1): 26–46, doi:10.1093/jrs/fes007 
Amnesty International (2013) Refugees from Syria Face Further Suffering if Jordan Closes 
Border, Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/01/refugees-
from-syria-face-further-suffering-if-jordan-closes-border/ (accessed 27 June 2017) 
Anderson, S. (2013) ‘Child Marriages Rise Among Syrian Refugee Girls’, The Atlantic, 28 
May, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/child-marriages-rise-among-
syrian-refugee-girls/276287/ 
ARDD-Legal Aid (2016a) Hidden Guests: Yemenis in Jordan, Protection Issues in Jordan 
No. 1, Amman: Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development 
ARDD-Legal Aid (2016b) Accessing the Labour Market for Syrian refugees: Lessons Learnt 
from the Iraqi Refugee Crisis, Amman: Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development 
ARDD-Legal Aid (undated) Birth and Marriage Registration in Jordan, Amman: Arab 
Renaissance for Democracy and Development 
Ayoub, L. (2017) ‘Lebanese Municipalities: Regulating Refugee Presence is “Our 
Jurisdiction”‘, The Legal Agenda, 29 May, http://legal-agenda.com/en/article.php?id=3689 
Bekkers, J. (2017) ‘Negotiating (im)mobility: A Field Study on Negotiating Refugee 
Trajectories from Syria to Jordan’s Urban Areas’, MA Thesis, Sociology of Development and 
Change, Wageningen University 
Bellamy, C.; Haysom, S.; Wake, C. and Barbelet, V. (2017) ‘The Lives and Livelihoods of 
Syrian Refugees: A Study of Refugee Perspectives and their Institutional Environment in 
Turkey and Jordan’, report commissioned by HPG, Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
Berman, S.L. (2016) ‘Identity and Trauma’, Journal of Traumatic Stress Disorders and 
Treatment 5(2), doi:10.4172/2324-8947.1000e108 
Betts, A.; Ali, A. and Memişoğlu, F. (2017) Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis: 
Exploring Responses in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, Report, Oxford: Refugee Studies 
Centre, University of Oxford 
93 
Betts, A. and Collier, P. (2017) Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System, UK: Allen 
Lane 
Bidinger, S.; Lang, A.; Hites, D.; Kuzmova, Y.; Noureddine, E. and Akram, S.M. (2015) 
Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing, Report, 
Boston: Boston University School of Law 
Boustani, M.; Capri, E.; Gebara, H. and Mourad, Y. (2016) Responding to the Syrian Crisis in 
Lebanon: Collaboration Between Aid Agencies and Local Governance Structures, Human 
Settlements Working Paper, London: International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) 
Brun, C. (2015) ‘Active Waiting and Changing Hopes: Toward a Time Perspective on 
Protracted Displacement’, Social Analysis 59: 19–37, doi:10.3167/sa.2015.590102 
Brun, C. and Fábos, A. (2015) ‘Making Homes in Limbo? A Conceptual Framework’, Refuge 
31(1): 5–17 
CARE (2015) Five Years Into Exile: The Challenges Faced by Syrian Refugees Outside 
Camps in Jordon and How They and Their Host Communities Are Coping, Amman: CARE 
International 
CARE (2017) 7 Years Into Exile: How Urban Syrian Refugees, Vulnerable Jordanians and 
Other Refugees in Jordan Are Being Impacted by the Syria Crisis, Amman: CARE 
International 
Carmona, M. (2013) ‘Planning, Beirut-style’, Journal of Space Syntax 4(1), 123–129 
Carrion, D. (2016) ‘Hard Paths Ahead: Syrian Refugees in Jordan’, Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung, 22 September, 
http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/234502/syrian-refugees-in-
jordan?p=all 
Carswell, K.; Blackburn, P. and Barker, C. (2011) ‘The Relationship Between Trauma, Post-
migration Problems and the Psychological Well-being of Refugees and Asylum Seekers’, 
International Journal of Social Psychiatry 57(2): 107–119, doi:10.1177/0020764009105699 
Chatelard, G. (2010) ‘What Visibility Conceals: Re-embedding Refugee Migration from Iraq’, 
in D. Chatty and B. Finlayson (eds) Dispossession and Displacement: Forced Migration in 
the Middle East and North Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Chatham House (2015) The Role of Local Government in Addressing the Impact of Syrian 
Refugees: Jordan Case Study, Chatham House, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org//node/18192 (accessed 24 August 2017) 
Chatty, D. (2017) ‘The Syrian Humanitarian Disaster: Understanding Perceptions and 
Aspirations in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey’, Global Policy 8(51): 25–32, doi:10.1111/1758-
5899.12390 
Cherri, Z.; Arcos Gonzalez, P. and Castro Delgado, R. (2016) ‘The Lebanese-Syrian Crisis: 
Impact of Influx of Syrian Refugees to an Already Weak State’, Risk Management and 
Healthcare Policy 9(2016): 165–172, doi:10.2147/RMHP.S106068 
Christophersen, M.; Liu, J.; Thorleifsson, C. and Tiltnes, Å.A. (2013) Lebanese Attitudes 
Towards Syrian Refugees and the Syrian Crisis, Fafo-paper 2013:13, Oslo: Fafo 
94 
Chynoweth, S.K. (2008) ‘The Need for Priority Reproductive Health Services for Displaced 
Iraqi Women and Girls’, Reproductive Health Matters 16(31): 93–102, doi:10.1016/S0968-
8080(08)31348-2 
Crisp, J. (2017) ‘Finding Space for Protection: An Inside Account of the Evolution of 
UNHCR’s Urban Refugee Policy’, Refuge 33: 87–96 
Daily Star (2014) ‘Lebanon Cabinet Votes to Stop Accepting Syrian Refugees’, The Daily 
Star Lebanon, 24 October, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Oct-
23/275075-refugee-crisis-tops-lebanon-cabinet-agenda.ashx (accessed 27 June 2017) 
Davis, G. (2004) A History of the Social Development Network in The World Bank, 1973–
2003, Social Development Papers No. 56, The World Bank 
DeJong, J.; Sbeity, F.; Schlecht, J.; Harfouche, M.; Yamout, R.; Fouad, F.M.; Manohar, S. 
and Robinson, C. (2017) ‘Young Lives Disrupted: Gender and Well-being Among Adolescent 
Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, Conflict and Health 11(Suppl 1): 23, doi:10.1186/s13031-017-
0128-7 
Deneulin, S. and McGregor, J.A. (2010) ‘The Capability Approach and the Politics of a Social 
Conception of Wellbeing’, European Journal of Social Theory 13(4): 501–519,  
doi:10.1177/1368431010382762 
Dhingra, R. (2015) ‘Providing Sustainable Psychosocial Support for Syrian Refugees in 
Jordan’, Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration 5(1): 33–37 
Doocy, S.; Lyles, E.; Akhu-Zaheya, L.; Burton, A. and Burnham, G. (2016) ‘Health Service 
Access and Utilization Among Syrian Refugees in Jordan’, International Journal for Equity in 
Health 15: 108, doi:10.1186/s12939-016-0399-4 
Doocy, S.; Sirois, A.; Tileva, M.; Storey, J.D. and Burnham, G. (2013) ‘Chronic Disease and 
Disability Among Iraqi Populations Displaced in Jordan and Syria’, International Journal of 
Health Planning and Management 28(1): e1–e12, doi:10.1002/hpm.2119 
Doraï, K. (2010) ‘From Camp Dwellers to Urban Refugees? Urbanization and Marginalization 
of Refugee Camps in Lebanon’, in M.A. Khalidi (ed.) Manifestations of Identity: The Lived 
Reality of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 75–92, ResearchGate (PDF Download 
Available), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44844486_From_Camp_Dwellers_to_Urban_Refug
ees_Urbanization_and_Marginalization_of_Refugee_Camps_in_Lebanon (accessed 13 
September 2017) 
Dunmore, C. (2016) ‘Work Permit Boost Gives Hope to Syrian Refugees in Jordan’, UNHCR, 
19 April, http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2016/4/57162b0a6/work-permit-boost-gives-
hope-syrian-refugees-jordan.html (accessed 15 December 2017) 
Eastmond, M. (2006) ‘Transnational Returns and Reconstruction in Post-war Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, International Migration 44(3): 141–166 
Eghdamian, K. (2016) ‘Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement: An Examination 
into the Discursive Representations of Syrian Refugees and Their Effects on Religious 
Minorities Living in Jordan’, Journal of Refugee Studies 30(3): 447–467, 
doi:10.1093/jrs/few030 
EIU (2017a) Country Report: Jordan, London: European Intelligence Unit 
EIU (2017b) Country Report: Lebanon, London: European Intelligence Unit 
95 
Ellis, B.H.; MacDonald, H.Z.; Klunk-Gillis, J.; Lincoln, A.; Strunin, L. and Cabral, H.J. (2010) 
‘Discrimination and Mental Health Among Somali Refugee Adolescents: The Role of 
Acculturation and Gender’, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 80(4): 564 
El-Natour, S. (2012) The Campaign for Real Estate Property Ownership for the Palestinian 
Refugees in Lebanon, Beirut: Human Development Center 
Elvidge, C.; Baugh, K.; Hobson, V.; Kihn, E.; Kroehl, H.; Davis, E. and Cocero, D. (1997) 
‘Satellite Inventory of Human Settlements Using Nocturnal Radiation Emissions: A 
Contribution for the Global Toolchest’, Global Change Biology 3(5): 387–395 
Emanuel, J. (2012) Discriminatory Nationality Laws in Jordan and Their Effect on Mixed 
Refugee Families, Student Research Papers #2012–4, Beirut: University of Notre Dame Law 
School 
Errighi, L. and Griesse, J. (2016) The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Labour Market Implications in 
Jordan and Lebanon, Discussion Paper 29, Brussels: European Commission, 
doi:10.2765/901541 
Fafo; Government of Jordan and UNFPA (2007) ‘Iraqis in Jordan: Their Number and 
Characteristics’, report commissioned by the Government of Jordan and funded by the 
Norwegian Government and UNFPA 
Fakhry, A. (2017) ‘Gendering Urban Exile: The Daily Lives of Syrian Women in Amman, 
Jordan’, MA Thesis, Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University 
Fakih, A. and Ibrahim, M. (2016) ‘The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Labor market in 
Neighboring Countries: Empirical Evidence from Jordan’, Defence and Peace Economics 
27(1): 64–86, doi:10.1080/10242694.2015.1055936 
FAO (2013) Agricultural Livelihoods and Food Security Impact Assessment and Response 
Plan for the Syria Crisis in the Neighbouring Countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Turkey, Food and Agriculture Organisation 
Farhood, L.; Zurayk, H.; Chaya, M.; Saadeh, F.; Meshefedjian, G. and Sidani, T. (1993) ‘The 
Impact of War on the Physical and Mental Health of the Family: the Lebanese Experience’, 
Social Science & Medicine 36(12): 1555–1567, doi:10.1016/0277-9536(93)90344-4 
Farsoun, S. and Zacharia, C.E. (1997) Palestine And The Palestinians, 1st ed., Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press 
Fawaz, M. (2009) ‘Neoliberal Urbanity and the Right to the City: A View from Beirut’s 
Periphery’, Development and Change 40(5): 827–852, doi:10.1111/j.1467-
7660.2009.01585.x 
Fazel, M.; Reed, R.V.; Panter-Brick, C. and Stein, A. (2012) ‘Mental Health of Displaced and 
Refugee Children Resettled in High-Income Countries: Risk and Protective Factors’, The 
Lancet 379(9812): 266–282, doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(11)60051-2 
Feldman, I. (2017) ‘Humanitarian Care and the Ends Of Life: The Politics of Aging and Dying 
in a Palestinian Refugee Camp’, Cultural Anthropology 32(1): 42–67, doi:10.14506/ca32.1.06 
Fisk, R. (1990) Pity the Nation, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Francis, A. (2015) ‘Jordan’s Refugee Crisis’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
21 September, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/21/jordan-s-refugee-crisis-pub-61338 
96 
Frangieh, G. (2017) ‘Denying Syrian Refugees Status: Helping or Harming Lebanon?’, The 
Legal Agenda, 09 January, http://legal-agenda.com/en/article.php?id=3355 
Freedman, J. (2016) ‘Sexual and Gender-based Violence Against Refugee Women: A 
Hidden Aspect of the Refugee “Crisis”‘, Reproductive Health Matters 24(47): 18–26,  
doi:10.1016/j.rhm.2016.05.003 
Frelick, B. (2013) ‘Fleeing Syria: Insights on Lebanon’s Open Border’, Human Rights Watch, 
24 March, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/24/fleeing-syria-insights-lebanons-open-border 
(accessed 28 June 2017) 
Ghazal, M. (2017) ‘Jordan Rejects as Groundless HRW’s Allegations of Forced Deportation, 
The Jordan Times, 02 October, http://jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-rejects-groundless-
hrw%E2%80%99s-allegations-forced-deportation 
Gough, I. and McGregor, J.A. (eds) (2007) Wellbeing in Developing Countries: From Theory 
to Research, New York: Cambridge University Press 
Government of Jordan (2016a) The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach Between the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to Deal with the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis, London: Government of Jordan 
Government of Jordan (2016b) Habitat III National Report 
Government of Lebanon (2016) Habitat III National Report, Grand Serail, Beirut: Council for 
Development and Reconstruction 
Government of Lebanon and United Nations (2017) Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) 
2017- 2020 
Government of Lebanon and United Nations (2014) Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015–16 
Goyes, F.; Tolgay, S. and Vidal, V. (2017) ‘Refugees, Incremental Housing and Shelter in the 
21st Century’, in Wilson Center Urban Perspectives: Climate Change, Migration and 
Financing. A New Generation of Ideas 2017: 5–27 
Guay, J. (2015) Social Cohesion Between Syrian Refugees and Urban Host Communities in 
Lebanon and Jordan, World Vision International 
Habib, R.; Basma, S. and Yeretzian, J. (2006) ‘Harboring Illnesses: On the Association 
Between Disease and Living Conditions in a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Lebanon’, 
International Journal of Environmental Health Research 16(2): 99–111, 
doi:10.1080/09603120500538341 
Halabi, Z. (2004) ‘Exclusion and Identity in Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps: A Story 
of Sustained Conflict’, Environment and Urbanization 16(2): 39–48, 
doi:10.1177/095624780401600221 
Hall, S. (1993) ‘Culture, Community, Nation’, Cultural Studies 7(3): 349–363, 
doi:10.1080/09502389300490251 
Hall, S.M. (2015) ‘Migrant Urbanisms: Ordinary Cities and Everyday Resistance’, Sociology 
49(5), 853–869, doi:10.1177/0038038515586680 
Hanafi, S. Chaaban, J. and Seyfert, K. (2012) ‘Social Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in 
Lebanon: Reflections on the Mechanisms that Cement their Persistent Poverty’, Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 31(1): 34–53, doi:10.1093/rsq/hdr018 
97 
Hanafi, S. and Long, T. (2010) ‘Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of Exception 
in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon’, Journal of Refugee Studies 23(2): 134–159, 
doi:10.1093/jrs/feq014 
Hankir, A. and Sadiq, A. (2013) ‘Lessons From Psychiatry in The Arab World: A Lebanese 
Trainee Psychiatrist’s Qualitative Views on the Provision of Mental Healthcare Services for 
Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon and an Interview with a Consultant Psychiatrist on the 
Effects of the Arab Spring on the Mental Health of Libyans’, Psychiatria Danubina 25(2): 
S345–S349 
Harb, C. (2016) ‘Perceived Inequalities Among Lebanese Nationals and Syrian Refugees’, in 
ISSC, IDS and UNESCO (2016) World Social Science Report 2016, Challenging Inequalities: 
Pathways to a Just World, Paris: UNESCO Publishing: 129–131 
Harb, C. and Saab, R. (2014) Social Cohesion and Intergroup Relations: Syrian Refugees 
and Lebanese Nationals in the Bekaa and Akkar, Save the Children Report, American 
University of Beirut and Save the Children 
Harild, N. (2016) ‘Forced Displacement: A Development Issue with Humanitarian Elements’, 
Forced Migration Review Issue 52, http://www.fmreview.org/solutions/harild.html (accessed 
24 August 2017) 
Harmsen, E. (2008) Islam, Civil Society and Social Work, Amsterdam University Press 
Harrell-Bond, B. (1997) ‘The Experience of Refugees as Recipients of Aid’, Forced Migration 
Online, http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:2049 (accessed 24 
August 2017) 
Harvey, C.; Garwood, R. and El-Masri, R. (2013) Shifting Sands: Changing Gender Roles 
Among Refugees in Lebanon, Research Report, Oxford: Oxfam International 
Haysom, S. (2013) Sanctuary in the City? Reframing Responses to Protracted Urban 
Displacement, HPG Briefing Paper 52, Overseas Development Institute (ODI),  
https://www.odi.org/publications/7533-sanctuary-city-reframing-responses-protracted-urban-
displacement (accessed 06 September 2017) 
Hejoj, I. (2007) ‘A Profile of Poverty for Palestinian Refugees in Jordan: The Case of Zarqa 
and Sukhneh Camps’, Journal of Refugee Studies 20(1): 120–145, doi:10.1093/jrs/fel025 
Hodeib, M. (2014) ‘Bassil Warns Against Syrian Refugee Camps’, The Daily Star, 05 July, 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jul-05/262746-bassil-warns-against-
syrian-refugee-camps.ashx 
Horst, C. and Grabska, K. (2015) ‘Flight and Exile: Uncertainty in the Context of Conflict-
Induced Displacement’, Social Analysis 59(1): 1–18, doi:10.3167/sa.2015.590101 
Howden, D.; Patchett, H. and Alfred, C. (2017) ‘The Compact Experiment: Push for Refugee 
Jobs Confronts Reality of Jordon and Lebanon’, Refugees Deeply Quarterly 
HRW (2017a) ‘Lebanon: Migrant Domestic Workers With Children Deported’, Human Rights 
Watch, 25 April, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/25/lebanon-migrant-domestic-workers-
children-deported (accessed 27 June 2017) 
HRW (2017b) ‘Lebanon: New Refugee Policy a Step Forward’, Human Rights Watch, 14 
February, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/14/lebanon-new-refugee-policy-step-forward 
(accessed 27 June 2017) 
98 
HRW (2017c) ‘“I Have No Idea Why They Sent Us Back” – Jordanian Deportations and 
Expulsions of Syrian Refugees’, Human Rights Watch, 02 October,  
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/02/i-have-no-idea-why-they-sent-us-back/jordanian-
deportations-and-expulsions-syrian 
HRW (2016a) ‘Lebanon: Residency Rules Put Syrians at Risk’, Human Rights Watch, 12 
January, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/12/lebanon-residency-rules-put-syrians-risk 
(accessed 27 June 2017) 
HRW (2016b) “I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person”: How Lebanon’s Residency Rules 
Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees, HRW Report, USA: Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
HRW (2015a) ‘Observations and Recommendations on New Entry Restrictions for Syrians 
and Refugee Protection Principles in Lebanon’, Human Rights Watch, 16 January,  
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/16/observations-and-recommendations-new-entry-
restrictions-syrians-and-refugee (accessed 28 June 2017) 
HRW (2015b) ‘Human Rights Watch Submission to the CEDAW Committee of Lebanon’s 
Periodic Report 62nd Session, February 2015’, Human Rights Watch, 01 February, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/01/human-rights-watch-submission-cedaw-committee-
lebanons-periodic-report-62nd-session (accessed 28 June 2017) 
HRW (2015c) ‘Lebanon: Laws Discriminate Against Women’ Human Rights Watch, 19 
January, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/19/lebanon-laws-discriminate-against-women 
(accessed 28 June 2017) 
HRW (2014a) ‘Lebanon: Spiraling Insecurity, Stagnant Reforms’, Human Rights Watch, 21 
January, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/21/lebanon-spiraling-insecurity-stagnant-reforms 
(accessed 28 June 2017) 
HRW (2014b) ‘Lebanon: Palestinians Barred, Sent to Syria’, Human Rights Watch, 05 May, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/lebanon-palestinians-barred-sent-syria (accessed 13 
December 2017) 
HRW (2014c) ‘Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian Refugees’, Human 
Rights Watch, 03 October, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/03/lebanon-least-45-local-
curfews-imposed-syrian-refugees 
HRW (2013a) ‘Lebanon: Stagnation on Reforms in 2012’, Human Rights Watch, 07 
February, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/07/lebanon-stagnation-reforms-2012 (accessed 
13 December 2017) 
HRW (2012a) ‘Lebanon: Stop Abuse of Domestic Workers’, Human Rights Watch, 23 March, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/23/lebanon-stop-abuse-domestic-workers (accessed 27 
June 2017) 
HRW (2012b) ‘Jordan: Bias at the Syrian Border’, Human Rights Watch, 04 July, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/04/jordan-bias-syrian-border (accessed 27 June 2017) 
HRW (2010a) ‘Lebanon: Seize Opportunity to End Discrimination Against Palestinians’, 
Human Rights Watch, 18 June, https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/18/lebanon-seize-
opportunity-end-discrimination-against-palestinians (accessed 21 July 2017) 
HRW (2010b) ‘How the Lebanese Justice System Fails Migrant Domestic Workers’, Human 
Rights Watch, 16 September, https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/09/16/without-protection/how-
lebanese-justice-system-fails-migrant-domestic-workers 
99 
HRW (2007) ‘Rot Here or Die There – Bleak Choices for Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon 
(executive summary)’, Human Rights Watch, 03 December, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/12/03/rot-here-or-die-there/bleak-choices-iraqi-refugees-
lebanon 
Huang, X.; Schneider, A. and Friedl, M.A. (2016) ‘Mapping Sub-Pixel Urban Expansion in 
China Using MODIS and DMSP/OLS Nighttime Lights’, Remote Sensing of Environment 
175: 92–108, doi:10.1016/j.rse.2015.12.042 
ICMC and USCCB (2007) Iraqi Asylum Seekers in Jordan: A Report of the ICMC-USCCB 
Mission to Assess the Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum Seekers in Jordan, Report, 
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops (USCCB) 
ILO (2017) Work Permits and Employment of Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Towards 
Formalising the Work of Syrian Refugees, Report, ILO Regional Office for Arab States 
ILO (2016) Intertwined. A Study of Employers of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon, 
Geneva: International Labour Organisation of the United Nations 
ILO (2015a) Work Permits for Syrian Refugees in Jordan, Amman: International Labour 
Organization Regional Office for Arab States 
ILO (2015b) Access to Work for Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Discussion Paper on Labour 
and Refugee Laws and Policies, Amman: ILO Regional Office for Arab States 
ILO (2014a) Child Labour in the Urban Informal Sector in Three Governorates of Jordan 
(Amman, Mafraq and Irbid), International Labour Organization (ILO) 
ILO (2014b) Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and their Employment 
Profile, Beirut: ILO Regional Office for Arab States 
IOM (2015) The World Migration Report 2015: Migrants and Cities, New Partnerships to 
Manage Mobility, Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
IRC; Save the Children; DRC; Oxfam and DFID (2013a) Emergency Market Mapping and 
Analysis (EMMA) of the Agricultural Labor Market System in North and Bekaa, Lebanon, 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
IRC; Save the Children; DRC; Oxfam and DFID (2013b) Emergency Market Mapping and 
Analysis (EMMA) of the Construction Labor Market System in North and Bekaa, Lebanon, 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
IRIN (2010) ‘Palestinian Refugee Numbers/Whereabouts’, IRIN, 16 January, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/89571/middle-east-palestinian-refugee-numberswhereabouts 
Jabbar, S.A. and Zaza, H.I. (2016) ‘Evaluating a Vocational Training Programme for Women 
Refugees at the Zaatari Camp in Jordan: Women Empowerment: A Journey and Not An 
Output’, International Journal of Adolescence and Youth 21(3): 304–319,  
doi:10.1080/02673843.2015.1077716 
Jacobsen, K. (2002) ‘Livelihoods in Conflict: The Pursuit of Livelihoods by Refugees and the 
Impact on the Human Security of Host Communities’, International Migration 40(5): 95–123, 
doi:10.1111/1468-2435.00213 
Janmyr, M. (2016) ‘Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 35(4): 58–78, doi:10.1093/rsq/hdw016 
100 
Kabeer, N. (2013) Paid Work, Women’s Empowerment and Inclusive Growth, Report, UN 
Women 
Kattaa, M. (2016) ‘Syrian Refugees’ Status in the Jordanian Labor Market’, Turkish Policy 
Quarterly 15(3): 71–78 
Kazour, F.; Zahreddine, N.R.; Maragel, M.G.; Almustafa, M.A.; Soufia, M.; Haddad, R. and 
Richa, S. (2017) ‘Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in a Sample of Syrian Refugees in 
Lebanon’, Comprehensive Psychiatry 72: 41–47, doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2016.09.007 
Khawaja, B. (2017) ‘The Gaps in Lebanon’s New Refugee Policy’, Human Rights Watch, 14 
March, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/14/gaps-lebanons-new-refugee-policy (accessed 
28 June 2017) 
Khawaja, M.; Abdulrahim, S.; Soweid, R.A.A. and Karam, D. (2006) ‘Distrust, Social 
Fragmentation and Adolescents’ Health in the Outer City: Beirut and Beyond’, Social Science 
& Medicine 63(5): 1304–1315, doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2006.03.047 
Kirbyshire, A.; Wilkinson, E.; Le Masson, V. and Batra, P. (2017) Mass Displacement and the 
Challenge for Urban Resilience, ODI Working Paper, London: Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) 
Knudsen, A. (2007) The Law, the Loss and the Lives of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 
CMI Working Paper, Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) 
Krause, S.; Williams, H.; Onyango, M.A.; Sami, S.; Doedens, W.; Giga, N.; Stone, E. and 
Tomczyk, B. (2015) ‘Reproductive Health Services for Syrian Refugees in Zaatri Camp and 
Irbid City, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: An Evaluation of the Minimum Initial Services 
Package’, Conflict and Health 9(1): S4, doi:10.1186/1752-1505-9-S1-S4 
Lebanon Support (2016a) Formal Informality, Brokering Mechanisms, and Illegality. The 
Impact of the Lebanese State’s Policies on Syrian Refugees’ Daily Lives, Beirut: Lebanon 
Support 
Lebanon Support (2016b) Syrian Refugees’ Livelihoods. The Impact of Progressively 
Constrained Legislations and Increased Informality on Syrians’ Daily Lives, Beirut: Lebanon 
Support 
Lenner, K. (2016) Blasts from the Past: Policy Legacies and Memories in the Making of the 
Jordanian Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, EIU Working Paper, European University 
Institute, available at http://opus.bath.ac.uk/52658/ (accessed 24 August 2017) 
Lenner, K. and Schmelter, S. (2016) ‘Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Between 
Refuge and Ongoing Deprivation?’, in IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2016, Barcelona: 
European Institute of the Mediterranean: 122–126 
Libal, K. and Harding, S. (2011) ‘Humanitarian Alliances: Local and International NGO 
Partnerships and the Iraqi Refugee Crisis’, Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 9(2): 
162–178, doi:10.1080/15562948.2011.567153 
Lund, C. (2006) ‘Twilight Institutions: An Introduction’, Development and Change 37(4): 673–
684, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2006.00496.x 
Mackreath, H. (2014) ‘The Role of Host Communities in North Lebanon’, Forced Migration 
Review 47: 19–21 
101 
Makhoul, J.; Ghanem, D.A. and Ghanem, M. (2003) ‘An Ethnographic Study of the 
Consequences of Social and Structural Forces on Children: The Case of Two Low-Income 
Beirut Suburbs’, Environment and Urbanization 15(2): 249–260, 
doi:10.1177/095624780301500213 
Malkki, L.H. (1995) ‘Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of 
Things’, Annual Review of Anthropology 24: 495–523, 
doi:10.1146/annurev.an.24.100195.002431 
Martin, D. (2015) ‘From Spaces of Exception to `Campscapes’: Palestinian Refugee Camps 
and Informal Settlements in Beirut’, Political Geography 44: 9–18, 
doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.08.001 
Mason, V. (2011) ‘The Im/mobilities of Iraqi Refugees in Jordan: Pan-Arabism, “Hospitality” 
and the Figure of the “Refugee”‘, Mobilities 6(3): 353–373, 
doi:10.1080/17450101.2011.590035 
McGregor, J.A.; Camfield, L. and Woodcock, A. (2009) ‘Needs, Wants and Goals: Wellbeing, 
Quality of Life and Public Policy’, Applied Research in Quality of Life 4(2): 135–154, 
doi:10.1007/s11482-009-9069-7 
McGregor, J.A.; McKay, A. and Velazco, J. (2007) ‘Needs and Resources in the Investigation 
of Well-being in Developing Countries: Illustrative Evidence from Bangladesh and Peru’, 
Journal of Economic Methodology 14(1): 107–131, doi:10.1080/13501780601170115 
Mercy Corps (2015) ‘Seeking Stability: Evidence on Strategies for Reducing Risk of Conflict 
in Northern Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees’, Mercy Corps, 14 April, 
https://www.mercycorps.org.uk/research-resources/seeking-stability-evidence-strategies-
reducing-risk-conflict-northern-jordanian 
Mercy Corps (2014) Municipal Guide: Successful Municipal Strategies to Respond to the 
Syria Refugee Crisis, Mercy Corps 
Miller, K.E. and Rasmussen, A. (2017) ‘The Mental Health of Civilians Displaced by Armed 
Conflict: An Ecological Model of Refugee Distress’, Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences 
26(2): 129–138, doi:10.1017/S2045796016000172 
Miller, K.E. and Rasmussen, A. (2010) ‘War Exposure, Daily Stressors, and Mental Health in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings: Bridging the Divide Between Trauma-Focused and 
Psychosocial Frameworks’, Social Science & Medicine 70(1): 7–16, 
doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.09.029 
Moghaddam, H.T.; Sayedi, S.J.; Moghadam, Z.E.; Bahreini, A.; Abbasi, M.A. and Saeidi, M. 
(2017) ‘Refugees in the Eastern Mediterranean Region: Needs, Problems and Challenges’, 
International Journal of Pediatrics 5(3): 4625–4639, doi:10.22038/ijp.2017.8452 
Mourad, L. and Piron, L.-H. (2016) Municipal Service Delivery, Stability, Social Cohesion and 
Legitimacy in Lebanon, Literature Review, Developmental Leadership Program (DLP, 
University of Birmingham) and the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International 
Affairs (American University Beirut) 
Musa, N. (2017) Conceptualizing Resilience in Refugee Host Communities (A Case Study of 
Jordan), Major Research Paper (MRP), Ottawa: University of Ottawa 
NCEI (2018) ‘Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series’, National Centers for 
Environmental Information (NCEI), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA),  https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html 
102 
NRC (2016a) Drivers of Despair: Refugee Protection Failures in Jordon and Lebanon, 
Briefing Note, Norwegian Refugee Council 
NRC (2016b) Securing Status: Syrian Refugees and the Documentation of Legal Status, 
Identity, and Family Relationships in Jordan, Report, Norwegian Refugee Council 
NRC (2013) No Place Like Home: An Assessment of the Housing, Land and Property Rights 
of Palestinian Refugee Women in Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon, Report, Norwegian 
Refugee Council 
NRC and IRC (2015) Legal Status of Refugees from Syria: Challenges and Consequences of 
Maintaining Legal Stay in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Report, Norwegian Refugee Council 
and International Rescue Committee 
Nusair, I. (2013) ‘Permanent Transients: Iraqi Women Refugees in Jordan’, Middle East 
Report 
OECD (2016) Jordan Country Profile, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) 
Oesch, L. (2017) ‘The Refugee Camp as a Space of Multiple Ambiguities and Subjectivities’, 
Political Geography 60: 110–120, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.05.004 
Oesch, L. (2010) ‘The Evolution of Urban Upgrading and Rehabilitation in Greater Amman’, 
SLUM Lab 5: 22–23 
Onishi, N. (2013) ‘Lebanon Worries That Housing Will Make Syrian Refugees Stay’, The 
New York Times, 11 December, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/11/world/middleeast/lebanon-worries-that-housing-will-
make-syrian-refugees-stay.html 
Parkinson, S.E. and Behrouzan, O. (2015) ‘Negotiating Health and Life: Syrian Refugees and 
the Politics of Access in Lebanon’, Social Science & Medicine 146: 324–331, 
doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.10.008 
Parnell, S. (2016) ‘Defining a Global Urban Development Agenda’, World Development 78: 
529 – 540, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.0288 
Pavanello, S.; Metcalfe, V. and Martin, E. (2012) Survival in the City: Youth, Displacement 
and Violence in Urban Settings, HPG Policy Brief No. 44, London: Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) 
Psychosocial Working Group (2003) Psychosocial Intervention in Complex Emergencies: A 
Conceptual Framework, The Psychosocial Working Group Working Paper, available at  
http://www.eldis.org/document/A17612 (accessed 13 September 2017) 
Ramadan, A. (2013) ‘Spatialising the Refugee Camp’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 38(1): 65–77, doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00509.x 
Ramadan, A. (2009) ‘Destroying Nahr el-Bared: Sovereignty and Urbicide in the Space of 
Exception’, Political Geography 28(3): 153–163, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2009.02.004 
Ramadan, A. (2008) ‘The Guests’ Guests: Palestinian Refugees, Lebanese Civilians, and the 
War of 2006’, Antipode 40(4): 658–677, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2008.00628.x 
103 
Ramadan, A. and Fregonese, S. (2017) ‘Hybrid Sovereignty and the State of Exception in the 
Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon’, Annals of the American Association of 
Geographers 107(4): 949–963, doi:10.1080/24694452.2016.1270189 
Rasmussen, A. and Annan, J. (2010) ‘Predicting Stress Related to Basic Needs and Safety 
in Darfur Refugee Camps: A Structural and Social Ecological Analysis’, Journal of Refugee 
Studies 23(1): 23–40, doi:10.1093/jrs/fep044 
Razzaz, S. (2017) A Challenging Market Becomes More Challenging: Jordanian Workers, 
Migrant Workers and Refugees in the Jordanian Labour Market, Report, Amman: ILO 
Regional Office for Arab States 
REACH and UNICEF (2014a) Syrian Refugees Staying in Informal Tented Settlements in 
Jordan: Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, August 2014, Reach Initiative and UN Children’s 
Fund 
REACH (2014b) Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host 
Communities: Assessment Report June 2014, Reach Initiative 
Republic of Lebanon (2016) London Conference – Lebanon Statement of Intent, DFID Policy 
Paper, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/supporting-syria-and-the-region-london-
2016-lebanon-statement 
Riach, G. and James, Z. (2016) ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law on the Margins: Experiences 
from Za’atari Refugee Camp, Jordan’, The International Journal of Human Rights 20(2): 549–
566, doi:10.1080/13642987.2016.1142759 
Rojas, M. (2008) ‘Experienced Poverty and Income Poverty in Mexico: A Subjective Well-
Being Approach’, World Development 36(6): 1078–1093, 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.10.005 
Rollins, T. (2016) ‘Syrians Make Easy Scapegoats in Lebanon’, IRIN, 28 July, 
https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2016/07/28/syrians-make-easy-scapegoats-lebanon 
(accessed 23 January 2018) 
Rousseau, C.; Drapeau, A. and Platt, R. (2004) ‘Family Environment and Emotional and 
Behavioural Symptoms in Adolescent Cambodian Refugees: Influence of Time, Gender, and 
Acculturation’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival 20(2): 151–165, 
doi:10.1080/1362369042000234735 
Roy, A. (2009) ‘Civic Governmentality: The Politics of Inclusion in Beirut and Mumbai’, 
Antipode 41(1): 159–179, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2008.00660.x 
Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, C. (2013) ‘The Economics of Forced Migration’, The Journal of 
Development Studies 49(6): 772–784, doi:10.1080/00220388.2013.777707 
Rummery, A. (2016) Access to Jobs Improving for Syrian Refugees in Jordan, UNHCR 
Briefing Notes, UNHCR 
Sadek, G. (2013) Legal Status of Refugees: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, Washington 
DC: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center 
Saliba, I. (2016) Refugee Law and Policy: Jordan, Washington DC: The Law Library of 
Congress, Global Legal Research Center 
Sanyal, R. (2017) ‘A No-Camp policy: Interrogating Informal Settlements in Lebanon’, 
Geoforum 84: 117–125, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.06.011 
104 
Sassoon, J. (2008) The Iraqi Refugees: The New Crisis in the Middle-East, London: 
I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 
Sayigh, R. (1995) ‘Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future’, Journal of 
Palestine Studies 25(1): 37–53 
Scales, P.C.; Roehlkepartain, E.C.; Wallace, T.; Inselman, A.; Stephenson, P. and 
Rodriguez, M. (2015) ‘Brief Report: Assessing Youth Well-being in Global Emergency 
Settings: Early Results from the Emergency Developmental Assets Profile’, Journal of 
Adolescence 45, 98–102, doi:10.1016/j.adolescence.2015.09.002 
Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom, New York: Oxford University Press 
Shammout, N.A. (2016) ‘A Sample of the Syrian Refugee Students’ Degree of Psychological 
Alienation in Jordan’, Journal of Education and Social Research 6(3): 135, doi: 
10.5901/jesr.2016.v6n3p135 
Sibai, A.M.; Rizk, A. and Chemaitelly, H. (2017) ‘Self-Rated Health Disparities Among 
Disadvantaged Older Adults in Ethnically Diverse Urban Neighborhoods in a Middle Eastern 
Country’, Ethnicity & Health 22(5): 490–509, doi:10.1080/13557858.2016.1244736 
Stave, S.E. and Hillesund, S. (2015) Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour 
Market, Report, ILO and Fafo 
Stevens, D. (2013) ‘Legal Status, Labelling, and Protection: The Case of Iraqi “Refugees” in 
Jordan’, International Journal of Refugee Law 25(1): 1–38, doi:10.1093/ijrl/eet001 
Stevens, M.R. (2016) ‘The Collapse of Social Networks Among Syrian Refugees in Urban 
Jordan’, Contemporary Levant 1(1): 51–63, doi:10.1080/20581831.2016.1153358 
Su, A. (2017) ‘Abused Migrant Workers End Up in Prison After Trying to Flee’, Refugees 
Deeply, 09 June, http://www.develop.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2017/06/09/abused-
migrant-workers-end-up-in-prison-after-trying-to-flee-2 (accessed 01 February 2018) 
Sullivan, D.J. and Simpson, C. (2017) Syrian “Guests” in Jordan: Family Ties, Strained 
Relations, and Recommendations for Mutual Development, Policy Paper No. 4, Amman: 
Boston Consortium for Arab Region Studies 
Summerfield, D. (1995) ‘Assisting Survivors of War and Atrocity: Notes on “Psychosocial” 
Issues for NGO Workers’, Development in Practice 5(4): 352–356, 
doi:10.1080/0961452951000157374 
Sumner, A. and Mallett, R. (2011) Snakes and Ladders, Buffers and Passports: Rethinking 
Poverty, Vulnerability and Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 83, International Policy Centre for 
Inclusive Growth (IPC – IG) 
Swan, G. (2017) Undocumented, Unseen, and at Risk: The Situation of Syrian Refugees 
Lacking Civil and Legal Documentation in Jordan, Report, International Catholic Migration 
Commission (ICMC) 
te Lintelo, D.; Gupte, J.; McGregor, J.A.; Lakshman, R.W.D. and Jahan, F. (2017) ‘Wellbeing 
and Urban Governance: Who Fails, Survives or Thrives in Informal Settlements in 
Bangladeshi Cities?’, Cities 72(B): 391–402, doi:10.1016/j.cities.2017.10.002 
Thorleifsson, C. (2016) ‘The Limits of Hospitality: Coping Strategies Among Displaced 
Syrians in Lebanon’, Third World Quarterly 37(6): 1071–1082, 
doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1138843 
105 
Turner, L. (2015) ‘Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class 
and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan’, Mediterranean Politics 20(3): 386–404, 
doi:10.1080/13629395.2015.1078125 
Ulrichs, M.; Hagen-Zanker, J. and Holmes, R. (2017) Cash Transfers for Refugees: An 
Opportunity to Bridge the Gap Between Humanitarian Assistance and Social Protection, ODI 
Briefing Paper, London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
UNDP (2014) ‘UNDP’s Resilience-Based Approach to the Regional Syrian Crisis’, United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 09 January,  
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/undp-
s-resilience-based-approach-to-the-regional-syrian-crisis.html (accessed 13 September 
2017) 
UNDP; Jordan Economic and Social Council; AECID and MOP (2013) The Informal Sector in 
the Jordanian Economy, Amman: UNDP, Jordan Economic and Social Council, Spanish 
Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) and Ministry of Planning 
UNDP; Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation; AECID and Economic and Social 
Council (2012) The Panoramic Study of the Informal Economy in Jordan, Amman: UNDP 
UN-Habitat (2017) Neighbourhood Profile: Bourj Hammoud, Lebanon, Beirut: UN-Habitat 
UN-Habitat (2016) Urbanization and Development: Emerging Futures, World Cities Report, 
New York: UN-Habitat 
UNHCR (2016) Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, Report, UNHCR 
UNHCR (2014a) ‘UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps’, UNHCR, 22 July, 
UNHCR/HCP/2014/9, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/statelessness/5422b8f09/unhcr-
policy-alternatives-camps.html 
UNHCR (2014b) Living in the Shadows: Jordan Home Visits Report 2014, Report, Amman: 
UNHCR 
UNHCR (2014c) Syria Refugee Response Lebanon: Beirut and Mount Lebanon 
Governorates – Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level as of 
30 April 2014, Map, UNHCR 
UNHCR (2014d) Woman Alone: The Fight for Survival by Syria’s Refugee Women, Report, 
UNHCR 
UNHCR (2013a) From Slow Boil to Breaking Point: A Real-Time Evaluation of UNHCR’s 
Response to the Syrian Refugee Emergency, Evaluation Report, Geneva: Policy 
Development and Evaluation Service, UNHCR 
UNHCR (2013b) Syria Refugee Response Lebanon: Beirut and Mount Lebanon 
Governorates Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level (as of 29 
August 2013), Map, UNHCR 
UNHCR (2009) ‘UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas’, 
UNHCR, September 2009, 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/hcdialogue%20/4ab356ab6/unhcr-policy-refugee-
protection-solutions-urban-areas.html 
UNHCR Jordan (2015) Jordan Refugee Response – Vulnerability Assessment Framework 
Baseline Survey May 2015, Report, Jordan: Vulnerability Assessment Framework, UNHCR 
106 
UNHCR; UNICEF and WFP (2017) VASYR 2017: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian 
Refugees in Lebanon, Report, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP) 
UNHCR; UNICEF and WFP (2016) Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 
2016, Report, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP) 
UNICEF and IMC (2014) Mental Health Psychosocial and Child Protection for Syrian 
Adolescent Refugees in Jordan, Report, UN Children’s Fund and International Metidal Corps 
United Nations (2015) HABITAT III Issue Papers: 2 – Migration and Refugees in Urban 
Areas, New York: Habitat III – United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable 
Urban Development, 03 June 2015 
United Nations (2014) World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision Highlights, Report 
No. ST/ESA/SER.A/352, New York: Department of Economics and Social Affairs (DESA), 
United Nations 
UNOCHA (2012) Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees: Mid-Year Review, Report, 
New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 
UN Women (2013) Gender-Based Violence and Child Protection Among Syrian Refugees in 
Jordan, with a Focus on Early Marriage, Report, Amman: Peace and Security, UN Women 
Wallin, A.-M.M. and Ahlström, G.I.,(2005) ‘Unaccompanied Young Adult Refugees in 
Sweden, Experiences of their Life Situation and Well-Being: A Qualitative Follow-Up Study’, 
Ethnicity & Health 10(2): 129–144, doi:10.1080/13557850500071145 
Watters, C. (2008) Refugee Children: Towards the Next Horizon, London: Routledge 
Watters, C. (2001) ‘Emerging Paradigms in the Mental Health Care of Refugees’, Social 
Science & Medicine 52(11): 1709–1718, doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(00)00284-7 
Wells, R.; Steel, Z.; Abo-Hilal, M.; Hassan, A.H. and Lawsin, C. (2016) ‘Psychosocial 
Concerns Reported by Syrian Refugees Living in Jordan: Systematic Review of Unpublished 
Needs Assessments’, The British Journal of Psychiatry 209(2): 99–106, 
doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.115.165084 
WFP and REACH (2016) Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Excercise (CFSME): 
Registered Syrian Refugees in Jordan, 2016 Report, World Food Programme and REACH 
Initiative 
WFP and REACH (2015) Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Excercise (CFSME): 
Registered Syrian Refugees in Jordan, 2015 Report, World Food Programme and REACH 
Initiative 
White, S. (2008) ‘But What is Wellbeing? A Framework for Analysis in Social and 
Development Policy and Practice’, Centre for Development Studies, ESRC Research Group 
on Wellbeing in Developing Countries, University of Bath, January 2008,  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/241141227_But_What_is_Wellbeing_A_Framewor
k_for_Analysis_in_Social_and_Development_Policy_and_Practice (accessed 14 September 
2017) 
White, S.C. (2016) ‘The Many Faces of Wellbeing’, in S.C. White and C. Blackmore (eds) 
Cultures of Wellbeing, Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan 
107 
White, S.C. (2012) ‘Beyond the Paradox: Religion, Family and Modernity in Contemporary 
Bangladesh’, Modern Asian Studies 46(5): 1429–1458, doi:10.1017/S0026749X12000133 
White, S.C. (2010) ‘Analysing Wellbeing: A Framework for Development Practice’, 
Development in Practice 20(2): 158–172, doi:10.1080/09614520903564199 
White, S.C. (2009) Bringing Wellbeing into Development Practice, Wellbeing in Developing 
Countries (WeD) Working Papers No. 09, Bath: University of Bath/Wellbeing in Developing 
Countries Research Group 
Williamson, J. and Robinson, M. (2006) ‘Psychosocial Interventions, or Integrated 
Programming for Well-being?’ Intervention 4(1): 4–25 
Wimelius, M.E.; Eriksson, M.; Isaksson, J. and Ghazinour, M. (2017) ‘Swedish Reception of 
Unaccompanied Refugee Children—Promoting Integration?’, Journal of International 
Migration and Integration 18(1): 143–157 
World Bank (2016a) ‘Jordan- Emergency Services and Social Resilience’, The World Bank, 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P147689?lang=en (accessed 06 February 2018) 
World Bank (2016b) ‘Jordan’s Economic Outlook – Spring 2016’, The World Bank, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/ country/jordan/publication/economic-outlook-spring-2016 
World Bank (2013) Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
Yasmine, R. and Moughalian, C. (2016) ‘Systemic Violence Against Syrian Refugee Women 
and the Myth of Effective Intrapersonal Interventions’, Reproductive Health Matters 24(47): 
27–35, doi:10.1016/j.rhm.2016.04.008 
Yassin, N.; Stel, N. and Rassi, R. (2016) ‘Organized Chaos: Informal Institution Building 
among Palestinian Refugees in the Maashouk Gathering in South Lebanon’, Journal of 
Refugee Studies 29(3): 341–362, doi:10.1093/jrs/few016 
Zabaneh, J.E.; Watt, G.C.M. and O’Donnell, C.A. (2008) ‘Living and Health Conditions of 
Palestinian Refugees in an Unofficial Camp in the Lebanon: A Cross-Sectional Survey’, 
Journal Epidemiology & Community Health 62(2): 91–97, doi:10.1136/jech.2006.054338 
Zetter, R. (1991) ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity’, 
Journal of Refugee Studies 4(1): 39–62, doi:10.1093/jrs/4.1.39 
  
108 
Appendix A Legal distinctions in Lebanon 
and Jordan: Syrians, Palestinian Refugees from 
Syria and Iraqis 
Lebanon 
 Law applies to: 
Syrian PRS Iraqi 
Right to Work 
Lebanese Labour Law 
(1946) 
The law does not exclude non-Lebanese 
workers, but it adopts the principle of preference 
of nationals. 
ü ü ü 
Bilateral agreement for 
Social and Economic 
Cooperation and 
Coordination between the 
Lebanese Republic & the 
Syrian Arab Republic (1993) 
The agreement seeks to gradually reach 
reciprocity between Syria and Lebanon with 
respect to economic integration. The agreement 
encourages freedom of movement, stay, work, 
and practising of economic activity in conformity 
with the laws of each country. 
ü   
Bilateral Labour agreement 
(1994) 
The agreement established a joint office on the 
Syria-Lebanon border and created a department 
within the MoL to handle Syrian workers’ issues. 
ü   
Decree no 17561 (1964) Every foreigner wishing to work in Lebanon 
needs pre-approval from the MoL before arriving 
in Lebanon and must obtain a work permit within 
10 days of entering Lebanon. The MoL has the 
prerogative to select jobs and professions that 
are exclusive to Lebanese. Taking into account 
the principle of preference of Lebanese, 
foreigners can be granted a work permit, if they 
meet certain conditions. 
ü ü ü 
MoL Resolution No. 1/19 
(Amendments of the Articles 
No. 8 and 9 of the resolution 
17561 related to organising 
the work of foreigners) 
(2013) 
The resolution specifies the set of professions 
reserved for Lebanese. Palestinians born in 
Lebanon and officially registered are excluded 
from this law. Some professions previously 
reserved for Lebanese (construction, electricity, 
sales, carpentry, blacksmiths…) are now 
accessible to Syrians. The MoL has the authority 
to exclude some foreigners from the decree 
based on several criteria. 
ü ü  
MoL Resolution No.1/1 
(2012) 
The resolution specifies how a foreigner, married 
to a Lebanese or born to a Lebanese mother, 
can obtain a work permit. 
ü ü ü 
Decree No. 1658 Article No. 
5 regulating the medicine 
profession (1979) 
The permit to practise medicine is granted to 
Arab non-Lebanese doctors under the same 
conditions that apply to any Lebanese (a degree 
from an accredited university, passing the 
Colloquium exam, etc.) if there is a reciprocity 
agreement between Lebanon and the country of 
origin of the doctor. 
ü  ü 
(Cont’d.) 
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Lebanon (cont’d.) 
 Law applies to: 
Syrian PRS Iraqi 
Right to Work 
Law No. 42 Article No. 5 
regulating the attorney 
profession (1991) 
To practise in Lebanon a lawyer needs to have 
held Lebanese citizenship for at least 10 years. 
ü ü ü 
Law No. 636 Article No. 4 
regulating the engineering 
profession (1997) 
Non-Lebanese Arab engineers may practise if: 
he/she abides by the conditions for a Lebanese 
engineer, a reciprocity condition exists with the 
country of origin, he/she has the right to practise 
the engineering profession in their country of 
origin, he/she holds a residence card, a work 
permit and resides in Lebanon. 
ü  ü 
Right to property/rent 
Law No. 296 Article No. 1 
and Article No. 7 (2001) 
A non-Lebanese may not acquire any real estate 
in Lebanon unless he obtains a licence given by 
decree issued by the Council of Ministers upon 
the proposal of the Minister of Finance. It is only 
possible to obtain this license if the requester 
has citizenship issued by a recognised state. As 
a result, Palestinian refugees are not allowed to 
own property. The acquired real estate area 
should not exceed 3,000 m2. The total area of 
non-Lebanese possessions should not exceed 
3% of total Lebanese area (or 3% of every 
Caza’s area and 10% of Beirut governorate’s 
area). 
ü  ü 
Law No. 160 (1992) The law grants any person the right to rent. ü ü ü 
Source: (ACAPS, 2013) 
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Jordan 
 Law applies to: 
Syrian PRS Iraqi 
Right to Work 
Labour Law No. 8 (1996) 
with amendments until Law 
No. 26 (2010) 
The Minister of Labour has the authority to 
license the establishment of special recruitment 
offices to regulate the recruitment and 
employment of non-Jordanian workers in any 
sector approved by the Council of Ministers and 
consistent with the objectives of the Ministry and 
its policy of providing job opportunities to 
Jordanians (Article No.3). The Minister may 
issue any necessary instructions to regulate the 
introduction and employment of non-Jordanian 
workers (Article No.5). The law requires the 
employer to meet several criteria before hiring a 
foreign worker. The hiring request is sent to the 
recruitment office for approval after if it satisfies 
the conditions. After obtaining the approval of 
the Minister (or representative), the work permit 
is issued. 
ü ü ü 
Resolution on list of 
professions not allowed to 
non-Jordanians workers 
(2010) 
16 professions are reserved for Jordanians. 
These are medical, engineering, administrative, 
accounting and clerical professions, telephones 
and warehouses works, sales, education, 
hairdressing, decorations, fuel sales, electricity 
and mechanical occupations, guards, drivers 
and buildings’ workers. 
   
Regulation No. 36 amending 
the regulation of fees of work 
permits for non-Jordanian 
workers (1997) 
The employer needs to pay specified fees for 
issuing or renewing a yearly work permit for 
every Arabic and non-Arabic worker. 
ü ü ü 
Instructions and conditions of 
the hiring non-Jordanian 
workers in the Qualified 
Industrial Zones (2007) 
Every employer who wants to hire a non-
Jordanian worker in the qualified industrial zones 
must submit a written request to the Ministry 
Commissioner to the investment desk in the 
promoting investment institution explaining the 
details of the company and the worker 
ü ü ü 
Law No. 13 of Jordan 
Doctors’ Syndicate (1972) 
Arab doctors can work in Jordan if they are 
registered in any Syndicate of an Arabic country 
and with a license to practise provided his/her 
country abides by the reciprocity principle. 
ü  ü 
Lawyers Syndicate Law No. 
11 (1972) 
To practise the profession, any lawyer needs to 
have held Jordanian citizenship for at least 10 
years. 
ü ü ü 
(Cont’d.) 
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Jordan (cont’d.) 
 Law applies to: 
Syrian PRS Iraqi 
Right to Work 
Engineering Syndicate Law 
No. 15 (1972) 
Any Arabic engineer needs to be registered 
within the relevant register for foreigners in the 
Syndicate after fulfilling certain criteria (like 
his/her country of origin respecting the 
reciprocity principle; having practised the 
profession for the last 7 years, etc.). 
ü  ü 
Investment Law No.68 
(2003) 
Any non-Jordanian person is entitled to invest in 
Jordan in accordance with the conditions 
determined under a system issued for this 
purpose and that determines the allowed sectors 
and subsectors of investment, as well as the 
maximum rate of participation or contribution and 
the minimum foreign capital. 
ü ü ü 
Right to property/rent 
Law of rent and sales of 
immovable property to non-
Jordanians No. 47 (2006) 
An Arabic person can own immovable property 
for housing purposes based on the approval of 
the relevant authorities, and in accordance with 
the: approval of the General Director of Lands 
and Areas if the property is not more than two 
houses and an office, consent of the finance 
minister upon the recommendation of the 
Director for more than two houses and an office 
such that the land area allocated for this purpose 
does not exceed 10 acres. 
ü ü ü 
Law of rent and sales of 
immovable property to non-
Jordanians No. 47 (2006) 
Non-Jordanian people can rent property for 
employment or housing. If the land to be rented 
is larger than 10 acres and for a period of more 
than three years, the approval of the Minister of 
Interior or his designee is recommended. 
ü ü ü 
Source: (ACAPS, 2013) 
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Appendix B Systematic search strategy for 
academic literature 
This review systematically searched and collected academic literature relevant to the topic. 
The following steps provide a summary of this process: 
1. Download and save bibliographic details including the abstracts of 408 references in 
Research Information Systems (RIS) format. 
2. Import the saved RIS files were into Zotero (https://www.zotero.org/), an open-source 
reference management software. 
3. Use Zotero’s functionality/feature to identify and then remove 50 duplicate references. 
Because the searches were done in three separate databases it was not possible to 
avoid the same study being selected from multiple sources. 
4. Apply inclusion/exclusion criteria based on titles and abstracts and apply Zotero tags 
accordingly. Three researchers were involved in this and the inclusion/exclusion 
decisions for all studies were confirmed by at least two of them. This first screening 
approved 162 studies for inclusion. 
5. In addition to the online/database searches, 72 studies separately identified as 
relevant (using snowball review method or previous exposure to the literature) were 
also included at this stage. 
6. The included studies were accessed physically or online. Only 11 studies were not 
accessible. 
7. All documents were saved in an online shared platform (Microsoft SharePoint) and 
were screened after a full document read. At this stage 47 studies were excluded. 
8. Remaining studies (176) were all included and analysed/synthesised as part of the 
academic review. 
The use of electronic databases is an important part of this process which can be 
systematised by carefully documenting the search terms used for that purpose. The choice of 
search terms used in electronic searches was made bearing in mind two opposite objectives. 
Firstly, there was the need to capture all relevant studies, or to minimise the probability of 
excluding relevant studies during electronic searches. Secondly, there was the need to 
minimise the probability of including irrelevant studies in electronic search results, to keep a 
tab on the cost of the review. A higher number of irrelevant studies in electronic searches 
increases the costs because they then need to be excluded at a later round of searches. The 
preliminary searches revealed that five sets of search terms are relevant for this review. 
1. Host countries: “Jordan” and “Lebanon” 
2. Populations: “refugees”, “displaced”, “forced migrants” and “hosts” 
3. Nationality of refugee/displaced populations: “Syrian”, “Iraqi” and “Palestinian” 
4. Urban terms: “Urban”, “City”, “town” and “municipal” 
5. Thematic areas: “hospitality”, “registration”, “shelter”, “settlement”, “camp”, “housing”, 
“economic participation”, “labour”, “work”, “citizen”, “right”, “policy”, “residency”, 
“permit”, “migrant”, “curfew”, “guarantor”, “sponsor”, “screening”, “transit”, “border”, 
“regime”, “evict”, “wellbeing”, “welfare”, “social cohesion” 
In addition, depending on the search engine, we also restricted the search for papers written 
in English and in the last 20 years. The above five sets of search terms were combined in a 
single main search term: 
First Set AND Second Set AND Third Set AND (Fourth Set OR Fifth Set) 
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The following databases were searched: Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar. The 
final search terms and strategies are described below: 
Scopus 
When using Scopus, we further restricted the search to cover articles, in press articles, 
books and book chapters only. 
( DOCTYPE ( ar OR ip OR bk OR ch ) AND LANGUAGE ( english ) AND PUBYEAR > 1997 
AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( leban* OR jordan* ) AND ( refuge* OR displace* OR “forced 
migrants” OR host* ) AND ( syria* OR iraq* OR palestin* ) AND ( ( urban OR city OR cities 
OR town* OR municipal* ) OR ( hospitality OR registration OR shelter* OR settlement* OR 
camp* OR hous* OR “economic participation” OR labour* OR labor* OR work* OR citizen* 
OR right* OR policy OR policies OR residency OR permit* OR migrant* OR curfew* OR 
guarantor* OR sponsor* OR screening OR transit OR border* AND regime* OR evict* OR 
wellbeing OR welfare OR “social cohesion” ) ) ) ) 
Web of Science 
The following databases available in Web of Science were included in this search: 
● Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED) – 1900–present 
● Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) – 1900–present 
● Arts & Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI) – 1975–present 
● Book Citation Index – Science (BKCI-S) – 2005–present 
● Book Citation Index – Social Sciences & Humanities (BKCI-SSH) – 2005–present 
● Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI) – 2015–present 
The following search term was implemented in the “advanced search” option in Web of 
Science. 
(TS=((leban* OR jordan* ) AND ( refuge* OR displace* OR “forced migrants” OR host*) AND 
( syria* OR iraq* OR palestin* ) AND (( hospitality OR registration OR shelter* OR 
settlement* OR camp* OR hous* OR “economic participation” OR labour* OR labor* OR 
work* OR citizen* OR right* OR policy OR policies OR residency OR permit* OR migrant* 
OR curfew* OR guarantor* OR sponsor* OR screening OR transit OR border* AND regime* 
OR evict* OR wellbeing OR welfare OR “social cohesion” ) OR ( urban OR city OR cities OR 
town* OR municipal*)))) AND LANGUAGE: (English) 
Indexes=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, BKCI-S, BKCI-SSH, ESCI Timespan=1998–2017 
Google Scholar 
This engine searches for all the content, including title, journal name, author, etc. As a result, 
papers authored by “Jordan” as well as all publications published in “Journal of Refugee 
Studies”, “Refugee Quarterly”, etc., are selected, irrespective of whether they cover topics 
relevant for this study. There is, however, an abstract searching facility which covers only the 
previous year. We decided to use this facility even though it covered only the previous year  
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as: (1) it eliminates thousands of studies that get selected when alternative methods are 
used; and (2) we assume that older studies are sufficiently covered in Scopus and Web of 
Science. 
● with all of the words “Syrian refugee Jordan” 
with at least one of the words “urban urbanisation urbanization city cities town 
municipal municipality mayor” 
Press “Sort by date” then select “Abstracts” 
39 
● with all of the words “Syrian refugee Lebanon” 
with at least one of the words “urban urbanisation urbanization city cities town 
municipal municipality mayor” 
Press “Sort by date” then select “Abstracts” 
33 
Import the above two sets of results into Zotero, one page at a time. Then 19 duplicates were 
deleted leaving 39+33–20=52 Google Scholar studies. 
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Appendix C Stakeholder maps 
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Appendix D Statistical comparison across 
five cities in Jordan 
Chi-Square test on overall similarity across 5 cities 
 Value Significance Level 
Feel like part of this community 6.886 0.549 
Access shelter causes tension in community 11.736 0.019* 
Overall impression of Neighbours 9.751 0.283 
Satisfaction with municipal services 73.115 0.000* 
*Significant at 5 per cent level. 
Chi-Square test on pair-wise similarity across 5 cities 
 Al-Mafraq Az Zarqa Irbid Jerash  
Feel like part of this community 0.76 0.831 0.642 0.884 Ajloun 
 0.230 0.039 0.216 Al-Mafraq 
  0.916 0.971 Az Zarqa 
   0.695 Irbid 
Access shelter causes tension in 
community 
0.094 0.626 0.815 0.941 Ajloun  
 0.65 0.004* 0.001* Al-Mafraq 
  0.617 0.336 Az Zarqa 
   0.521 Irbid 
Overall impression of Neighbours 0.235 0.193 0.379 0.269 Ajloun 
 0.700 0.295 0.45 Al-Mafraq 
  0.077 0.109 Az Zarqa 
   0.789 Irbid 
Satisfaction with municipal services 0.157 0.867 0.102 0.004* Ajloun  
 0.040* 0.000* 0.000* Al-Mafraq 
  0.004* 0.000* Az Zarqa 
   0.086 Irbid 
*Significant at 5 per cent level. 
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Appendix E Shortlist of Impact initiative’s 
primary datasets 
 
Assessment 
date 
Assessment name Brief description 
Dec-16 Comprehensive Food Security 
Monitoring Exercise (CFSME) 
2016 
An annual exercise conducted for WFP to assess: 
(1) current levels of refugee food security; (2) how 
these have changed from last year; and (3) review 
how many and who are the most vulnerable 
refugees. This then informs WFP targeting, the 
prioritisation of families and households for urgent 
assistance. 
Nov-16 Youth Assessment: Za’atari and 
Azraq Camps 
Assessment of youth (15–32) to understand access 
to youth services (both social and professional) and 
looks at how these impact wellbeing. 
Oct-16 Women Working: Jordanian and 
Syrian Refugee Women’s 
Labour Force Participation and 
Attitudes Towards Employment 
Understand women’s participation in the labour 
market and women’s perceptions on employment, 
as well as factors that might be preventing women 
from employment.  
Feb-16 USAID Community Engagement 
Project: Baseline Assessment 
USAID CEP seeks to contribute to increased 
community resilience and support social cohesion in 
host communities. USAID CEP is a five-year activity 
which aims to achieve this goal by building 
community cohesion and enhancing the resilience of 
communities to more effectively address evolving 
challenges. The assessment sought to understand 
community members’ perceptions of different 
aspects of social cohesion and community 
resilience, in order to provide a baseline for USAID 
CEP’s implementation. 
Jan-16 Jordan Emergency Services and 
Social Resilience Project 
(JESSRP): Monitoring Study 1 
JESSRP aims to strengthen the capacity of 
municipalities by investing in social infrastructure 
and supporting visible and tangible improvements at 
the municipal level. The monitoring study builds 
upon the baseline assessment and outlines the 
findings of the first monitoring round of the nine 
initial treatment municipalities which have received a 
series of investments through the project. 
Sep-15 Migration Trends and Patterns of 
Syrian Asylum Seekers 
travelling to the European Union 
Qualitative assessment to understand push and pull 
factors for migration of Syrian refugees from the 
Middle East to Europe in 2015. 
May-15 Mapping of Higher Education 
Needs and Opportunities for 
Syrian Refugees 
Identify immediate priorities, challenges, needs and 
mitigation measures related to education access, 
with a particular focus on capacities and needs of 
Syrian refugee children aged 6–17, as well as 
exploring issues facing youth aged 18 to 24. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Appendix E (cont’d.) 
Assessment 
date 
Assessment name Brief description 
Jul-15 Comprehensive Food Security 
Monitoring Exercise (CFSME) 2015 
An annual exercise conducted for WFP to 
assess (1) current levels of refugee food security 
(2) how these have changed from last year and 
(3) review how many and who are the most 
vulnerable refugees. This then informs WFP 
targeting, the prioritisation of families and 
households for urgent assistance. 
May-15 Social Cohesion in Host 
Communities in Northern Jordan 
REACH implemented an evaluation of support 
provided to municipalities in northern Jordan. 
This follow-up builds upon the previous 
assessment (see: Understanding Social 
Cohesion in 2014) by analysing the findings from 
the household baseline component of this 
evaluation and through exploring potential 
drivers of tensions in the medium to long term 
between host communities and the refugee 
population, and between community residents 
and local services providers.  
May-15 Jordan Emergency Services and 
Social Resilience Project 
(JESSRP): Baseline Study 
JESSRP aims to strengthen the capacity of 
municipalities by investing in social infrastructure 
and supporting visible and tangible 
improvements at the municipal level. 
Investments in social infrastructure aim to 
support community and recreational centres; 
increase information-sharing between 
municipalities and citizens; promote town hall 
meetings and accountability mechanisms for 
municipalities. Visible and tangible improvements 
refer to physical improvements such as 
increased street lighting; road rehabilitation; solid 
waste issues.  
Jun-14 Livelihoods, Employment and 
Tensions in Jordanian Communities 
Hosting Syrian Refugees 
Thematic assessment report to understand how 
tensions in host communities have emerged as a 
result of the Syrian refugee crisis. 
Jun-14 Access to Healthcare and Tensions 
in Jordanian Communities Hosting 
Syrian Refugees 
Thematic assessment report to understand how 
tensions in host communities have emerged as a 
result of the Syrian refugee crisis. 
Jun-14 Housing and Tensions in Jordanian 
Communities Hosting Syrian 
Refugees 
Thematic assessment report to understand how 
tensions in host communities have emerged as a 
result of the Syrian refugee crisis. 
Jun-14 Perceptions of External Support 
and Tensions in Jordanian 
Communities Hosting Syrian 
Refugees 
Thematic assessment report to understand how 
tensions in host communities have emerged as a 
result of the Syrian refugee crisis. 
Jun-14 Access to Water and Tensions in 
Jordanian Communities Hosting 
Syrian Refugees 
Thematic assessment report to understand how 
tensions in host communities have emerged as a 
result of the Syrian refugee crisis. 
Jun-14 Education and Tensions in 
Jordanian Communities Hosting 
Syrian Refugees 
Thematic assessment report to understand how 
tensions in host communities have emerged as a 
result of the Syrian refugee crisis. 
Aug-14 Syrian Refugees Staying in Informal 
Tented Settlements in Jordan 
Multi-sector needs assessment of ITS 
households in Jordan. 
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